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Preface
The dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters in the area of quantitative finance. The
first chapter is related to the modeling of LIBOR rates and the pricing of interest rate derivatives.
The second chapter is related to the valuation of real options in the presence of non-diversifiable
risk and the third chapter deals with the valuation of executive stock options and the embedded
risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation contracts. An executive summary of each of the
three chapters is provided below.
Chapter 1: Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model: Pricing and Joint Estimation of the Cap
Surface and Swaption Cube (2012), joint work with Prof. Markus Leippold
One of the main challenges in term-structure modeling and derivatives pricing, is the specification
of a LIBOR market model which is flexible enough to capture the joint dynamics of the implied
volatilities of caps and swaptions. In the paper, we take up this challenge and design a novel and
parsimonious Le´vy LIBOR market model to jointly price caps and swaptions. Having access to
a unique data set of implied volatilities of the cap surface1 and the swaption cube2 spanning the
financial crisis 2007/08 we provide a comprehensive analysis of the joint pricing and estimation of
our model. The model successfully matches important empirical features of the cap implied volatility
surface and swaption cube. Specifically, we find a high degree of integration for longer maturity
1The cap surface, refers to the implied volatilities of caps indexed by the option maturity and the strike.
2The swaption cube, refers to implied volatilities of swaptions indexed by the expiry date of the option, the strike
rate, and the tenor of the underlying swap.
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caps and swaptions. We speculate, that this is due to the fact, that financial institutions and other
investors primarily trade longer-dated caps and swaptions for hedging their duration exposure in
the financial markets. Finally, we find a weakening link between actual and implied volatilities with
mortgage backed security refinancing activity after the Fed’s intervention and a strengthening link
with the European sovereign debt crisis.
The originality of this work is rich. On a theoretical level, our model improves upon recent
contributions to the literature (e.g., Jarrow, Li, and Zhao (2007) and Trolle and Schwartz (2009)).
Furthermore, the choice of modeling co-sliding forward swap rates together with our model design
allows for pricing formulae for caps and swaptions which are market-consistent with the Black model.
On an empirical level, we provide a first comprehensive analysis of the joint pricing and estimation
of a LIBOR market model to the cap and swaption market by incorporating information from the
whole swaption cube.
One of the key challenges when designing a model to capture the joint dynamics of caps and
swaptions over a period of extreme market turmoil, such as the financial crisis 2007/08, is the
trade-off between model parsimony versus pricing performance. There are indications in the data,
that extending the instantaneous volatility specification, e.g., to follow a two-state Markov chain
would improve the pricing performance. This observation is consistent with evidence in White and
Rebonato (2008) but would render the model intractable in terms of estimation. In the post-crisis
period, financial market participants started to price and quote interest rate derivatives using dif-
ferent curves for projecting the cash flows and discounting (e.g. Mercurio (2009)). An interesting
avenue for future research would be to incorporate this new practice into the model framework but
it would bring along some additional model complexity.
Chapter 2: Strategic Investment and Optimal Portfolio Choice under Incomplete Markets (2012)
The aim of this paper, is to analyze how non-diversifiable risk and strategic considerations re-
garding technology adoption affect individuals’ investment timing decision to become entrepreneurs
x
and their optimal portfolio choice. To make progress on this issue, I develop a continuous-time
real option model under incomplete markets where two risk-averse individuals strategically have
to decide whether to adopt an existing technology or whether to wait for the arrival of a future
technological innovation.
I show that the impact of non-diversifiable risk on the option timing decision is ambiguous
and depends on the arrival intensity of the future technology. Consequently, non-diversifiable risk
may accelerate or delay the optimal investment decision compared to complete markets. Moreover,
higher risk-aversion leads to delayed preemption under incomplete markets whereas the impact
on the follower’s investment timing is ambiguous. Finally, I show that strategic considerations
regarding technology adoption play a central role for the optimal portfolio choice in the presence
of non-diversifiable risk. According to the model, not only current entrepreneurs being exposed to
non-diversifiable income risk from managing a business should hold more conservative risky asset
allocations (e.g., Heaton and Lucas (2000) for empirical evidence) it may also apply to prospective
entrepreneurs.
The originality of this research, is that it challenges common predictions on investment timing
from traditional real option models under complete markets. Most papers in the real option literature
rely on the assumption that either the underlying real asset is directly traded or its risk profile can
be spanned by trading existing financial assets. In reality, most real assets are not traded in the
capital markets and their risk characteristics may at best be partially spanned by the universe of
traded financial assets thus leading to incomplete markets. Recently some theoretical development
has been made in the literature to extend real option models to incomplete markets. However,
strategic considerations regarding investment by other individuals and arrival of future technological
innovations have not yet been studied in this literature. One limitation of the model, however,
relates to the utility function adopted due to analytical tractability. Future studies may explore
more realistic utility specifications. Another interesting dimension to develop would be to make the
innovation process endogenous within the model.
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Chapter 3: Managerial Incentives to Take Asset Risk (2012), joint work with Prof. Marc Chesney
and Prof. Alexander F. Wagner
The aim of this paper, is to investigate managerial incentives to take asset risk. We make
progress on this issue by addressing two questions: First, how powerful are a typical manager’s
incentives to take asset risk and to increase firm value? Second, can asset risk-taking incentives
add to our understanding of the cross-sectional variation of asset risk-taking in the financial crisis
2007/08? We answer these questions using descriptive analysis and cross-sectional regressions. The
write-downs incurred by the financial institutions during the financial crisis 2007/08 serve as our
dependent variable and the incentive to take asset risk acts as our prime explanatory variable in
addition to a range of control variables.
We show that managerial incentives to take asset risk can be large compared to incentives to
increase firm value. Moreover, we find that stock holdings can induce substantial asset risk-taking
incentives, challenging the common belief regarding the central role of stock options as inducing
risk-taking behavior. Finally, we find that incentives to take asset risk help explain asset risk-taking
of U.S. financial institutions before the 2007/08 crisis. Using equity risk-taking incentives, instead,
one may conclude that incentives do not explain risk-taking.
The originality of this research is that it challenges the traditional approach used in the litera-
ture to proxy managerial risk-taking incentives. In particular, by relying on the compound option
pricing model of Geske (1979), our approach allows for a rethinking of risk-taking incentives in
financial markets. For a sample of financial institutions where leverage plays a key role, we em-
pirically document the merits of our approach. One limitation of our approach, relates to limited
sample under investigation. A future analysis, may fruitfully extend our sample to include industrial
companies and also adopt more general measures of risk-taking. This would altogether, facilitate
more advanced econometric techniques that would allow for statements regarding potential causal
effects.
xii
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Chapter 1
Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model: Pricing
and Joint Estimation of the Cap Surface and
Swaption Cube
joint work by Markus Leippold and Jacob Strømberg

Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model: Pricing and Joint
Estimation of the Cap Surface and Swaption Cube∗
Markus Leippold† Jacob Strømberg§
Abstract
We propose a novel time-changed Le´vy LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) market model
for jointly pricing of caps and swaptions. The time changes are split into three components. The
first component allows matching the volatility term structure, the second generates stochastic
volatility, and the third accommodates for stochastic skew. The parsimonious model is flexible
enough to accommodate the behavior of both caps and swaptions. For the joint estimation we
use a comprehensive data set spanning the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010. We find that, even
during this period, neither market is as fragmented as suggested by the previous literature.
JEL-Classification: C51, E43, G13.
Keywords: LIBOR market models; Time-changed Le´vy process; Caps volatilities; Swaption cube;
Unscented Kalman filter.
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Chapter 1: Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model
I. Introduction
We introduce a novel time-changed Le´vy LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) market model
(LMM) that is analytically tractable and parsimonious. Yet, it is flexible enough to jointly and
consistently price caps and swaptions in an efficient way. For the period spanning the financial crisis
of 2007 to 2010, we perform a comprehensive empirical analysis of our model. We make use of a
unique data set of implied volatilities of the cap surface and the entire swaption cube. The swaption
cube refers to the implied volatilities of swaptions indexed by the expiry date of the option, the
strike rate, and the tenor of the underlying swap. Previous endeavors on the joint pricing of caps
and swaptions restrict their swaption data to at-the-money (ATM) quotes. However, we incorporate
all information contained in non-ATM volatilities for estimating the model.1 To our best knowledge,
this is the first paper that develops and estimates a model that jointly prices the whole swaption
cube and the caps implied volatility surface.
To design our theoretical model, we start with a preliminary data analysis of the cap volatility
surface and the swaption cube. We then introduce three distinct model devices to match the stylized
features of the data. The first component is a Brownian motion combined with a parametric function,
which allows us to capture the volatility term structure. The second component is a time-changed
Brownian motion that generates stochastic volatility. Correlating the time change with the changes
in the LIBOR gives us additional flexibility to match implied volatility skews. The third component
is a time-changed jump process with asymmetric upward and downward jumps. This component
allows us to accommodate variations in volatility skews over time. Hence, these three components
not only match different characteristics of the implied volatilities, but also allow for a parsimonious
parameterization. The parsimony is crucial for both efficient pricing and model estimation.
The modeling approach we take belongs to the general class of time-changed Le´vy processes.
1Data on the swaption cube have not been available to researchers until recently. To our knowledge, Trolle and
Schwartz (2013) are the first to systematically analyze data from the swaption cube.
4
Chapter 1: Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model
Our motivation to use this class lies in its generality.2 On the one hand, Le´vy processes can
generate almost any return innovation distribution and they can account for potential discontinuities
in the LIBOR dynamics.3 On the other hand, applying time changes randomizes the innovation
distribution of LIBORs over time. Imposing suitable time changes allows us to match volatility
term structure effects, to generate stochastic volatility, and to accommodate for stochastic skew.
While the literature on Le´vy term structure models has been exclusively concerned with presenting
a theoretically consistent no-arbitrage framework for pricing derivatives, no guidance has been given
on the empirical performance of these models. We fill this gap and bring our time-changed Le´vy
model to the data.
We estimate our model using a maximum likelihood method joint with the unscented Kalman
filter. Analyzing our parameter estimates, we find a strong negative correlation between changes in
volatility and changes in LIBORs. This negative correlation could be driven by hedging activities
in the market for mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Previous literature argues that, as interest
rates drop and borrowers prepay their mortgages, the increasing hedging activity of government-
sponsored institutions, such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), could lead to an increase in interest rate
volatilities, particularly for longer maturities.4
To examine whether the markets of caps and swaptions are integrated during the recent financial
crisis, we carefully analyze the characteristics of the pricing errors. Our empirical analysis suggests
that caps and swaptions markets are well integrated during the financial crisis, especially when
2Le´vy models, but without time changes have been adopted for modeling interest rates within the class of LMMs
by, e.g., Eberlein and Raible (1999), Eberlein and Ozkan (2005), Eberlein and Kluge (2006), and Eberlein and Liinev
(2007).
3Several papers have empirically shown the need for incorporating jumps in interest rates, e.g., Babbs and Webber
(1997), Das (2002), El-Jahel, Lindberg, and Perraudin (1997), and Johannes (2004).
4Duarte (2008) shows that the inclusion of prepayment speed as an additional factor in the LIBOR model of
Longstaff, Santa-Clara, and Schwartz (2001) significantly reduces the pricing error of ATM swaptions. These results
are further corroborated by Li and Zhao (2009). However, hedging demand from the MBS market could have decreased
when on January 5, 2009 the Fed began purchasing fixed rate mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae (Government National Mortgage Association).
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we look at contracts with intermediate and longer maturities. In contrast, several papers find
segmentation between the two markets.5 Such findings are more likely driven by the rigidity of the
model used, because our parsimonious and yet flexible model can accommodate the variations of
the two markets very well.
We proceed as follows. In Section II, we describe the data and present a preliminary data
analysis on the implied volatilities of caps and the swaption cube, which guide our model design.
We introduce the time-changed Le´vy LIBOR model in Section III and show how to construct the
family of forward LIBOR and swap rates. In Section IV, we adopt the fast Fourier transform (FFT)
technique to price interest rate derivatives within our Le´vy framework. In Section V, we present
our estimation strategy based on the unscented Kalman filter. In Section VI, we present the results
of our estimation exercise, and Section VII concludes.
II. Data analysis
We obtain the cap and floor implied volatility mid-quotes on the US dollar three-month forward
LIBOR from Bloomberg (ICAP), covering a wide range of strikes and maturities. The implied
volatility quotes are available for ten fixed maturities that include every year from one to ten years.
At each date and maturity, we have seven fixed strike levels, including 1.5%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%,
and 7% and also one floating strike level at the money. We obtain the swaptions implied volatility
data from BGC Partners.6 The ATM swaption quotes were collected for option maturities equal to
three and six months and one, two, three, four, five, seven, and ten years. These option maturities
are combined with swap terms of one, two, three, four, five, seven, and ten years. We end up with a
total of 63 ATM swaptions implied volatility quotes per observation day. For out-of-the-money and
in-the-money volatilities, we collect option maturities equal to three months, one year, five years,
5See, e.g., Jagannathan, Kaplin, and Sun (2003), Longstaff, Santa-Clara, and Schwartz (2001), Brigo and Mercurio
(2002), Driessen, Klaassen, and Melenberg (2003), and Fan, Gupta, and Ritchken (2003).
6BGC Partners, Inc. is a leading global intermediary for wholesale financial markets, specializing in brokering a
broad range of financial products, including fixed income and interest rates. For a further description of the swaption
cube, including liquidity issues, refer to Trolle and Schwartz (2013).
6
Chapter 1: Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model
and ten years. These option maturities are combined with swap terms of two, five, and ten years,
spanning strikes of ±{25, 50, 100, 200} basis points away from the ATM swaption quotes.
Our data set spans the period from August 8, 2007 to August 11, 2010, covering three years of
data. This includes the recent financial crisis and thus serves as an interesting period over which
to test our model. For the estimation period, we consider weekly data sampled on Wednesdays to
avoid weekday effects. The summary statistics of the LIBORs and swap rates are well documented.
Therefore, we focus on the behavior of the cap and floor and swaptions implied volatility quotes
along three important dimensions: moneyness, maturity (of the option as well as the swap), and
time.
II.1. Time-series dynamics of the implied volatilities of ATM caps and swaptions
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the implied volatilities of ATM caps and swaptions spanning our
data sample period. Significant time variation exists in the implied volatilities for both caps and
swaptions. From levels of around 20% before the crisis, the implied volatilities increased dramati-
cally, reaching levels above 100% for the shorter-dated option maturity contracts. Because implied
volatilities are quoted under the Black (1976) model, which assumes log-normally distributed for-
ward LIBORs and swap rates, this increase might not only result from markets being more volatile,
but also from interest rates going down.
The implied volatilities in the two markets exhibit similar co-movements over time. This behavior
is natural because caps and swaptions essentially share the same underlying quantity. The forward
swap rates driving swaption prices can be viewed as a weighted sum of forward LIBORs, which drive
cap prices. The correlation of the one-year caps and swaptions ATM implied volatilities is 95% over
our sample period. Furthermore, the average correlation between the ATM implied volatilities of
caps and swaptions across all option and swap maturities averages 84%. However, the correlation
decreases with increasing maturity of the underlying swap. Hence, swaps with longer maturities
carry some term structure information that is not contained in the LIBOR underlying the cap
7
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Figure 1. Time variation in caps and swaptions at-the-money (ATM) implied volatilities. The
figure shows the time-variation in ATM cap (Panel A) and swaption (Panel B) implied volatilities
in percentage points. For caps, we use option maturities of one (solid line), two (dashed line),
five (dash-dotted line), and ten years (dotted line). For swaptions, we use option maturities of
three months, one year, five years, and ten years, for a one year swap term. The data are weekly
(Wednesday), spanning our entire data sample from August 8, 2007 to August 11, 2010; in total,
158 weeks.
prices. Nevertheless, the strong co-movement at shorter swap maturities suggests these two markets
should be analyzed jointly, as they could be significantly integrated.
II.2. Volatility term structure across option maturities
When we analyze swaption data, we have two different maturity dimensions: the maturity of the
option contract and the maturity or tenor of the underlying swap. We discuss only the option
maturity dimension and keep the swap tenor fixed.
In Fig. 2, we plot the evolution of the volatility term structure for ATM caps (Panel A) and
for ATM swaptions on a one-year swap (Panel B). During our sample period, the term structure of
volatilities is usually monotonically decreasing for both caps and swaptions. Also, the term structure
for caps tends to be higher than for swaptions. However, both curves exhibit from time to time a
8
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Figure 2. Evolution of implied volatility term structures. Panel A shows the evolution of the at-
the-money (ATM) volatility term structure for caps implied volatilities in percentage points across
the one- to ten-year option maturities. Panel B shows the evolution of the ATM volatility term
structure for swaptions implied volatilities across the three-month to ten-year option maturities for
the one-year swap tenor.
hump-shaped term structure. Hence, as indicated in Fig. 2, term structure shapes for both markets
could simultaneously share similar patterns through time. If this is the case, then a joint estimation
using data from both markets could facilitate identification of the model.
II.3. Cap and swaptions implied volatility smile/skew across moneyness
For our graphical analysis of implied volatilities across moneyness, we use a quadratic fit to the
quoted implied volatilities, for which we standardize the moneyness d by
d ≡ lnK/S(t, T )
ATMV (t, T )
√
T − t , (1)
where K is the strike rate level, S(t, T ) denotes the swap rate of the corresponding maturity (spot
for caps and forward starting for swaptions), ATMV (t, T ) is the ATM implied volatility quote,
and T − t denotes the option’s time-to-maturity. Because the cap is a portfolio of caplets, the
9
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moneyness for different caplets differs due to differences in both maturities and underlying forward
rates. Hence, for caps, the above definition of moneyness represents an aggregate approximate
measure. We perform a quadratic fit as follows:
IV = â+ b̂ d+ ĉ d2 + . (2)
The slope estimate b̂ measures the implied skewness, and the curvature estimate ĉ captures the
implied kurtosis in the distribution of the underlying rate. The estimate â captures the average level
of the implied volatilities and  denotes the residual between the actual implied volatility quotes
and the quadratic fit.
Fig. 3 plots the caps and swaptions implied volatility smiles and skews at an arbitrary day
together with their average shapes. On November 28, 2007 (Fig. 3, Panels A and B), the implied
volatilities exhibit significant skewness at each maturity. November 28, 2007 is just at the onset of
the financial crisis. At the time, significant uncertainty existed about the current and future levels
of the forward LIBOR, which drives the amount of interbank lending. The relatively high caps
implied volatilities for low strikes indicate that financial institutions were demanding caps with low
strikes, presumably as an insurance or hedge against future hikes in the LIBOR.
A similar pattern, although to a lesser extent, emerges in Panel B for swaption prices. Here, we
plot the implied volatilities for swaptions on the five-year swap. These volatilities are quoted at a
lower level than the corresponding volatilities for caps, which corresponds to the intuition that the
LIBOR underlying the cap should be more volatile than the swap rate, as it has a shorter maturity
(three months). Nevertheless, it seems that, on that particular day, both markets shared the same
qualitative characteristics in terms of the volatility shape. This observation is confirmed when we
look at the average shapes of the implied volatilities across moneyness in Panels C and D of Fig.
3. They are all negatively skewed for both markets. The cap volatilities are higher on average than
the swaption volatilities. Furthermore, they tend to have a more pronounced skew and, at least for
the caps volatilities with one-year maturity, the implied volatility has a slight smile pattern.
10
Chapter 1: Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 215
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Moneyness
Im
pl
ie
d 
vo
la
tili
ty
Panel A: Caps November 28, 2007
−2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
15
20
25
30
35
40
Moneyness
Im
pl
ie
d 
vo
la
tili
ty
Panel B: Swaptions November 28, 2007
−2 −1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 20
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Moneyness
Im
pl
ie
d 
vo
la
tili
ty
Panel C: Average implied caps volatilities
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 10
10
20
30
40
50
60
Moneyness
Im
pl
ie
d 
vo
la
tili
ty
Panel D: Average implied swaptions volatilities
Figure 3. Cap and swaptions implied volatility smiles and skews across moneyness. In Panel A,
we plot caps implied volatility smiles in percentage points on November 28, 2007. The four lines
in Panel A correspond to four maturities: one year (solid line), two years (dashed line), five years
(dash-dotted line), and ten years (dotted line). Circles are data points; lines are quadratic fits. In
Panel B, we plot swaptions implied volatility smiles on November 28, 2007, for a five-year swap
tenor. The four lines in each panel represent four option maturities: three months (solid line), one
year (dashed line), five years (dash-dotted line), and ten years (dotted line). In Panels C and D, we
plot the corresponding implied volatility smiles for caps and swaptions when averaged across our
whole data sample.
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II.4. Dynamic properties of the caps and swaptions implied skew and curvature
For our model design, we could gain further insights into the properties of caps and swaptions
dynamics by analyzing the slope and curvature of the implied volatilities over time. As in Subsection
2.3, we summarize each caps and swaptions implied volatility smile by three quantities: its level â,
its slope b̂, and its curvature ĉ from the quadratic fit in Eq. (2) normalized by the ATM volatility
level.
In Fig. 4, we plot the time series behavior of the slope and curvature of caps and swaptions
implied volatility for an option maturity of five years. For the underlying swap, we consider a tenor
of two years. Panel A shows a cap volatility skew that is systematically higher than the swaption
skew. Nevertheless, they move in the same direction. Hence, we can conclude that the forward rate
as well as the swap rate exhibit negative skewness and that their skewness is highly correlated.
By inspection of Panel B, we find that the curvature behaves slightly differently. At the beginning
of the sample period, the curvature of the caps is lower than that of the swaptions. In particular,
the time series plot indicates that the forward rates did not have much excess kurtosis until January
2008. In the subsequent period, the excess kurtosis increased steadily to levels similar to the excess
kurtosis of the two-year swap rate. Furthermore, the variation in the caps’ curvature, and hence
in the forward rate’s excess kurtosis, is much more pronounced. Nevertheless, the curvature for
the implied volatilities of caps and swaptions seems to be correlated as well. Repeating the same
calculations across different option maturities, swap tenors, and moneyness, we observe that the
correlations between skew and curvature are substantial, especially for intermediate and long option
maturities.
Hence, by incorporating information from the whole swaption cube, we do not necessarily have to
introduce a large number of additional factors to fully capture the moneyness and the two maturity
dimensions. Instead, given the high co-movement, especially across the maturity dimensions, the
swaption cube might improve the model identification when it comes to estimation.
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Figure 4. Time variation in caps and swaptions implied volatility skew and curvature. The figure
plots the time series of the normalized slope and curvature of the caps and swaptions implied
volatility smile. In Panel A, we plot the implied volatility skew of a five-year cap (solid line) and
for a five-year swaption to enter into a two-year swap (dashed line). In Panel B, we plot, for the
same contracts, the time series of the corresponding curvatures. The caps and swaptions skews and
curvatures have been fitted using weekly (Wednesday) data, spanning the period from August 8,
2007 to August 11, 2010.
II.5. Principal component analysis
Now that we have analyzed the data across different maturities and levels of moneyness, the next
step is to analyze how many factors are needed to jointly describe the caps and swaptions data in the
cross-sectional and time series dimension. We do so by using a principal component analysis (PCA).
As in Heidari and Wu (2003), we first perform a PCA of the LIBOR and swap rates to identify
the common factors driving the yield curve.7 Once we have extracted the common factors from
the interest rate market, we regress the caps and swaptions implied volatilities on the yield curve
factors. We use the regression residuals to perform another PCA to identify the common factors
driving the implied volatilities. Finally, we regress the caps and swaptions implied volatilities on
7However, we do not introduce their modification to explicitly account for the sharp difference in liquidities between
the interest rate market and the swaptions market.
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both the yield curve and the common volatility factors.
Table I. Principal component analysis (PCA).
Number of term structure and volatility factors (m,n)
(1,1) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2) (2,3) (3,1) (3,2) (3,3)
Caps 89.7 94.9 93.3 97.4 98.0 95.0 97.7 98.3
ATM swaptions 89.6 92.0 91.2 93.8 94.6 94.1 95.9 96.6
Non-ATM swaptions 86.0 89.2 87.7 92.0 93.6 91.6 94.6 96.1
Total 88.5 92.1 90.8 94.4 95.4 93.6 96.1 97.0
R2 values (in percentages) are from regressing the implied volatilities of caps and swaptions on the yield
curve factors and the volatility factors. We obtain the yield curve factors from a PCA on LIBORs (London
Interbank Offered Rates) and swap rates. The volatility factors are obtained from a PCA on the residuals of
regressing the implied volatilities on the yield curve factors. The table shows the R2 values (in percentage)
for different factor combinations (m,n), where m is the number of yield curve factors and n is the number
of volatility factors. The numbers are averaged for caps, at-the-money (ATM) swaptions, and non-ATM
swaptions. We base our analysis on weekly data sampled on Wednesdays, spanning the period August 8,
2007 to August 11, 2010.
Table I shows the resulting R2 values. Because we have in total 161 time series of implied
volatilities, we take averages across caps, ATM swaptions, and non-ATM swaptions. We analyze
different factor combinations (m,n), where m is the number of yield curve factors and n is the
number of volatility factors. On average, a model with one term structure and one volatility factor
already explains 88.5% of the variance in caps and swaptions implied volatilities. However, especially
for non-ATM swaptions, models that do not include more than three factors cannot explain more
than 90% of the variation. When we add factors, the explained variation for all implied volatilities
increases well above 93%. The (3, 3)-model with three term structure and three volatility factors
explains 97%. This result is very close to the findings in Heidari and Wu (2003). However, they
analyze only ATM swaptions data.
We also see from Table I that the (3, 2)-model with three term structures and two volatility
factors does a reasonably good job in explaining the variation across the different markets. The
14
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Table II. Explained variation for swaptions across option maturities and swap tenors for the
(3,2)-model.
Panel A: R2 for ATM swaptions
Option maturity
Swap tenor 3 m 6 m 1 y 2 y 3 y 4 y 5 y 7 y 10 y
1 y 94.4 97.0 97.4 95.4 95.9 95.3 95.1 94.3 91.9
2 y 94.9 96.7 96.3 95.7 96.0 95.7 95.7 95.4 92.1
3 y 95.6 96.1 96.9 96.8 96.5 96.5 96.1 96.0 91.4
4 y 95.4 96.8 97.8 97.4 97.2 97.0 96.6 96.0 90.8
5 y 95.1 97.4 98.1 97.7 97.6 97.3 96.9 95.7 90.3
7 y 96.5 97.9 98.4 97.8 97.6 97.2 96.7 95.1 90.8
10 y 95.8 97.0 97.7 97.4 97.1 96.6 95.9 94.2 91.3
Panel B: R2 for non-ATM swaptions
Option maturity Swap tenor
Moneyness 3 m 1 y 5 y 10 y 2 y 5 y 10 y
0.90 93.1 97.3 96.0 90.0 92.6 94.8 94.9
0.95 93.3 97.5 96.2 91.0 93.1 95.3 95.2
1.05 93.5 97.6 96.3 91.7 93.4 95.6 95.3
1.10 93.5 97.5 96.2 92.2 93.6 95.8 95.3
Panel A shows the R2 values from regressing the (3,2)-model with three term structure and two volatility
factors on at-the-money (ATM ) swaptions volatilities. Panel B shows the corresponding R2 values for non-
ATM volatilities. We base our analysis on weekly data sampled on Wednesdays, spanning the period August
8, 2007 to August 11, 2010.
total variation explained is above 96% and for non-ATM swaptions close to 95%. Therefore, for
the sake of parsimony, we content ourselves with designing a model that is based on two instead of
three volatility factors. To further validate such a factor structure, we can break down the explained
variation across the different caps and swaptions implied volatilities for the (3, 2)-model. Because
this model already explains 97.7% of the variation in caps implied volatilities, in Table II, we present
the results only for the swaptions volatilities.
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Table II shows the R2 values for swaptions across different option maturities and swap tenors
(Panel A) and across different levels of moneyness (Panel B). For the ATM swaptions in Panel A,
we find the comforting result that all entries are above 90%. The performance of the (3, 2)-model
struggles most for the ten-year option maturity with some values only slightly above 90%. We also
note that the R2 values are more stable across swap tenors than across option maturities, which
indicates that the volatility factors could act differently mainly along the option maturity dimension,
while their impact along the swap tenor dimension is relatively flat. Again, this observation is in
line with Heidari and Wu (2003). For the non-ATM swaptions in Panel B, we find a similar pattern.
For a given level of moneyness and if compared across option maturities, the variation of the R2
values is larger than the variation of R2 values across swap tenors. However, even for non-ATM
swaptions, the R2 values never fall below 90% for the (3, 2)-model.
III. The specification of the Le´vy LIBOR market model
Guided by the stylized features of the caps’ implied volatility surface and the swaption cube, we
next introduce our term structure model. Instead of starting from instantaneous forward rates or
zero-coupon bond prices, we begin directly with the specification of the forward LIBORs and model
them as Le´vy processes. To describe the tenor structure of the forward LIBORs, we consider a
fixed set of increasing and equidistant maturities T0, T1, . . . , Tn with δ ≡ Tj+1 − Tj for all j. The
maturity Tn denotes the terminal maturity and the tenor δ is typically three months. We assume the
existence of an initial strictly positive and decreasing term structure of zero-coupon bonds, P (0, T ),
for T ∈ (0, Tn]. We denote by L(0, Tj) ≡ L(0;Tj , Tj+1) the forward LIBOR contracted at date t = 0
for the period [Tj , Tj+1] defined by
L(0, Tj) ≡ 1
Tj+1 − Tj
(
P (0, Tj)
P (0, Tj+1)
− 1
)
, j = 0, . . . , n− 1. (3)
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III.1. Model design
We consider a complete filtered probability space {Ω,FTn , (Ft)0≤t≤Tn ,P} with the augmented filtra-
tion (Ft)0≤t≤Tn satisfying the usual conditions. As it is convenient to price interest rate derivatives
under the so-called T -forward measure Qn ∼ P, we specify the dynamics of the forward LIBOR
directly under Qn. Under this measure, L(t, Tn−1) is a martingale on the interval [0, Tn−1] and we
assume that it has the representation
L(t, Tn−1) = L(0, Tn−1) exp
(∫ t
0
bQn(s, Tn−1, Tn)ds+
∫ t
0
dXs
)
, (4)
where
Xs =
∫ t
0
λ(s, Tn−1)dBQns +
∫ t
0
√
V Ws dW
Qn
s +
∫ t
0
∫ 0
−∞
x
(
µ−(ds, dx)− piQn
J−(x)dxν
J
s ds
)
+
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
x
(
µ+(ds, dx)− piQn
J+
(x)dxνJs ds
)
(5)
is a nonhomogeneous Le´vy process. The term bQn(t, Tn−1, Tn) in Eq. (4) denotes a deterministic
drift, which we need to specify in such a way that the forward LIBOR L(t, Tn−1) becomes a Qn-
martingale. We decompose the random shocks in the above forward LIBOR dynamics into different
types. First, we introduce continuous shocks by two standard Brownian motions BQnt and W
Qn
t ,
for which we assume dBQnt dW
Qn
t = 0. Second, we introduce discontinuous shocks Jt, for which we
allow a separate specification of positive jumps J+t and negative jumps J
−
t , i.e., Jt = J
+
t + J
−
t .
By µ+(dt, dx) and µ−(dt, dx), we denote the counting measures for upward and downward jumps,
respectively. By piQn
J+
(x) and piQn
J−(x), we denote the corresponding Le´vy densities, which characterize
the jump structure under Qn. The arrival rate of upward jumps of size x at time t is governed by
piQn
J+
(x)νJt . Hence the Qn-compensator for upward jumps becomes pi
Qn
J+
(x)dxνJt dt. The compensator
for downward jumps has the same form, but with piQn
J+
(x) replaced by piQn
J−(x).
8
8A similar specification of the jump components has recently been proposed by Carr and Wu (2011) for modeling
equity index options.
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III.1.1. Time changes
The specification of the LIBOR in Eqs. (4) and (5) is a nonhomogenous Le´vy process under Qn, de-
fined by its time-dependent local characteristic triplet. This time dependency can also be interpreted
through the following time changes:
T Bt =
∫ t
0
λ(s, Tn−1)2ds, T Wt =
∫ t
0
V Ws ds, T Jt =
∫ t
0
νJs ds. (6)
We can specify these three components separately. First, we specify the time changes T Wt and T Jt
through their activity rates under Qn:
dV Wt = κW (θW − V Wt )dt+ σW
√
V Wt dW˜
Qn
t , dW
Qn
t dW˜
Qn
t = ρdt (7)
and
dνJt = κJ(θJ − νJt )dt+ σJ
√
νJt dZ
Qn
t , (8)
where W˜Qnt and Z
Qn
t are Qn-Brownian motions. We assume that the instantaneous correlation
between the time changes of the jump and the continuous component is zero. The specification
in Eqs. (7) and (8) dictates that stochastic volatility enters our model via two different sources:
(1) the time change of the Brownian motion WQnt and (2) the stochastic activity rate of jumps
νJt . Furthermore, to account for a potential leverage effect, we allow the instantaneous correlation
between the activity rate V Wt and the Brownian motion W
Qn
t to be nonzero.
In addition to the time changes T Wt and T Jt , we introduce a purely deterministic time change
T Bt governed by the parametric functional form of λ(t, Tn−1). By choosing a functional form such
as
λ(t, Tj) = (β1 + β2(Tj − t)) exp(−β3(Tj − t)) + β4, (9)
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we can ensure not only sufficient flexibility for the volatility function to match potentially hump-
shaped patterns (see, e.g., Rebonato, McKay, and White, 2009), but also analytical tractability.9
III.1.2. Jump process
For the jump specification, we borrow the variance-gamma jump process from Carr and Wu (2007).
They propose a simple yet flexible specification for the Le´vy density that successfully reconciles the
properties of currency option skews. We split the Le´vy density under the terminal forward measure
Qn into a right-skewed jump component and a left-skewed jump component:
piQnJ (x) =
 pi
Qn
J+
(x) = λe
− x
ν+ x−1, x > 0
piQn
J− (x) = λe
− |x|
ν− |x|−1 , x < 0
, (10)
where λ, ν+, ν− > 0. Hence, we let the jump arrival rate decrease monotonically with increasing
jump size. The parameters ν+ and ν− control the scale of the positive and negative jumps. Applying
different scales allows us to capture any asymmetric discontinuous movements in the jump arrival
rate of the forward LIBOR. Because the characteristic exponent of the jump process in Eq. (10) is
available in closed form, our LIBOR model remains analytically tractable.
Before we continue with constructing the family of forward LIBORs and swap rates, note that our
additive structure not only ensures the analytical tractability of the characteristic exponent of the
underlying Le´vy process, which is crucial for deriving our pricing formulae, but the explicit mapping
of the various components, to capture specific properties of caps and swaptions implied volatilities,
also facilitates the economic interpretation of the model. First, we have seen in the preliminary data
analysis of Section II that we need a time-varying stochastic volatility in the underlying forward
LIBOR (see Fig. 1). We let the process Vt take care of this. Second, as Fig. 2 illustrates, we
also need a sufficiently general and flexible volatility function to capture various shapes of the
volatility term structure, such as monotonically decreasing and hump-shaped forms. Therefore,
9Note that limt→T λ(t, T ) = β1 + β4 and limT→∞ λ(t, T ) = β4. Furthermore, the maximum of the volatility curve
occurs at a T ∗, where T ∗ = 1/β3 − β1/β2.
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we have chosen the functional form of λ(t, T ) as in Eq. (9). Third, Fig. 3 provides evidence
for implied volatility smiles and skews in both the caps and swaptions market, underscoring the
importance of allowing for a nonzero correlation between innovations to the forward rates and its
underlying stochastic volatility (see, e.g., Casassus, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2005)). Fourth,
the findings in Fig. 4 call for a model that can match both the persistent fat-tail behavior and the
strong time variation in the skewness (specifically for short option maturities) of the forward-neutral
distribution of the forward log-LIBOR. The fat-tail behavior could be captured by including a jump
component into the underlying forward rate dynamics. As Carr and Wu (2007) remark, standard
jump-diffusion models have difficulty in generating strong time variation in the risk-neutral skewness.
By randomizing the clock for the Le´vy jump component as we do in our model specification, we can
introduce stochastic skewness into the underlying distribution of the forward log-LIBOR. Finally,
the principal component analysis (see Subsection II.5) indicates that our model specification should
be rich enough to match the data across the dimensions of the option maturity, the swap tenor, and
the moneyness in both the caps and swaptions market. Hence, while keeping the model parsimonious
with three term structure factors and two volatility factors, each model device has its own individual
role in matching the stylized facts of caps and swaptions volatilities.
III.1.3. Market price of risk
To capture the observed time series dynamics under the historical measure (represented by P), we
need to specify the different market prices of risk related to each stochastic component in our model.
However, because the forward LIBOR and swap rate processes under the measure P are not relevant
for option pricing, we leave the market price of return risk unspecified and focus on the activity
rate processes. For simplicity, we assume constant market prices of risk for the activity rates. In
particular, we define the measure change from the terminal forward LIBOR measure Qn to P by
dP
dQn |Ft
= E
(
−γV W˜T Wt
)
E
(
−γνZT Jt
)
. (11)
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III.2. Constructing the family of forward LIBOR rates
In the representation of the forward LIBOR L(t, Tn−1) in Eqs. (4) and (5), the deterministic term
bQn(t, Tn−1, Tn) corresponds to a convexity-adjustment related to the Brownian motions and to the
jump components, respectively. For any j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, L(t, Tj) has to be a martingale under
the Tj+1-forward measure Qj+1, which we can ensure by a corresponding adjustment of the term
bQj+1(t, Tj , Tj+1). Proposition 1 shows how this martingale property can be enforced.
10
Proposition 1. The forward LIBOR L(t, Tj) is a martingale under the Tj+1-forward measure for
j = 0, . . . , n− 1 if the following drift condition is satisfied:
bQj+1(t, Tj , Tj+1) = −1
2
λ2(t, Tj)− 1
2
V Wt −
∫ ∞
−∞
(ex − 1− x)piQj+1J (dx)νJt . (12)
Proposition 1 allows us to express the martingale dynamics of the forward LIBOR L(t, Tj) under
the Tj+1-forward measure by
dL(t, Tj)
L(t, Tj)
= λ(t, Tj)dB
Qj+1
t +
√
V Wt dW
Qj+1
t +
∫ 0
−∞
(ex − 1)
(
µ−(dt, dx)− piQj+1
J− (x)dxν
J
t dt
)
+
∫ ∞
0
(ex − 1)
(
µ+(dt, dx)− piQj+1
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
)
, (13)
subject to the activity rate processes in Eqs. (6) to (9) and the jump specification given in Eq. (10)
under the appropriate forward measure.
For a recursive backward construction of the family of forward LIBORs L(t, Tj) under their
corresponding forward measures Qj+1, we have to switch between different forward measures. For
that purpose, we need to know how the components of the nonhomogenous Le´vy process Xt must
be adjusted for different forward measures. Proposition 2 shows how to do so.11
Proposition 2. For each j = 2, . . . , n, the forward measure defining the martingale dynamics of
10We relegate all proofs to Appendix A.
11For regularity conditions, we refer to Eberlein and Ozkan (2005).
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the family of forward LIBORs is related to the terminal forward measure Qn by
dB
Qj−1
t = dB
Qn
t −
n+1−j∑
k=1
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
λ(t, Tn−k)dt, (14)
dW
Qj−1
t = dW
Qn
t −
n+1−j∑
k=1
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
√
V Wt dt, (15)
and
pi
Qj−1
J ν
J
t =
n+1−j∏
k=1
(
1 +
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
(ex − 1)
)
piQnJ ν
J
t , (16)
where V Wt , ν
J
t , λ(t, Tj), and pi
Qn
J are defined in Eqs. (7) to (10).
Next, we need to find the change of measure of the activity rate dynamics under the forward
measures Qj+1 governing the stochastic volatility V Wt that affects the Brownian motion Wt due to
the nonzero correlation assumption. The result is given in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. The forward changes of measure related to the Brownian motion W˜Qj−1 of the
stochastic activity rate in Eq. (7) obey
dW˜
Qj−1
t = dW˜
Qn
t −
n+1−j∑
k=1
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
√
V Wt ρdt, j = 2, . . . , n. (17)
Propositions 2 and 3 provide us with the results necessary for the construction of the family of
forward LIBORs L(t, Tj)t∈[0,Tj ] driven by the nonhomogenous Le´vy process in Eq. (5) under their
corresponding forward measures Qj+1 for j = 0, . . . , n− 1.
III.3. Constructing the family of forward swap rates
For the construction of the forward swap rates, we assume a set of equally spaced reset dates
{T0, T1, . . . , Tn} with interval length δ. For a swap contract starting at date Tj , j = 1, . . . , n − N ,
the first settlement date is at time Tj+1 and the maturity date of the swap is TN+j . We fix the
22
Chapter 1: Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model
length N of the swap, but we let the starting date, and thus also the maturity, vary. We let
RNj (t) ≡ R(t;Tj , Tj+N ) denote the forward swap rate contracted at time t for the swap arrangement
over the period [Tj , Tj+N ]. In terms of zero bond prices, the swap rate equals
R(t;Tj , Tj+N ) =
P (t, Tj)− P (t, Tj+N )
δ
∑j+N
k=j+1 P (t, Tk)
=
P (t, Tj)− P (t, Tj+N )
St(Tj , Tj+N )
, j = 0, . . . , n−N. (18)
The term St(Tj , Tj+N ) =
∑j+N
k=j+1 δP (t, Tk) is often referred to as the present value of a basis point
or the sliding level process.12 In what follows, we make use of an approximate representation
of the swap rate. The representation, which is given in Proposition 4, helps us retain analytical
tractability.13
Proposition 4. The terminal co-sliding forward swap rate RNn−N (t) given by
RNn−N (t) ≈ RNn−N (0) exp
∫ t
0
n−1∑
k=n−N
ω˜k(0)dXs + drift
 (19)
is a QNn−N+1-martingale.14 The weights
ω˜k(0) =
ωk(0)L(0, Tk)
RNj (0)
, (20)
with ωk(0) =
P (0,Tk+1)∑j+N
k=j+1 P (0,Tk)
, are obtained by freezing the coefficients to their initial values. Under
12See, e.g., Bjork (2004).
13We use an approximation based on freezing the coefficients together with an approximation of exponential func-
tions. The technique of freezing the coefficients is well established and has been tested for its quality by, e.g., Brigo
and Mercurio (2006, Chapter 8). For details, refer to Appendix A.
14The drift in Eq. (19) has to be adjusted in such a way that RNn−N (t) is a QNn−N+1-martingale. Because it has no
impact on the pricing, we leave it unspecified.
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the terminal co-sliding forward swap measure QNn−N+1, we have
Xs =
∫ t
0
λ(s, Tk)dB
QNn−N+1
s +
∫ t
0
√
V Ws dW
QNn−N+1
s +
∫ t
0
∫ 0
−∞
x
(
µ−(ds, dx)− piQ
N
n−N+1
J− (x)dxν
J
s ds
)
+
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
x
(
µ+(ds, dx)− piQ
N
n−N+1
J+
(x)dxνJs ds
)
. (21)
The jump intensity under QNn−N+1 becomes
pi
QNn−N+1
J (x)ν
J
s = e
ϕ2xpiQnJ (x)ν
J
s (22)
for J = {J−, J+}, and the activity rate dynamics are
dV Wt =
(
κW θW − κ˜QNn−N+1V Wt
)
dt+ σW
√
V Wt dW˜
QNn−N+1
t (23)
dνJt = κJ(θJ − νJt )dt+ σJ
√
νJt dZ
QNn−N+1
t , (24)
with κ˜Q
N
n−N+1 = κW −ϕ2σWρ for a given N , and where ϕ2 is defined in Lemma A.2 of Appendix A.
The above specification of the forward swap rates with fixed N is also referred to as a co-sliding
forward swap rate model.15 This specification facilitates the estimation and calibration of our
model to actual market quotes, and, most important, it is consistent with our previous construction
of forward LIBORs. The forward LIBORs L(t;Tj , Tj+1) coincides with the one-period forward swap
rate over the interval [Tj , Tj+1]. Hence, we can view the LIBOR market model as a subclass of the
co-sliding forward swap rate model with N = 1 corresponding to the three-month tenor. For a given
length of the swap tenor N we can, with minimal effort, adjust all measure change results from
Subsection III.2 and apply them to the co-sliding forward swap rate model. In contrast, if we were
to specify a swap market model based on, e.g., the co-terminal swap rate, the theoretical results and
15See, e.g., Musiela and Rutkowski (2005), Chapter 13.5.
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the numerical implementation would become substantially more involved and cumbersome.16
From the specification of the co-sliding forward swap rate in Proposition 4, we can start the
backward construction of the entire family of co-sliding forward swap rates. But because the co-
sliding forward swap rate in Eq. (19) is an exponential of nonhomogenous Le´vy processes under the
appropriate co-sliding forward swap rate measure, the calculations are essentially similar to those
for the LIBOR model. Therefore, we omit the details of the construction of the family of co-sliding
forward swap rates. The explicit calculations can be obtained upon request.
IV. Pricing interest rate derivatives
For pricing interest rate derivatives, we adopt the FFT technique introduced for stock options by
Carr and Madan (1999).
IV.1. Pricing caps
A cap contract is a sum of a number of basic contracts known as caplets. Each caplet can be viewed
as a call option on the underlying forward LIBOR such that the time t value of the cap with maturity
Tn and strike K can be represented by
Capt(K,Tn) =
n−1∑
j=0
P (t, Tj+1)E
Qj+1
t
(
δ(L(Tj , Tj)−K)+
)
(25)
under the forward measure Qj+1. We can write the time t price of a caplet on the forward LIBOR
L(Tj , Tj) with strike K and maturity Tj as
Ct(K,Tj) = δP (t, Tj+1)E
Qj+1
t
[
(L(Tj , Tj)−K)+
]
= δP (t, Tj+1)E
Qj+1
t
[
(e
YTj − ek)+
]
, (26)
16 Eberlein and Liinev (2007), derive measure change formulae for a Le´vy swap rate model based on co-terminal
forward swap rates. Galluccio, Ly, Scaillet, and Huang (2007) show that the LIBOR market model is the only
admissible model of a co-sliding type.
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where k = lnK and
YTj = lnL(t, Tj) +
∫ Tj
t
bQj+1(s, Tj , Tj+1)ds+
∫ Tj
t
dXs. (27)
The drift bQj+1(t, Tj , Tj+1) is given in Proposition 1. To calculate cap prices, we make use of
the complex valued measure change as developed in Carr and Wu (2004). Furthermore, for the
characteristic exponent of the convexity-adjusted jump component of the Le´vy process ψ
Tj+1
J (u)
under the measure Qj+1, we apply the widely used freezing coefficients approach. The result is
given in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The time t price of the caplet given in Eq. (26) can be calculated by
Ct(k, Tj) =
e−zik
pi
δP (t, Tj+1)
∫ ∞
0
e−izrk
φYTj (zr − izi − i)
(izr + zi)(izr + zi + 1)
dzr. (28)
The characteristic function φYTj (·) of the nonhomogenous Le´vy process YTj is given by
φYTj (u) = E
Qj+1
t
(
exp
(
iuYTj
))
(29)
= L(t, Tj)
iu exp
[
−1
2
(
iu+ u2
)∫ Tj
t
λ(s, Tj)
2ds− aW (τ)− bW (τ)Vt − aJ(τ)− bJ(τ)νJt
]
,
(30)
where τ = Tj − t and the coefficients aW (τ), bW (τ), aJ(τ), and bJ(τ) are given by
ai(τ) =
κiθi
σ2i
[
2 ln
(
1− γi − κˆi
2γi
(
1− e−γiτ
))
+ (γi − κˆi) τ
]
, (31)
and
bi(τ) =
2ψi(u)
(
1− e−γiτ)
2γi − (γi − κˆi) (1− e−γiτ ) , γi =
√
κˆ2i + 2σ
2
i ψi(u). (32)
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For the index i ∈ {W,J} and
ψi(u) =
 ψW (u) =
1
2(iu+ u
2) if i = W
ψ
Qj+1
J (u) if i = J
, κˆi =
 κ
M
j if i = W
κJ if i = J
, (33)
with κMj = κW −
∑n−j−1
k=1
δL(0,Tn−k)
1+δL(0,Tn−k)
σWρ− iuσWρ, and
ψ
Qj+1
J (u) ≈
∫
R0
(
1− eiux
) n−1−j∏
k=1
(
1 +
δL(0, Tn−k)
δL(0, Tn−k) + 1
(ex − 1)
)
piQnJ dx. (34)
The characteristic exponent ψ
Qj+1
J (u) can be recursively calculated in closed form starting from
the terminal measure Qn. The term
∫ Tj
t λ(s, Tj)
2ds can also be calculated in closed form. Therefore,
our model specification allows closed form solutions for pricing caps and floors (up to a single
integration), which enables us to use FFT methods efficiently.
IV.2. Pricing swaptions
A payer swaption (PS) is a call option that allows us to enter into an interest rate swap agreement
at some future time. The term “payer” refers to the fixed leg of the contract, such that, when we
enter into a swap agreement, we receive the floating leg and pay the fixed leg. We consider a payer
swaption on the forward swap rate RNj (Tj) with strike K. The value under the co-sliding forward
swap measure QNj+1 at time t is
PSt(Tj , Tj+N ,K) =
j+N∑
k=j+1
δP (t, Tk)E
QNj+1
t
[
(RNj (Tj)−K)+
]
(35)
= St(Tj , Tj+N )E
QNj+1
t
[
(RNj (Tj)−K)+
]
, (36)
for j = 0, 1, . . . , n − N . Under the measure QNj+1, the forward swap rate RNj (t) is a martingale.
Because we work under the approximate swap rate derived in Proposition 4, we use the pricing
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formula
PSt(Tj , Tj+N ,K) ≈ St(Tj , Tj+N )EQ
N
j+1
t
[(
e
Y˜Tj − ek
)+]
, (37)
where k = lnK and
Y˜Tj = lnR
N
j (t) +
∫ Tj
0
j+N−1∑
k=j
ω˜k(0)dXs + drift , (38)
and where the weights ω˜k(0) are given in Eq. (20). Because the precise specification of the drift in
Y˜Tj is not relevant for the option pricing formula, we simply write it as drift.
17 The price of a payer
swaption is given in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The time t price of a payer swaption with maturity Tj on the swap rate R
N
j (Tj)
with strike K is approximately given by
PSt(k, Tj , Tj+N ) ≈ e
−zik
pi
St(Tj , Tj+N )
∫ ∞
0
e−izrk
φ
Y˜Tj
(zr − izi − i)
(izr + zi)(izr + zi + 1)
dzr. (39)
The characteristic function φ
Y˜Tj
(·) of Y˜Tj is given by
φ
Y˜Tj
(u) = E
QNj+1
t
(
exp
(
iuY˜Tj
))
(40)
= exp
−1
2
(
iu+ u2
)∫ Tj
t
j+N−1∑
k=j
ω˜k(0)λ(s, Tk)
2 ds

× RNj (t)iu exp
(
−aW (τ)− bW (τ)Vt − aJ(τ)− bJ(τ)νJt
)
, (41)
17Again, for the derivation of the swaption price in the Proposition 6, we make use of the freezing coefficients
technique.
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where τ = Tj − t. The coefficients aW (τ), bW (τ), aJ(τ), and bJ(τ) are given by
ai(τ) =
κiθi
σ2i
[
2 ln
(
1− γi − κˆi
2γi
(
1− e−γiτ
))
+ (γi − κˆi) τ
]
(42)
and
bi(τ) =
2ψi(u)
(
1− e−γiτ)
2γi − (γi − κˆi) (1− e−γiτ ) , γi =
√
κˆ2i + 2σ
2
i ψi(u), (43)
and, for the index i ∈ {W,J},
ψi(u) =
 ψW (u) =
1
2(iu+ u
2) if i = W
ψ
QNj+1
J (u) if i = J
κˆi =
 κ
M
j if i = W
κJ if i = J
, (44)
with κMj = κW − ϕ2σWρ −
∑n−N−j
k=1
δRNn−N+1−k(0)
1+δRNn−N+1−k(0)
σWρ − iuσWρ. The characteristic exponents of
the convexity-adjusted jump component are given by the approximation
ψ
QNj+1
J (u) ≈
∫
R0
(
1− eiux
) n−N−j∏
k=1
(
1 +
δRNn−N+1−k(0)
1 + δRNn−N+1−k(0)
(ex − 1)
)
pi
QNn−N+1
J dx, (45)
where
pi
QNn−N+1
J (x) =
 λe
− x
ν¯+ x−1, x > 0
λe
− |x|
ν¯− |x|−1 , x < 0
, (46)
with ν¯+ =
ν+
1−ϕ2ν+ , ν¯− =
ν−
1+ϕ2ν− , and ϕ2 given in Lemma A.2 in Appendix A.
Again, not only can the term
∫ Tj
t
(∑j+N−1
k=j ω˜k(0)λ(s, Tk)
)2
ds be calculated in closed form, but
so can ψ
QNj+1
J (u). Furthermore, a special case of the above valuation formula is obtained for the case
N = 1. With N = 1, the swap rate is equal to the three-month LIBOR. Because for N = 1 the term
ϕ2 vanishes, the pricing result in Proposition 6 corresponds to the one in Proposition 5 for caplets.
Hence, in concluding this section, we can say that our flexible yet parsimonious time-changed Le´vy
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model allows analytical pricing for caps as well as for swaptions. Furthermore, the resulting formulae
are consistent with each other.
V. Estimation
Implied volatilities for caps and swaptions are quoted under the Black (1976) model, which assumes
log-normally distributed forward LIBORs and swap rates. To convert the implied volatility quotes
into the option prices used in the estimation, we need the zero-coupon bond prices (see also Appendix
B for details). We obtain from Bloomberg the US dollar forward LIBORs at maturities of one, two,
three, six, nine, and 12 months and US dollar swap rates with various maturities. Relying on the
Nelson and Siegel (1987) parametric form, we bootstraped the forward three-month forward LIBOR
curve.
For the estimation of our model, we follow other studies on pricing interest rate derivatives (e.g.,
Jarrow, Li, and Zhao, 2007) and define the moneyness of a contract as the ratio between the strike
and the ATM strike of the particular contract (cap or swaption). For caps we consider moneyness
spanning from 0.80 to 1.20 with intervals of 0.10. For swaptions, due to lower liquidity in the cross
section, we consider a range of moneyness from 0.90 to 1.10 with intervals of 0.05. In total, we end
up with 161 interest rate derivative quotes (50 cap and floor and 111 swaption quotes) spanning
three years of data (158 weeks), which yields a total of 25′438 quotes to be matched in the joint
estimation.
The model uses two state variables, namely, the activity rates Vt and νt, to capture the variation
of the implied volatility surface in the caps and swaptions market over time. To estimate the model
parameters, we cast the model into state space form by treating the state variables as hidden states.
The implied volatility quotes from the caps and swaptions market serve as observations with errors.
We employ a nonlinear filter, the unscented Kalman filter, to extract the levels of the states at each
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date in our sample.18 The model parameters are estimated by maximizing the likelihood defined on
the forecasting errors of option prices.
For the state space formulation, we treat the two activity rates as unobservable state variables.
Hence, their dynamics constitute the state propagation equations, which we formulate in discrete
time as
[Vt+1, νt+1]
′ = f (Vt, νt; Θ) +
√
Σεt+1, (47)
where
f (Vt, νt; Θ) =
 κW θW∆t+ (1− κPW∆t)V Wt
κJθJ∆t+ (1− κPJ∆t)νJt
 , Σt =
 σ2WV Wt 0
0 σ2Jν
J
t
∆t, (48)
with κPW = κW −σWγV and κPJ = κJ −σJγν . We denote by ∆t = 7/365 the weekly frequency of the
data we apply in the estimation. The term εt+1 denotes an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) bivariate standard normal innovation. For the measurement equation, we write
yt = h(Vt, νt; Θ) +
√
Ωet, (49)
where the vector yt contains the observed market prices of caps, floors, and swaptions at time t
scaled by their respective vega, i.e., their sensitivity to volatility changes. The function h(·) denotes
the model-implied option prices as a function of our parameter set Θ and the state vector [Vt, νt]
′.
To obtain cap, floor and swaption prices from the implied volatility quotes, we invert them by using
the Black (1976) model. Appendix B presents the details on how we compute the option prices from
the market data. We assume the pricing errors et, are independent and normally distributed with
zero mean and constant diagonal covariance matrix Ω.
18For a general treatment of unscented Kalman filters, see Wan and Van Der Merwe (2000) and Leippold and Wu
(2007) for an application to term structure modeling.
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To estimate the model parameters, we define the quasi log-likelihood value for each week’s
observation of the option prices assuming that the forecasting errors are normally distributed:
lt+1(Θ) = −1
2
ln
∣∣∣At∣∣∣− 1
2
((
yt+1 − yt+1
)> (
At+1
)−1 (
yt+1 − yt+1
))
, (50)
where y denotes the model-implied option prices and A denotes the covariance on the model-implied
option prices. We choose the model parameters to maximize the log-likelihood of the data series,
which is a summation of the weekly log-likelihood values
Θˆ ≡ arg max
Θ
L(Θ, {yt}Nt=1), with L(Θ, {yt}Nt=1) =
N−1∑
t=0
lt+1(Θ), (51)
where N = 158 is the number of weeks in our sample, Θ denotes the parameter set to be estimated,
and Θˆ denotes the optimal parameters. Our full model specification has 15 parameters,
Θ =
{
β1, β2, β3, β4, κW , θW , σW , κJ , θJ , σJ , ρ, ν+, ν−, γV , γν
}
, (52)
which govern the dynamics of the underlying forward LIBORs and swap rates and two state variables
{Vt, νt} to price the time series and cross-sectional behavior of 161 interest rate options each week
corresponding to a total of 25′438 contracts.
Despite its richness in economic structures and flexibility in allowing separate sources of volatility
variation, the model is very parsimonious in terms of the number of free parameters. In particular, its
parsimony and the large number of option prices available allow us to identify the model parameters
with strong statistical significance.
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VI. Results
In the following, we discuss our estimation results for the theoretical model developed in the previous
sections.
VI.1. Parameter estimates
Table III gives the parameter estimates together with their standard errors and the log-likelihood.
Consistent with our discussion in Subsection III.1, we find that a large and significantly negative
correlation parameter ρ is needed to fit the implied volatility skew in both the caps and swaptions
market. In the estimation we get ρ = −0.844. If we take the sample average of the activity rate
Vt, our estimated value of ρ implies a correlation between innovations in the forward rate and its
stochastic volatility of ρσWVt = −0.41.
Table III. Parameter Estimates.
κW 0.021 (0.000) κJ 0.773 (0.594) θW 0.065 (0.005) θJ 0.083 (0.058)
σW 0.773 (0.000) σJ 2.263 (0.066) ν+ 0.016 (0.000) ν− 0.018 (0.000)
γV -0.064 (0.033) γν -0.531 (0.000) β1 0.278 (0.004) β2 0.023 (0.019)
β3 0.666 (0.000) β4 0.085 (0.006) ρ -0.844 (0.000) σ
2
e 0.001 (0.000)
L -49,598
Reported are maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters, their standard errors (in parentheses),
and the log-likelihood value denoted by L. We estimate our model on weekly data of implied volatilities for
caps and swaptions sampled on Wednesdays, spanning the period August 8, 2007 to August 11, 2010.
As for the jump parameters ν+ and ν−, we find that they are highly significant. Hence, during
the financial crisis, jumps were an integral part of the forward rate dynamics, both in the forward
LIBORs and in the forward swap rates. As the asymmetry between negative and positive jump
sizes is small, we also estimated a restricted model with equal jump sizes. We find that, based on a
likelihood ratio test, we can reject it in favor of the unrestricted model.
33
Chapter 1: Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model
Turning to the risk premium parameter γV on the stochastic activity rate Vt, we get a moderate
value of −0.064, which, however, is statistically significant. In unreported results using caps data
only for the estimation, we were not able to generate an estimate for γV different from zero. Hence,
the inclusion of swaptions data clearly helps to identify the risk premium on stochastic volatility.
Compared with the risk premium parameter γV , the parameter for the jump risk premium γν
is much larger. Combining the market price of risk coefficient estimates with the extracted risk
factors, we can compute the instantaneous risk premium on the two risk factors, i.e., σWγ
V Vt
for the instantaneous variance rate and σJγ
ννt for the jump activity rate. When we take sample
averages for the activity rates, we get a mean risk premium value of -1% and -29%, respectively.
Hence, both the magnitude and the time variation of the jump risk premium clearly dominate that
of the variance risk premium.
Given the negative values for γV and γν , the mean reversion speed parameters κW and κJ
are both smaller under the terminal forward measure Qn than under the historical measure P.
Furthermore, the low Qn-values indicate a high persistence under the pricing measure. Under P,
the mean reversion speed of Vt still remains low (κ
P
W = 0.07), given the low volatility risk premium.
In contrast, for νt the mean reversion speed (κ
P
J = 1.97) suggests a more transient jump activity
rate under the historical measure. Finally, the estimated values βi that specify the deterministic
volatility function λ(t, T ) produce a downward sloping volatility curve with limt→T λ(t, T ) = 0.34
and limT→∞ λ(t, T ) = 0.08.
To gain intuition on the role of different parameters on the volatility surface, we shock some of
the estimated parameters that are of particular interest, namely, the correlation parameter ρ and the
jump sizes ν+ and ν−, respectively. As we want to see the parameters’ impact across the moneyness,
option maturity, and swap tenor dimensions, we focus only on the swaption cube. In Fig. 5, the
solid lines in each panel represent the implied volatilities of the swaption cube generated by our
model with all parameters set equal to their estimated values and the activity rates set equal to
their sample averages. For our analysis, we use swaption implied volatilities with an option maturity
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of one year and a swap tenor of five years.
We first analyze the impact of parameter shocks along the option maturity dimension. In Fig. 5,
Panels A and B display the responses of the swaption implied volatility to changes in ρ and ν±. In
Panel A, the implied volatility decreases sharply with maturity when we set ρ = 0 (dashed line). For
a larger (negative) correlation ρ = −0.5 (dash-dotted line), this decline is less dramatic. Hence, the
correlation parameter might serve as a mechanism not only to generate negative skew, but also to
generate persistency in the implied volatility along the option maturity dimension. Changes in the
jump sizes ν± have only a moderate effect on the implied volatilities as a function of option maturity.
Increasing ν+ to 0.05 and freezing ν− at zero (dashed line), the term structure is slightly shifted
downward. When we freeze ν+ at zero and let ν− increase to 0.05 (dashed-dotted line), the effect is
even smaller. When we symmetrically increase the jump sizes to ν± = 0.05 (dashed line with dots as
markers), the term structure across the option maturity dimension remains practically unchanged
compared with our current estimates, which are also almost symmetrical, but much smaller (0.016
and 0.018, respectively). Hence, along the option maturity dimension, the asymmetry between
positive and negative jumps has a larger effect than the absolute values of the jumps.
Next, we plot the same responses as above, but along the swap tenor dimension (Panels C and
D, Fig. 5). We see that a change in the correlation parameter ρ influences equally the implied
volatilities at different swap tenors. Hence, changes in ρ lead to a parallel shift of the term structure
and not to a shift in the steepness as in Panel A. Changes in the jump sizes ν± have, to a lesser extent,
the same effects. The impact is not as significant as in the case of ρ, but it is more pronounced than
the effect along the option maturity dimension in Panel B. In Panel D, an asymmetrical shock to the
jump sizes leads to a parallel downward shift, but when we symmetrically increase the jump sizes,
the term structure exhibits a parallel upward shift. This behavior corresponds to our intuition.
When we increase the negative jump parameter, future LIBORs tend to be lower. Through the
channel of the leverage effect, lower rates lead to higher volatilities. Similarly, when we increase ν+
the implicit volatility is lower.
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Finally, we plot the responses along the moneyness dimension (Panels E and F, Fig. 5). For
the correlation parameter, as expected, we cannot generate a negative skew with ρ = 0 (Panel E,
dashed line). The implied volatility curve becomes flat. When correlation turns negative, we obtain a
negative skew. While shocks in ν± have only moderate impacts along the term structure dimensions,
they do have a strong impact along the moneyness dimension (Panel F). When we increase ν−, the
implied volatility increases due to the link with the leverage effect and the implied volatility skew
becomes more negative (dash-dotted line). When we increase only ν+, volatility decreases and the
skew becomes flatter (dashed line). When we symmetrically increase the jumps sizes, the skew moves
in an almost parallel fashion. Hence, by splitting up the jumps sizes into negative and positive parts,
we can fine-tune the level and steepness of the skew along the moneyness dimension.19
To summarize the above analysis, the parameter ρ is essential for all three dimensions of the
swaption cube. Along the option maturity dimension, it governs the steepness of the term structure.
Along the swap tenor dimension, it influences the level of the term structure and, finally, along the
moneyness dimension it is essential to generate a negative skew. In contrast, the jump parameters
ν± do not play a significant role along the option maturity dimension. They play a moderate role
in the swap tenor dimension. Furthermore, the steepness of the negative skew is driven by the
magnitude of the negative shock ν− relative to ν+.
VI.2. Pricing errors
In Tables IV to VI we present the root mean squared pricing errors (RMSEs) and the mean pricing
errors (MPEs) on caps and swaptions implied volatilities, defined as the difference in percentage
points between the model-implied values and the market-implied volatility quotes. Overall, we find
that, for intermediate and long maturities, our model performs remarkably well. The cap pricing
errors in Table IV indicate that the model’s performance suffers mostly at the short end of option
19We also estimated the model on a restricted data set, neglecting the information from non-ATM swaptions. We
were not able to estimate the jump parameters with statistical significance. Hence, the crucial role of these parameters
as an important model device further supports the inclusion of non-ATM swaption quotes into the estimation.
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Figure 5. Response of swaption implied volatilities. Solid lines in each panel plot implied volatilities
in percentage points with all parameters set equal to their estimated values and the activity rates
set equal to their sample averages. In Panels A and B we fix the swap tenor to five years and show
the responses of the swaption implied volatility to changes in ρ and ν± as a function of the option
maturity. In Panels C and D, we do the same plot but as a function of the swap tenor and with an
option maturity fixed at one year. In Panels D and E, we fix the swap tenor to five years and the
option maturity to one year, and we plot the responses as a function of moneyness. In Panels A,
C, and E the dashed lines represent the case ρ = 0 and the dash-dotted lines, the case ρ = −0.5.
In Panels B, D, and F, the dashed lines correspond to (ν+ = 0.05, ν− = 0), the dash-dotted lines
to (ν+ = 0, ν− = 0.05), and the dashed lines with dots as markers to (ν+ = 0.05, ν− = 0.05). For
Panels A to D we use at-the-money swaptions.
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maturities, especially for the one-year maturity. Short maturity contracts are underpriced by the
model. However, the pricing performance considerably improves with increasing maturity. For
longer maturities, a tendency exists to underprice out-of-the money and overprice in-the-money
contracts.
Table IV. Pricing errors for the caps market
RMSE MPE
Maturity 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.20
1 y 16.86 18.62 20.15 20.30 22.03 -10.73 -11.08 -11.95 -12.32 -15.96
2 y 12.26 11.71 9.79 9.57 9.85 -8.64 -8.77 -6.99 -6.17 -7.01
3 y 8.78 6.75 4.75 4.19 4.02 -6.67 -5.15 -3.44 -2.52 -2.59
4 y 6.47 4.29 2.25 1.66 2.03 -4.81 -2.98 -1.40 -0.48 -0.06
5 y 4.98 2.94 1.35 1.26 2.18 -3.41 -1.67 -0.30 0.56 1.29
6 y 4.28 2.36 1.41 1.68 2.50 -2.63 -0.92 0.31 1.11 1.97
7 y 3.91 2.16 1.71 2.08 2.71 -2.07 -0.38 0.74 1.48 2.25
8 y 3.63 2.07 1.89 2.27 2.80 -1.71 -0.07 0.95 1.63 2.33
9 y 3.48 2.09 2.04 2.42 2.88 -1.35 0.20 1.15 1.79 2.41
10 y 3.37 2.15 2.18 2.54 2.95 -1.06 0.42 1.31 1.91 2.47
Reported are sample averages of the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) and mean pricing errors (MPEs)
for caps implied volatilities, defined as the difference in percentage points between the model-implied values
and the market-implied volatility quotes. Each row represents one cap maturity, and columns represent the
moneyness of the cap.
For the ATM swaptions implied volatilities in Table V, we observe a similar pattern. The model
struggles mostly for short option maturities and short swaption tenors, an observation that also
holds true for the non-ATM swaptions in Table VI. However, across moneyness no clear pattern
emerges in terms of over- and underpricing as is the case for in-the-money and out-of-the-money
caps.
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Table VI. Pricing errors for non-ATM swaptions
Maturities: RMSE MPE
Option Swap 0.90 0.95 1.05 1.10 0.90 0.95 1.05 1.10
3 m 2 y 1.72 10.69 7.39 13.28 -0.76 -7.89 2.24 4.82
3 m 5 y 11.37 12.09 5.26 12.59 -8.33 -8.52 1.01 9.44
3 m 10 y 9.66 11.79 4.92 9.64 -7.47 5.95 0.41 6.77
1 y 2 y 9.79 5.81 2.76 7.37 6.73 -3.43 1.62 6.02
1 y 5 y 5.01 6.41 1.51 5.96 -3.50 -3.57 0.97 4.41
1 y 10 y 5.05 3.81 1.19 4.27 -3.31 2.03 0.66 3.35
5 y 2 y 3.76 1.87 1.48 2.23 2.94 1.31 -0.79 -1.50
5 y 5 y 1.25 2.17 1.35 1.78 0.33 1.55 -0.31 -1.15
5 y 10 y 1.36 1.83 1.46 1.51 0.71 -1.17 -0.15 -0.79
10 y 2 y 1.54 1.86 1.62 2.45 -0.70 1.24 -0.53 -1.77
10 y 5 y 1.50 2.15 1.49 2.02 -0.31 1.58 0.26 -1.24
10 y 10 y 1.43 1.97 1.59 1.67 0.32 -1.09 0.55 -0.52
Reported are sample averages of the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) and mean pricing errors (MPEs) for
non-ATM swaptions implied volatilities, defined as the difference in percentage points between the model-
implied values and the market-implied volatility quotes. Each row represents one swaption maturity and one
swap tenor. Each column represents one level of moneyness.
The substantially higher pricing errors for the caps and swaptions market at shorter maturities
call for further investigation. Ultimately, the caps and swaptions markets must be closely connected,
as they both originate from derivatives written on the forward LIBOR. However, during periods of
extreme market turmoil, the two markets might exhibit different behaviors due to differences in
how the uncertainty regarding the intensified liquidity situation in the interbank market propagates
through the caps and swaptions markets. Therefore, we next analyze the behavior of the pricing
errors across time to see whether the caps and swaptions market become disintegrated or whether
they suffer from the same deficiencies.
In Fig. 6, we plot the time series of RMSE (Panel A) and the MPE (Panel B) for caps implied
volatilities. We split the time series into long maturities and short maturities. For the first period of
our data sample with the financial crisis already in full swing, the pricing errors in terms of RMSE
remain remarkably low. In addition, until October 2008, we do not observe a bias in the model’s
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Figure 6. Root mean squared error (RMSE) and mean pricing error MPE for caps with different
option maturities. Panels A and B show the RMSE and the MPE in percentage points across time
for caps implied volatilities of all maturities (solid line), for maturities up to three years (dash-dotted
line), and for maturities of four to ten years (dashed line). Data are weekly (Wednesday) spanning
our entire data sample August 8, 2007 to August 11, 2010; in total, 158 weeks.
pricing performance with the MPE close to zero. However, the pricing performance deteriorates
considerably around April 2009 with substantial underpricing of short maturity contracts. This
mispricing remains high until the end of our sample. Interestingly, this period of persistent mispricing
of short maturity contracts coincides with the period of high implied volatilities at these maturities
(see Fig. 1). Hence, our model suffers when the volatility term structure is unusually steep.
For the swaptions implied volatilities, we observe a similar pattern. Swaptions have two maturity
dimensions, the maturity of the swaption and the tenor of the swap. In Fig. 7, Panels A and B,
we analyze the pricing errors along the swap tenor dimension. The errors start to increase at the
same time as they do for the caps market. The underpricing of the swaptions on short tenor swaps
exhibit substantial and systematic underpricing after April 2009, although to a lesser extent than in
the caps market. In Fig. 7, Panels D and C, we analyze the pricing errors across option maturities.
There seems to be no systematic over- or underpricing. However, if we further split the data and
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plot the time series of short maturity swaptions with short swap tenors, the underpricing becomes
again large and systematic (Panel D, dotted line). As we show in our theoretical derivations, the
LIBOR is a special case of a swap rate with N = 1. Hence, it is not surprising that the pricing
performance of the model for swaptions with short swap tenors resembles the pricing performance of
the caps implied volatilities. When we calculate the correlation between the pricing errors of these
two time series, we find a correlation of 84% for the RMSE and of 78% for the MPE. Hence, we
could argue that both the pricing error and the pricing bias for caps and swaptions with short swap
tenors could have a common cause. However, for mid- and long-term contracts, our model performs
remarkably well over the whole sample period for both caps and swaptions.
A potential explanation for the model’s deteriorating performance toward the end of the sample
period could be that increased uncertainty materializes especially for short-term contracts and dries
out their liquidity. When we look at the figures, we could argue that the pricing performance
of our model deteriorates first around fall 2008 and again in spring 2009. We could link the first
deterioration with the spread between LIBOR and the Overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate. Although
there was already a sharp rise in the term spreads on August 9, 2007, associated with market concerns
related to subprime mortgage market, the spreads further skyrocketed from around 100 basis points
to 350 basis points, following the announcement that Lehman Brothers had filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in September 2008.
The Lehman bankruptcy certainly had an adverse effect on the pricing performance of our (or
any) model. Interestingly, however, the pricing errors increase again in spring 2009, showing a strong
persistency. They remain high until the end of our sample period. We conjecture that this systematic
bias might be caused by a change in market practice. As of mid–2013, financial market professionals
are still coming to grips with the many changes that have occurred in pricing practices since the
financial crisis. The basis between LIBOR and OIS, as well as between different parts of the LIBOR
curve, blew out dramatically. This prompted some major changes in valuation methodologies. Far
from using a single LIBOR curve to discount everything, many dealers started to develop multi-curve
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Figure 7. Root mean squared error (RMSE) and mean pricing error (MPE) for swaptions with
different option maturities and swap tenors. Panels A and B show the RMSE and the MPE in
percentage points for swaptions implied volatilities of all tenors (solid line), for tenors up to three
years (dash-dotted line) and for tenors of four to ten years (dashed line). In Panels C and D, we
plot the RMSE and MPE for swaptions implied volatilities with short option maturities up to two
years (dash-dotted line), and for option maturities of three to ten years (dashed line). In Panel D we
also plot the MPE for implied volatilities of swaptions with short option maturity and short swap
tenor (dotted line). Data are weekly (Wednesday) spanning our entire data sample August 8, 2007
to August 11, 2010; in total, 158 weeks.
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valuation models. Single curve and multi-curve approaches can diverge substantially in pricing and
risk calculations. If the market adopted a multi-curve approach on a large scale, then our single-
curve model might generate a systematic pricing error. As research on multi-curve modeling is still
evolving and as of mid-2013, there is no common market practice,20 a further substantiation of our
conjecture is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, it is an interesting research topic in its own right.
VI.3. Dynamics of activity rates
In Fig. 8, we plot the extracted state variables Vt and νt from the our estimation over the entire
period, August 8, 2007 to August 11, 2010. In Panel A, we plot the activity rate Vt. We observe
that in 2008 there was a constant increase in this rate with a consolidation at a high level after early
2009. When we look at the jump activity rate νt in Panel B, we see a dramatic increase during
the second half of 2009, in its level and its variation. To provide some intuition about the dynamic
behavior of the two state variables Vt and νt and their different roles during the financial market
crisis, we split our sample into three episodes linked to specific market events.
The first episode is characterized by an increasing volatility Vt and started in the fall of 2007,
when the interbank funding market experienced liquidity problems, as indicated by the increasing
LIBOR-OIS spread, which reached 108 basis points on December 6, 2007.21 At that time, the
investment bank Lehman Brothers reported large write-downs and subsequently, on March 17,
2008, Bear Stearns collapsed. These events are clearly captured by the first spikes in the activity
rates, particularly by the activity rate Vt driving the stochastic volatility of LIBORs. This period
was followed by another wave of events in the fall of 2008 that triggered a further increase in the
activity rate Vt. On September 7, 2008, the government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac were placed into conservatorship by the US government. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two
key players in the caps and swaptions markets, had large hedges related to their engagement in the
20See, e.g., Bianchetti and Carlicchi (2011), among others.
21During the financial crisis, the LIBOR-OIS spread was considered a key indicator for the degree of liquidity in the
interbank market.
44
Chapter 1: Time-Changed Le´vy LIBOR Market Model
01/2008 01/2009 01/20100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
V t
Panel A: Activity rate Vt
01/2008 01/2009 01/20100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
ν t
Panel B: Activity rate νt
Figure 8. Time variation in the state variables. Panel A shows the extracted time variation in
the activity rate Vt from the model estimated jointly to the caps and swaptions markets. Panel B
shows the corresponding activity rate to the jump component νt in the LIBOR forward rate. Data
are weekly (Wednesday) spanning our entire data sample August 8, 2007 to August 11, 2010.
mortgage-backed securities market. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy,
which undoubtedly spurred increasing uncertainty in the interbank market. During this period, the
activity rates Vt and νt increased substantially.
The second episode starts at the end of 2008. On November 25, 2008, the Fed announced its first
quantitative easing program (QE1) to buy $500 billion in mortgage bonds, effective beginning in
January 2009.22 Even though no MBS had yet been purchased by the Fed, the mere announcement
of the QE1 program led to an immediate reduction in the level of the stochastic volatility Vt. Hence,
the Fed signaled strong and credible backing for mortgage markets in particular and for interest
rate markets in general.23 Subsequently, on January 5, 2009, the Federal Reserve began purchasing
22The goal of the QE1 program, as stated by the Federal Reserve in its press release on November 25,
2008, was to “reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses, which in
turn should support housing markets and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally.” See
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125b.htm.
23The study by Hancock and Passmore (2011) is in line with our argumentation. They show that the Fed’s an-
nouncement reduced mortgage rates by about 85 basis points between November 25 and December 31, 2008.
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fixed rate mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which further
stabilized the volatility in the caps and swaptions markets. However, the average level of νt remained
high, which might reflect the market’s general unease with the uncertainty surrounding the impact
of the Fed’s intervention. Then, on May 7, 2009, the results from the US federal stress test of
the largest 19 US bank holding companies were announced. The stress test revealed that the 19
companies could potentially lose $600 billion during 2009 and 2010 if the economy were to follow
the adverse scenario considered in the stress test. Subsequently, on May 8 and May 12, respectively,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced large write downs. These events seem to have triggered
another period of increasing uncertainty, which hindered Vt from decline further to mid-2008 levels
and increased the level of νt to new heights. Hence, market participants could have expected some
sudden dramatic changes in future interest rates.
The third and final episode starts toward the end of 2009 and beginning of 2010. On March 31,
2010, the Federal Reserve’s mortgage bond buying program ended. The 30-year fixed rate rose to
5.125%. This increase was caused by investors exiting mortgage bond trades before the Fed money
was gone. The uncertainty surrounding the end of QE1 caused a large variation in νt. This variation
was further nourished by the debt problems in Greece. On May 9, 2010, the International Monetary
Fund decided to provide financial support to Greece. The increased awareness of a potentially
contagious sovereign debt crisis in Europe further increased uncertainty in the interest rate markets
and drove global investors into US mortgage and Treasury bonds. Subsequently, the 30-year fixed
rate dropped to 4.78%. However, the uncertainty about the future course of interest rates is reflected
by the substantial variation in the stochastic arrival rate for jumps νt in the LIBORs during the end
of our sample period.
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VII. Conclusion
We introduce a novel time-changed Le´vy LIBOR market model. Its design was motivated by a
preliminary analysis of the stylized facts about the implied volatilities of the cap surface and the
swaption cube. Our model is analytically tractable and yet flexible enough to price caps and swap-
tions simultaneously. The parsimonious model structure facilitates the identification and stability
of the parameter estimates, which is crucial for risk management and hedging.
We find that the incorporation of a jump component and a stochastic volatility factor that
is highly correlated with changes in interest rates is crucial for the simultaneous pricing of caps
and swaptions. Especially for intermediate and long maturities, we find evidence that the markets
for caps and swaptions have been well integrated even during the financial crisis. To explain the
volatility skew, we could also have extended the model using a constant elasticity of variance (CEV).
However, such an extension is beyond the scope of our paper.
The extension with a CEV-type structure as well as the analysis of the pricing errors during
the recent financial crisis could be an interesting avenue for future research. In particular, it would
be worthwhile to see what drives the pricing errors of short maturity contracts especially since
early 2009. Hence, depending on the availability of data, an important direction for future research
based on our results would be the development of models that include additional drivers, such as
liquidity or sovereign credit risk, and the potential impact of changing market practices, such as the
introduction of multiple discounting curves.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
From the specification given in Eqs. (4) and (5), we can apply Ito’s formula for Le´vy processes
(e.g., Cont and Tankov, 2004) to obtain the dynamics of the forward LIBOR L(t, Tj) under the
Tj+1-forward measure as follows:
dL(t, Tj)
L(t, Tj)
= b(t, Tj , Tj+1)dt+
1
2
λ2(t, Tj)dt+
1
2
V Wt dt
+
∫ 0
−∞
[ex − 1− x]piQj+1
J− (dx)ν
J
t dt+
∫ ∞
0
[ex − 1− x]piQj+1
J+
(dx)νJt dt
+ λ(t, Tj)dB
Qj+1
t +
√
V Wt dW
Qj+1
t +
∫ 0
−∞
[ex − 1]
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQj+1
J− (x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
∫ ∞
0
[ex − 1]
[
µ+(dt, dx)− piQj+1
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
]
. (A.1)
To ensure that L(t, Tj) is a martingale under the Tj+1-forward measure, the drift must equal zero,
which gives the drift condition in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
The proposition follows by (backward) induction starting from the dynamics of the forward LIBOR
under the terminal forward measure Qn. Consider first the change of measure from Qn to Qn−1.
The Radon-Nikodym derivative for changing the measure from the Tn-forward measure, Qn, to the
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Tn−1-forward measure, Qn−1, is
dQn−1
dQn |Ft
=
P (t, Tn−1)/P (0, Tn−1)
P (t, Tn)/P (0, Tn)
. (A.2)
The forward LIBORs L(t, Tn−1) are defined at time t by
L(t, Tn−1) =
1
Tn − Tn−1
[
P (t, Tn−1)
P (t, Tn)
− 1
]
, (A.3)
where Tn denotes the terminal maturity in the LIBOR tenor structure. This can be rewritten for
Tn − Tn−1 = δ as
P (t, Tn−1)
P (t, Tn)
= δL(t, Tn−1) + 1, (A.4)
where P (t,Tn−1)P (t,Tn) can be viewed as a forward price process. Consider now the dynamics of this forward
price process:
d
[
P (t, Tn−1)
P (t, Tn)
]
= δL(t, Tn−1)
[
λ(t, Tn−1)dBQnt +
√
V Wt dW
Qn
t
+
∫ 0
−∞
[ex − 1]
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQn
J−(x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
∫ ∞
0
[ex − 1]
[
µ+(dt, dx)− piQn
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
]]
(A.5)
=
[
P (t, Tn−1)
P (t, Tn)
] [
γλ(t, Tn−1, Tn)dBQnt + γV (t, Tn−1, Tn)dW
Qn
t
+
∫ 0
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γJ(t, Tn−1, Tn)
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQn
J−(x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
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0
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(A.6)
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using the fact that L(t, Tn−1) is a martingale under the measure Qn and that
γλ(t, Tn−1, Tn) =
δL(t, Tn−1)
δL(t, Tn−1) + 1
λ(t, Tn−1), (A.7)
γV (t, Tn−1, Tn) =
δL(t, Tn−1)
δL(t, Tn−1) + 1
√
V Wt , (A.8)
and
γJ(t, Tn−1, Tn) =
δL(t, Tn−1)
δL(t, Tn−1) + 1
[ex − 1] . (A.9)
Simplifying the above by putting FB(t, Tn−1, Tn) =
P (t,Tn−1)
P (t,Tn)
, and
H(t, Tn) =
∫ t
0
γλ(s, Tn−1, Tn)dBQns + γV (s, Tn−1, Tn)dW
Qn
s
+
∫ t
0
∫ 0
−∞
γJ(t, Tn−1, Tn)
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQn
J−(x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
γJ(t, Tn−1, Tn)
[
µ+(dt, dx)− piQn
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
]
, (A.10)
the stochastic differential equation can be reformulated as
dFB(t, Tn−1, Tn) = FB(t, Tn−1, Tn)dH(t, Tn) (A.11)
from which we know the solution is the Dole´ans–Dade stochastic exponential given by
FB(t, Tn−1, Tn) = FB(0, Tn−1, Tn)E
[
H(t, Tn)
]
. (A.12)
The term Tn in H(t, Tn) indicates that the stochastic exponential is taken under the Tn−1-forward
measure. Therefore,
P (t, Tn−1)/P (0, Tn−1)
P (t, Tn)/P (0, Tn)
= E [H(t, Tn)] . (A.13)
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We observe that the likelihood process we are looking for to change measure from the Tn-forward
measure, Qn, to the Tn−1-forward measure, Qn−1, is defined by the stochastic exponential of the
process H(t, Tn) (which by definition is a Qn-martingale due to the martingale preserving property;
see Proposition 8.23 in Cont and Tankov, 2004). Writing the measure transformation in more
familiar terms,
dQn−1
dQn |Ft
= E
[∫ t
0
γλ(s, Tn−1, Tn)dBQns + γV (s, Tn−1, Tn)dW
Qn
s
+
∫ t
0
∫ 0
−∞
γJ(t, Tn−1, Tn)
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQn
J−(x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
γJ(t, Tn−1, Tn)
[
µ+(dt, dx)− piQn
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
]]
, (A.14)
for all t ∈ [0, Tn−1]. We can now identify the Girsanov kernel in the measure transformation related
to the Brownian motion part, which allows us to change from one forward measure to another:
dB
Qn−1
t = dB
Qn
t − 〈dBQnt , γλ(t, Tn−1, Tn)dBQnt 〉 = dBQnt − γλ(t, Tn−1, Tn)dt (A.15)
and
dW
Qn−1
t = dW
Qn
t − 〈dWQnt , γV (t, Tn−1, Tn)dWQnt 〉 = dWQnt − γV (t, Tn−1, Tn)dt, (A.16)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the covariance. Moreover, we observe that the change of intensity of the jump
component (e.g., Bjork, Kabanov, and Runggaldier, 1997) takes the form
pi
Qn−1
J ν
J =
[
1 + γJ(t, Tn−1, Tn)
]
piQnJ ν
J , (A.17)
for J = {J−, J+}. Consider next the measure change Qn−1 to Qn−2. The Radon–Nikodym deriva-
tive for changing the measure from the Tn−1-forward measure, Qn−1, to the Tn−2-forward measure,
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Qn−2, is
dQn−2
dQn−1 |Ft
=
P (t, Tn−2)/P (0, Tn−2)
P (t, Tn−1)/P (0, Tn−1)
. (A.18)
The dynamics of the forward price process is given by
d
[
P (t, Tn−2)
P (t, Tn−1)
]
=
[
P (t, Tn−2)
P (t, Tn−1)
] [
γλ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)dB
Qn−1
t + γV (t, Tn−2, Tn−1)dW
Qn−1
t
+
∫ 0
−∞
γJ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQn−1
J− (x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
∫ ∞
0
γJ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)
[
µ+(dt, dx)− piQn−1
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
]]
, (A.19)
where
γλ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1) =
δL(t, Tn−2)
δL(t, Tn−2) + 1
λ(t, Tn−2), (A.20)
γV (t, Tn−2, Tn−1) =
δL(t, Tn−2)
δL(t, Tn−2) + 1
√
V Wt , (A.21)
and
γJ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1) =
δL(t, Tn−2)
δL(t, Tn−2) + 1
[ex − 1] . (A.22)
Similarly to the above, we end up with
P (t, Tn−2)/P (0, Tn−2)
P (t, Tn−1)/P (0, Tn−1)
= E [H(t, Tn−1)] , (A.23)
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where
H(t, Tn−1) =
∫ t
0
γλ(s, Tn−2, Tn−1)dBQn−1s + γV (s, Tn−2, Tn−1)dW
Qn−1
s
+
∫ t
0
∫ 0
−∞
γJ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQn−1
J− (x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
γJ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)
[
µ+(dt, dx)− piQn−1
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
]
, (A.24)
and again we observe that the likelihood process we are looking for to change measure from the
Tn−1-forward measure, Qn−1, to the Tn−2-forward measure, Qn−2, which is defined by the stochastic
exponential of the process H(t, Tn−1), which by definition is a Qn−1-martingale. As above, we can
write the measure transformation in more familiar terms as
dQn−2
dQn−1 |Ft
= E
[∫ t
0
γλ(s, Tn−2, Tn−1)dBQn−1s + γV (s, Tn−2, Tn−1)dW
Qn−1
s
+
∫ t
0
∫ 0
−∞
γJ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQn−1
J− (x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
γJ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)
[
µ+(dt, dx)− piQn−1
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
]]
(A.25)
for all t ∈ [0, Tn−2]. We can now identify the Girsanov kernel in the measure transformation related
to the Brownian motion part, which allows us to change from one forward measure to another:
dB
Qn−2
t = dB
Qn−1
t − 〈dBQn−1t , γλ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)dBQn−1t 〉 (A.26)
= dB
Qn−1
t − γλ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)dt (A.27)
= dBQnt −
2∑
k=1
γλ [t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k] dt (A.28)
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and
dW
Qn−2
t = dW
Qn−1
t − 〈dWQn−1t , γV (t, Tn−2, Tn−1)dWQn−1t 〉 (A.29)
= dW
Qn−1
t − γV (t, Tn−2, Tn−1)dt (A.30)
= dWQnt −
2∑
k=1
γV [t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k] dt. (A.31)
The change of intensity of the jump component takes the form
pi
Qn−2
J ν
J =
[
1 + γJ(t, Tn−2, Tn−1)
]
pi
Qn−1
J ν
J (A.32)
=
2∏
k=1
[
1 + γJ(t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k)
]
piQnJ ν
J (A.33)
for J = {J−, J+}. Continuing the same procedure along the entire tenor structure, we can, for
j = 2, . . . , n, summarize the forward measure transformations that define the family of spanning
forward LIBORs related to the terminal measure (i.e., the Qn measure):
dB
Qj−1
t = dB
Qn
t −
n+1−j∑
k=1
γλ [t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k] dt, (A.34)
dW
Qj−1
t = dW
Qn
t −
n+1−j∑
k=1
γV [t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k] dt, (A.35)
and
pi
Qj−1
J ν
J
t =
n+1−j∏
k=1
[
1 + γJ(t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k)
]
piQnJ ν
J , (A.36)
where
γλ(t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k) =
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
λ(t, Tn−k), (A.37)
γV (t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k) =
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
√
V Wt , (A.38)
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and
γJ(t, Tn−k, Tn+1−k) =
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
[ex − 1] (A.39)
for the jump components, where J = {J−, J+}, respectively, as given in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
We can proceed similarly to the proof of Proposition 2. Consider first Qn to Qn−1:
dW˜Qn−1 = dW˜Qn − 〈dW˜Qn , γV (t, Tn−1, Tn)
√
V Wt dW
Qn〉 (A.40)
= dW˜Qn − δL(t, Tn−1)
δL(t, Tn−1) + 1
√
V Wt ρdt. (A.41)
Now consider Qn−1 to Qn−2:
dW˜Qn−2 = dW˜Qn−1 − 〈dW˜Qn−1 , γV (t, Tn−2, Tn−1)
√
V Wt dW
Qn−1〉 (A.42)
= dW˜Qn−1 − δL(t, Tn−2)
δL(t, Tn−2) + 1
√
V Wt ρdt, (A.43)
which can be related to the terminal measure, Qn:
dW˜Qn−2 = dW˜Qn −
2∑
k=1
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
√
V Wt ρdt. (A.44)
Continuing the same procedure along the entire tenor structure, we can, for j = 2, . . . , n, summarize
the forward measure transformations that define the family of measure changes for the stochastic
volatility process by their relation to the terminal forward measure, Qn, as stated in the proposition.
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Proof of Proposition 4
To prove Proposition 4, we need Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.1. The co-sliding forward swap rate can be approximated by
RNj (t) ≈ RNj (0) exp
∫ t
0
j+N−1∑
k=j
ω˜k(0)dXs + drift
 , (A.45)
where Xs is the Le´vy process under the terminal forward LIBOR measure in Eq. (5) and ω˜k(0) =
ωk(0)L(0,Tk)
RNj (0)
with ωk(0) =
P (0,Tk+1)∑j+N
k=j+1 P (0,Tk)
.
Proof. We can represent the co-sliding forward swap rate as a weighted average of spanning
forward LIBORs:
RNj (t) =
P (t, Tj)− P (t, Tj+N )
δ
∑j+N
k=j+1 P (t, Tk)
=
j+N−1∑
k=j
ωk(t)L(t, Tk) (A.46)
where the weights are given by ωk(t) =
P (t,Tk+1)∑j+N
k=j+1 P (t,Tk)
. To obtain analytical tractability, we freeze
the weights ωk(t) at time t = 0 and we use the approximation ye
x ≈ y + yx for x small.24 Then,
RNj (t) ≈
j+N−1∑
k=j
ωk(0)L(t, Tk) =
j+N−1∑
k=j
ωk(0)L(0, Tk) exp
[∫ t
0
dXs + drift
]
(A.47)
≈
j+N−1∑
k=j
ωk(0)L(0, Tk) +
j+N−1∑
k=j
ωk(0)L(0, Tk)
[∫ t
0
dXs + drift
]
(A.48)
= RNj (0) +R
N
j (0)
∫ t
0
j+N−1∑
k=j
ωk(0)L(0, Tk)
RNj (0)
dXs + drift
 (A.49)
≈ RNj (0) exp
∫ t
0
j+N−1∑
k=j
ω˜k(0)dXs + drift
 , (A.50)
24Because the precise drift specification is not relevant for pricing, we do not write it out explicitly.
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where XQnt is the Le´vy process under the terminal forward measure given in Eq. (5) and ω˜k(0) =
ωk(0)L(0,Tk)
RNj (0)
. 
Lemma A.1 allows us to approximately model the co-sliding forward swap rate as an exponential
of the Le´vy process Xs under the terminal forward LIBOR measure. However, for pricing purposes,
it is convenient to formulate the forward swap rate dynamics under the appropriate terminal co-
sliding forward swap measures under which the forward swap rate is a martingale. By doing so, we
are consistent with the Black (1976) model, which is currently market practice for valuing swaption
derivatives.
Similar to the LMM, we can construct an entire family of co-sliding forward swap rates by
backward induction starting from the terminal co-sliding forward swap measure for a given N .
However, before we can perform the backward construction of the family of co-sliding swap rates,
we first need to establish the change of measure, which takes us from the terminal forward LIBOR
measure Qn to the terminal co-sliding forward swap measure QNn−N+1 for a given N . Qn coincides
with QNn−N+1 for N = 1. Hence, we get Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.2. Under the approximation of the forward swap rate in Eq. (A.45), the Radon-Nikodym
derivative of QNn−N+1 with respect to Qn is
dQNn−N+1
dQn |Ft
≈ E
[∫ t
0
ϕ1dB
Qn
s +
∫ t
0
ϕ2
√
V Ws dW
Qn
s
+
∫ t
0
∫ 0
−∞
(eϕ2x − 1)
[
µ−(dt, dx)− piQn
J−(x)dxν
J
t dt
]
+
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
(eϕ2x − 1)
[
µ+(dt, dx)− piQn
J+
(x)dxνJt dt
]]
, (A.51)
where E(·) is the Dole´ans-Dade exponential and
ϕ1 =
n−1∑
k=n−N
[
P (0, Tn−N )
P (0, Tn−N )− P (0, Tn)
δL(0, Tk)
1 + δL(0, Tk)
− ω˜k(0)
]
λ(s, Tk) (A.52)
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and
ϕ2 =
P (0, Tn−N )
P (0, Tn−N )− P (0, Tn)
n−1∑
k=n−N
δL(0, Tk)
1 + δL(0, Tk)
− 1. (A.53)
Proof. Consider the Radon-Nikodym derivative for some j = 0, . . . , n − N defined by the
following quantity,
dQNj+1
dQn |Ft
=
St(Tj , Tj+N )
P (t, Tn)
P (0, Tn)
S0(Tj , Tj+N )
, (A.54)
which by definition is a Qn-martingale. We first fix j = n −N for a given N and look at the first
term in Eq. (A.54):
St(Tn−N , Tn)
P (t, Tn)
=
1
RNn−N (t)
[
P (t, Tn−N )
P (t, Tn)
− 1
]
=
1
RNn−N (t)
 n−1∏
k=n−N
(1 + δL(t, Tk))− 1
 . (A.55)
By inserting our dynamics of the forward LIBOR and the approximate dynamics of the forward
swap rate in Eq. (A.45), we get, under Qn,
St(Tn−N , Tn)
P (t, Tn)
≈ 1
RNn−N (0)
exp
−∫ t
0
n−1∑
k=n−N
ω˜k(0)dXs + drift

×
 n−1∏
k=n−N
1 + δL(0, Tk) exp
[∫ t
0
dXs + drift
]− 1
 (A.56)
≈ 1
RNn−N (0)
P (0, Tn−N )− P (0, Tn)
P (0, Tn)
× exp
 n−1∑
k=n−N
∫ t
0
 P (0, Tn−N ) δL(0,Tk)1+δL(0,Tk)
P (0, Tn−N )− P (0, Tn) − ω˜k(0)
 dXs + drift
 , (A.57)
by relying (twice) on the approximation 1 + κ exp(x) ≈ (1 + κ) exp( κ1+κx) for x small.25 Inserting
25See, e.g., Kluge (2005, p. 73).
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the definition of the process dXs under the measure Qn proves the proposition.  Applying the
above change of measure result, we get the dynamics of the Le´vy components in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
For simplicity, we fix t = 0. Under some technical conditions, we obtain the Fourier transform of
the cap as
χ(z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
eizkC0(k, Tj)dk = δP (0, Tj+1)E
Qj+1
0
[∫ YTj
−∞
eizk
[
e
YTj − ek
]
dk
]
(A.58)
= δP (0, Tj+1)E
Qj+1
0
[
e
(1+iz)YTj
iz
− e
(1+iz)YTj
1 + iz
]
= δP (0, Tj+1)
φYTj (z − i)
(iz)(iz + 1)
, (A.59)
where φYTj (·) denotes the characteristic function of YTj .26 Then the option value can be calculated
using the Fourier inversion formula:
C0(k, Tj) =
1
2
∫ −izi+∞
−izi−∞
e−izkχ(z)dz =
e−zik
pi
∫ ∞
0
e−izrkχ(zr − izi)dzr (A.60)
=
e−zik
pi
δP (0, Tj+1)
∫ ∞
0
e−izrk
φYTj (zr − izi − i)
(izr + zi)(izr + zi + 1)
dzr. (A.61)
26See, e.g., Wu (2008).
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The complex valued measure as developed in Carr and Wu (2004) allows us to write the characteristic
function φYTj (u) = E
Qj+1
0 (exp(iuYTj )) as
φYTj (u) = E
Qj+1
0
exp
iu[lnL(0, Tj) + ∫ Tj
0
b(s, Tj , Tj+1)ds+
∫ Tj
0
dX
Qj+1
s
]
 (A.62)
= L(0, Tj)
iuEQj+10
exp
iu[∫ Tj
0
b(s, Tj , Tj+1)ds+
∫ Tj
0
dX
Qj+1
s
]
 (A.63)
= L(0, Tj)
iuEQj+10
exp
iu[BQj+1T BTj − 12T BTj
]
+ iu
[
W
Qj+1
T WTj
− 1
2
T WTj
]
+ iu
[
J
Qj+1
T JTj
− kJ(1)T JTj
]
 (A.64)
= L(0, Tj)
iuEM0
[
exp
(
−ψQj+1B (u)T BTj − ψ
Qj+1
W (u)T WTj − ψ
Qj+1
J (u)T JTj
)]
, (A.65)
where ψ
Qj+1
B (u), ψ
Qj+1
W (u), and ψ
Qj+1
J (u) denote the characteristic exponents of the convexity-
adjusted Le´vy components and where the time changes are given by
T BTj =
∫ Tj
0
λ2(s, Tj)ds, T WTj =
∫ Tj
0
V Ws ds, T JTj =
∫ Tj
0
νJs ds. (A.66)
The change to the measure M in Eq. (A.65) is given by the complex valued exponential Qj+1-
martingale,
dM
dQj+1 |Ft
= exp
iu[BQj+1T BTj − 12T BTj
]
+ ψ
Qj+1
B (u)T BTj + iu
[
W
Qj+1
T WTj
− 1
2
T WTj
]
+ ψ
Qj+1
W (u)T WTj
+ iu
[
J
Qj+1
T JTj
− kJ(1)T JTj
]
+ ψ
Qj+1
J (u)T JTj
 (A.67)
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for j = 0, 1 . . . , n−1, where kJ(1) represents the cumulant exponent of the Le´vy jump component.27
The advantage of the representation of the characteristic exponent in Eq. (A.65) is that we can
decompose the problem. First, we need to find the characteristic exponents of the Le´vy components
prior to the time change. Second, we need to find the characteristic exponents of the time changes.
If all of these parts are analytically tractable, then the characteristic exponent of the time-changed
Le´vy process is tractable. We start by looking at the terms ψ
Qj+1
B (u) and ψ
Qj+1
W (u) in Eq. (A.65),
which are the characteristic exponents of the two convexity-adjusted continuous Le´vy components
Bt − 12 t and Wt − 12 t, respectively. Because they do not depend on Tj+1, we simplify the notation
and get
ψB(u) = ψW (u) =
1
2
[
iu+ u2
]
. (A.68)
Next, we determine the characteristic exponent ψ
Qj+1
J (u) of the convexity-adjusted jump compo-
nent Jt − kJ(1)t. For analytical tractability, we adopt the commonly used freezing of coefficients
approximation:
δL(t, Tn−k)
δL(t, Tn−k) + 1
≈ δL(0, Tn−k)
δL(0, Tn−k) + 1
. (A.69)
Then, to determine the approximate characteristic exponent under the appropriate forward measure,
Qj+1, we have to compute the integral
ψ
Qj+1
J (u) ≈
∫
R0
[
1− eiux
] n−1−j∏
k=1
[
1 +
δL(0, Tn−k)
δL(0, Tn−k) + 1
[ex − 1]
]
piQnJ dx (A.70)
for j = 0, 1 . . . , n − 1. Starting from the terminal measure Qn (i.e., for j = n − 1) and given the
density describing the arrival rate of jumps, we can calculate the characteristic exponent of the
27 W
Qj+1
TW
Tj
denotes the standard Brownian motion W under the Tj+1-forward measure and subordinated to the
stochastic time change defined by T WTj .
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convexity-adjusted jump component:
ψQnJ (u) =
∫
R0
[
1− eiux
]
piQnJ dx− kJ(1) (A.71)
= ln
[
(1− iuνJ+)(1 + iuνJ−)
]− iu ln [(1− νJ+)(1 + νJ−)] . (A.72)
We next consider the characteristic exponent of the convexity-adjusted jump component under the
measure Qn−1, i.e., for j = n− 2. We obtain
ψ
Qn−1
J (u) ≈
∫
R0
[
1− eiux
] [
1 +An−1 [ex − 1]
)
piQnJ dx− kJ(1) (A.73)
= [1−An−1] ln
[
(1− iuνJ+)(1 + iuνJ−)
]
+An−1 ln
[
(1− iuνn−2
J+
)(1 + iuνn−2
J− )
]
− iu
[
[1−An−1] ln
[
(1− νJ+)(1 + νJ−)
]
+An−1 ln
[
(1− νn−2
J+
)(1 + νn−2
J− )
]]
, (A.74)
where
An−1 =
δL(0, Tn−1)
δL(0, Tn−1) + 1
, νj
J+
=
νJ+
1− (n− 1− j)νJ+
, νj
J− =
νJ−
1 + (n− 1− j)νJ−
. (A.75)
In the same manner, we can recursively proceed to calculate the characteristic exponents of the
convexity-adjusted jump component related to the entire family of forward measures corresponding
to the other payment dates T1, . . . , Tn−2 in closed form. It remains to obtain the Laplace transforms
of the time changes specified in Subsection III.1.1. We start with the deterministic time change,
T BTj . We directly obtain
EM0
[
exp
[
−ψQj+1B (u)T BTj
]]
= exp
[
−1
2
[
iu+ u2
] ∫ Tj
0
λ(s, Tj)
2ds
]
. (A.76)
The integral
∫ Tj
0 λ(s, Tj)
2ds results in a lengthy, but closed form, expression.28 Next, we take a look
at T Wt and T Jt . Due to the presence of the nonzero correlation parameter, we need to proceed in
28The explicit formula can be obtained upon request.
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two steps. First, for the change between the different forward measures, we can rely on the result
presented in Proposition 3. Second, when we switch from the forward measure Qj+1 to M, we have
to adjust the activity rate dynamics for the time change T Wt as follows:
dW˜Mt = = dW˜
Qj+1
t − 〈dW˜Qj+1t , iu
√
VtdW
Qj+1
t 〉 = dW˜Qj+1t − iu
√
Vtρdt, (A.77)
Finally, the time change T Jt of the jump component remains the same under M because its driving
Brownian motion is assumed to be independent of the different Le´vy processes driving the forward
LIBOR directly. Hence, the activity rates under the measure M follow the dynamics
dV Wt =
[
κW θW − κMj V Wt
]
dt+ σW
√
V Wt dW˜
M
t (A.78)
and
dνJt = κJ(θJ − νJt )dt+ σJ
√
νJt dZ
M
t , (A.79)
with κMj = κW −
∑n−j−1
k=1
δL(0,Tn−k)
1+δL(0,Tn−k)
σWρ − iuσWρ for j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. As the affine structure
is retained, the transform
EMt
[
exp
[
−ψQj+1W (u)T WTj − ψ
Qj+1
J (u)T JTj
]]
(A.80)
has the solution
φQj+1(u) = exp
[
−aW (τ)− bW (τ)Vt − aJ(τ)− bJ(τ)νJt
]
, (A.81)
with the coefficients given in the proposition. ψW (u) remains the same regardless of the forward
measure under which we perform the pricing, and so we omit the dependence on the forward measure
for notational convenience.
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Proof of Proposition 6
For simplicity, we fix t = 0. Following the same strategy as for the derivation of the caplet price,
the swaption value is
PS0(k, Tj , Tj+N ) ≈ e
−zik
pi
S0(Tj , Tj+N )
∫ ∞
0
e−izrk
φ
Y˜Tj
(zr − izi − i)
(izr + zi)(izr + zi + 1)
dzr, (A.82)
where φ
Y˜Tj
(z−i) denotes the characteristic function of the nonhomogenous Le´vy process Y˜Tj specified
under the co-sliding forward swap measure QNj+1. The transform φY˜Tj (u) takes the form
φ
Y˜Tj
(u) = E
QNj+1
0
[
exp
(
iuY˜Tj
]]
(A.83)
= E
QNj+1
0
exp
iu
lnRNj (0) + ∫ Tj
0
j+N−1∑
k=j
ω˜k(0)dX
QNj+1
s + drift


 (A.84)
= RNj (0)
iuE
QNj+1
0
exp(iu [BQNj+1T Bt − 12T BTj
]
+ iu
[
W
QNj+1
T Wt
− 1
2
T WTj
]
+ iu
[
J
QNj+1
T JTj
− kJ(1)T JTj
]
 (A.85)
= RNj (0)
iuEM0
[
exp
(
−ψQ
N
j+1
B (u)T BTj − ψ
QNj+1
W (u)T WTj − ψ
QNj+1
J (u)T JTj
)]
. (A.86)
The new measure M is defined by the complex valued exponential QNj+1-martingale,
dM
dQNj+1 |Ft=0
= exp
iu[BQNj+1T BTj − 12T BTj
]
+ ψ
QNj+1
B (u)T BTj + iu
[
W
QNj+1
T WTj
− 1
2
T WTj
]
+ ψ
QNj+1
W (u)T WTj
+ iu
[
J
QNj+1
T JTj
− kJ(1)T JTj
]
+ ψ
QNj+1
J (u)T JTj
 (A.87)
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for j = 0, . . . , n−N . By construction we have ∑j+N−1k=j ωk(0)L(0,Tk)RNj (0) = 1, and therefore, the weights
have no impact on the stochastic time changes to the Brownian motion W and the jump component
J because these time changes do not depend on the particular maturity Tj . Hence, the time changes
now become
T BTj =
∫ Tj
0
j+N−1∑
k=j
ω˜k(0)λ(s, Tk)
2 ds, T WTj = ∫ Tj
0
V Ws ds, T JTj =
∫ Tj
0
νJs ds (A.88)
The pricing problem can now be split again into calculating the characteristic exponents prior to
the time changes and the characteristic exponent of the time changes. The characteristic exponents
of the two convexity-adjusted continuous Le´vy components prior to the time change remain the
same as in the LIBOR model setting. To determine ψ
QNj+1
J (u), we first look at the jump intensity
under the co-sliding forward measure QNj+1. It is related to the jump intensity under the terminal
co-sliding forward measure QNn−N+1 by
pi
QNj+1
J ν
J
t ≈
n−N−j∏
k=1
[
1 +
δRNn−N+1−k(0)
1 + δRNn−N+1−k(0)
[ex − 1]
]
pi
QNn−N+1
J ν
J , (A.89)
where j = 0, 1 . . . , n−N and
pi
QNn−N+1
J [x] =
 λe
− |x|
ν¯+ |x|−1 , x > 0
λe
− |x|
ν¯− |x|−1 , x < 0
, (A.90)
with
ν¯+ =
ν+
1− ϕ2ν+ , ν¯− =
ν−
1 + ϕ2ν−
. (A.91)
We require λ, ν¯+, ν¯− > 0. By inspection of Eq. (A.90), we see that the change of measure from the
terminal forward LIBOR measure to the co-sliding terminal swap measure is driven by the term ϕ2.
Clearly, when N = 1, we are back in our LIBOR market setting. Next, as in Eq. (A.69) for the
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LIBOR specification, we freeze coefficients and set
δRNn−N+1−k(t)
1 + δRNn−N+1−k(t)
≈ δR
N
n−N+1−k(0)
1 + δRNn−N+1−k(0)
, (A.92)
to obtain
ψ
QNj+1
J (u) =
∫
R0
[
1− eiux
] n−N−j∏
k=1
[
1 + γJ(t, Tn−N+1−k, Tn+1−k)
]
pi
QNn−N+1
J dx (A.93)
≈
∫
R0
[
1− eiux
] n−N−j∏
k=1
[
1 +
δRNn−N+1−k(0)
1 + δRNn−N+1−k(0)
[ex − 1]
]
pi
QNn−N+1
J dx, (A.94)
for j = 0, 1 . . . , n−N . Because RNn−N (t) is a QNn−N+1-martingale, we obtain, for j = n−N ,
ψ
QNn−N+1
J (u) =
∫
R0
[
1− eiux
]
pi
QNj+1
J dx− kn−NJ (1) (A.95)
= ln
[
(1− iuν¯J+)(1 + iuν¯J−)
]− iu ln [(1− ν¯J+)(1 + ν¯J−)] . (A.96)
Eq. (A.95) is similar to the characteristic exponent in Eq. (A.71) for the LIBOR, but with kn−NJ (s)
as the cumulant exponent of the Le´vy jump component with the adjusted jump parameters given
in Eq. (A.91). Next, for a given N we have a family of co-sliding forward swap measures denoted
by
{
QN1 ,QN2 . . . ,QNn−N+1
}
. To find the characteristic exponent of the convexity-adjusted jump
component ψ
QNn−N
J (u) related to the swap measure Q
N
n−N prior to the time change, we have to adjust
the (co-sliding terminal) Le´vy density exactly as we did in the LMM. Working back recursively, and
because RNn−N−1(t) is a QNn−N -martingale, we get, for j = n−N − 1,
ψ
QNn−N
J (u) ≈
∫
R0
[
1− eiux
] [
1 +An−N [ex − 1]
)
pi
Qnn−N+1
J dx− kn−N−1J (1) (A.97)
= [1−An−N ] ln
[
(1− iuν¯J+)(1 + iuν¯J−)
]
+An−N ln
[
(1− iuν¯n−N−1
J+
)(1 + iuν¯n−N−1
J− )
]
− iu
[
[1−An−N ] ln
[
(1− ν¯J+)(1 + ν¯J−)
]
+An−N ln
[
(1− ν¯n−N−1
J+
)(1 + ν¯n−N−1
J− )
]]
,
(A.98)
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where
An−N =
δRNn−N (0)
1 + δRNn−N (0)
, ν¯j
J+
=
ν¯J+
1− (n−N − j)ν¯J+
, ν¯j
J− =
ν¯J−
1 + (n−N − j)ν¯J−
. (A.99)
Following the same argument, we can calculate the characteristic exponents of the convexity-adjusted
jump component related to the other co-sliding swap measures
{
QN1 ,QN2 , . . . ,QNn−N−1
}
in closed
form.
As in to the LIBOR market setting, we can show that the activity rate dynamics under the
complex measure M obeys the following form,
dV Wt =
[
κW θW − κMj V Wt
]
dt+ σW
√
V Wt dW˜
M
t (A.100)
and
dνJt = κJ(θJ − νJt )dt+ σJ
√
νJt dZ
M
t , (A.101)
with κMj = κW −ϕ2σWρ−
∑n−N−j
k=1
δRNn−N+1−k(0)
1+δRNn−N+1−k(0)
σWρ− iuσWρ for j = 0, 1, . . . , n−N .29 Because
the time change T Bt is deterministic, we obtain
EM0
[
exp
[
−ψQ
N
j+1
B (u)T BTj
]]
= exp
−1
2
[
iu+ u2
] ∫ Tj
0
j+N−1∑
k=j
ω˜k(0)λ(s, Tk)
2 ds
 ,(A.102)
which can be computed in closed form. We are, therefore, left with the Laplace transform
EM0
[
exp
[
−ψQ
N
j+1
W (u)T WTj − ψ
QNj+1
J (u)T JTj
]]
. (A.103)
29All the change of measure results applied to the co-sliding swap market model should match the formulae presented
for the LMM in the case N = 1 corresponding to a co-sliding forward swap rate defined on a three months tenor, in
which case it equals the definition of the forward LIBOR.
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Due to its exponential affine structure, the Laplace transform has a closed form solution:
φ(u) = exp
[
−aW (τ)− bW (τ)Vt − aJ(τ)− bJ(τ)νJt
]
, τ = Tj − t, (A.104)
with
ai(τ) =
κiθi
σ2i
[
2 ln
[
1− γi − κˆi
2γi
[
1− e−γiτ
]]
+ [γ − κˆi] τ
]
(A.105)
and
bi(τ) =
2ψi(u)
[
1− e−γiτ ]
2γi − (γi − κˆi) [1− e−γiτ ] , γi =
√
κˆ2i + 2σ
2
i ψi(u), (A.106)
for
ψi(u) =
 ψW (u) if i = WψQNj+1J (u) if i = J , κˆi =
 κ¯
M
j if i = W
κJ if i = J
. (A.107)
The index j denotes the option maturity under consideration.
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, we describe how we transformed the market quotes into the option prices that we
used for our model estimation.
Market prices of caps and floors
Given an implied volatility quote IV (t, T,K) at time t for a cap with maturity date T , strike rate
K, and tenor δ, the invoice (dollar) price of the cap with one dollar principal is computed based on
the Black (1976) formula,
Capt(T,K) =
N∑
i=1
Ct(Ti,K) = δ
N∑
i=1
P (t, t+ (i+ 1)δ)
[
L(t, t+ iδ)N(d1i)−KN(d2i)
]
, (A.108)
where T = (N + 1)δ. Here, Ct(T,K) is the price of the caplet with maturity T − t and strike K,
P (t, T ) denotes the zero-coupon bond with time to maturity T − t, and L(t, T ) denotes the forward
LIBOR at time t for [T, T + δ]. Also, N(·) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function, and
d1i and d2i are defined by,
d1i =
ln(L(t, t+ iδ)/K) + IV 2(iδ)/2
IV
√
iδ
, d2i = d1i − IV
√
iδ. (A.109)
Caplets are paid in arrears. The payoff settled at time T is to be paid one tenor later at T+δ. For US
dollar caps and floors, the payment interval is three months, i.e., δ = 1/4. From the Black-implied
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cap prices, the price of a floor contract can be computed by the parity,
Capt(T,K)− Floort(T,K) = Payer Swapt(T,K), (A.110)
which implies that
Floort(T,K) = Capt(T,K) +
N∑
i=1
δP (t, t+ (i+ 1)δ)(K − L(t, t+ iδ)), (A.111)
where the second term on the right-hand side is simply the present value of a (receiver) swap
contract. For the estimation of our model, we normalize the option prices by their vega, i.e., their
sensitivity to implied volatility (IV ) changes. For caps (and floors), the vega is given by,
Vcap/floor ≡
∂Capt(T,K)
∂IV
=
∂F loort(T,K)
∂IV
= δ
N∑
i=1
P (t, t+ (i+ 1)δ)L(t, t+ iδ)N ′(d1i)
√
iδ,
(A.112)
where N ′(·) is the density of the standard normal distribution.
Market prices of payer and receiver swaptions
Given an ATM implied swaption volatility quote IV (t, Tj , Tj+N ) at time t for an option expiry at
time Tj and a swap tenor equal to TN −Tj and tenor δ, the invoice (dollar) price of a payer swaption
can be computed by relying on the Black (1976) formula for swaptions. In particular, the price for
a Tj × (Tj+N − Tj) payer swaption at time t becomes,
Payer Swaptiont(Tj , Tj+N ) = St(Tj , Tj+N )
[
R(t;Tj , Tj+N )N(d1)−KN(d2)
]
, (A.113)
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where
d1 =
ln(R(t;Tj , Tj+N )/K) +
1
2IV (t, Tj , Tj+N )
2(Tj − t)
IV (t, Tj , Tj+N )
√
Tj − t
, d2 = d1 − IV (t, Tj , Tj+N )
√
Tj − t.
(A.114)
Furthermore, St(Tj , Tj+N ) =
∑j+N
k=j+1 δP (t, Tk) and the underlying forward swap rate can be com-
puted by R(t;Tj , Tj+N ) =
P (t,Tj)−P (t,Tj+N )
S(t,Tj ,Tj+N )
. From the payer swaption prices, one can apply the
put-call parity to obtain receiver swaption prices. Similarly to caps and floors, the ATM swaption
strike is defined to be the value of K, which makes the payer swaption and receiver swaption prices
equal to each other. From this parity relation, it follows that the ATM strike rate is simply the
forward starting par swap rate given by R(t;Tj , Tj+N ). For payer and receiver swaptions, the vega
is given by,
VSwaption ≡ ∂Swaptiont(Tj , Tj+N )
∂IV
= St(Tj , Tj+N )R(t;Tj , Tj+N )N
′(d1)
√
Tj − t. (A.115)
As for caps, we normalize the swaption prices by their Black (1976) vega.
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Chapter 2: Strategic Investment and Optimal Portfolio Choice
I. Introduction
Strategic considerations regarding technology adoption, future innovations and non-diversifiable risk
in business projects are essential factors affecting individuals’ decision to become entrepreneurs. I
study the implications of these factors on entrepreneurial entry and optimal portfolio choice in a
continuous-time real option model.1
Evidence indicates that one of the most profound reasons as to whether people decide to pursue
entrepreneurship is (related to) the uncertain income one receives as being an entrepreneur.2 Not
only is entrepreneurship risky due to the variable and uncertain income stream, but since ownership
in the business is often substantial (Hall and Woodward (2010), Gentry and Hubbard (2004) and
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)) the entrepreneur is also exposed to any non-diversifiable
income risk. Presence of non-diversifiable risk implies that the market becomes incomplete. There-
fore, when modeling entrepreneurial investment behavior, it seems particularly relevant to operate
under incomplete markets.
Entrepreneurship has long been regarded as a driving factor of technological change because
of private business owners’ willingness to adopt and exploit new innovations (e.g., Romer (1990)
and Quadrini (2009)). In order to study entrepreneurial investment behavior from a normative
perspective another central aspect to incorporate is technological innovation. Moreover, Huisman
and Kort (2004) show in complete markets that strategic aspects regarding technology adoption
have important implications on both the valuation and timing of investment decisions to enter into
markets where technological innovation is important.
1The decision by individuals to become entrepreneurs can be viewed as real investments. Due to the fundamental
impact real investments have on the economy, the real option approach has received considerable attention in the
literature starting with prominent contributions by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986). A
comprehensive overview of classical but also more recent real option contributions can be found in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) and Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2004).
2In May 2010, the European Commission published a report (Entrepreneurship in the EU and beyond) about
entrepreneurship, see European-Commission (2010). Respondents participating in the analysis were asked a range of
questions related to entrepreneurship. Asked about the greatest fears when starting up a business, the uncertainty of
not having a regular income was mentioned by 40% of the Europeans (and by nearly 50% of the people in US), as
being the most important risk of becoming an entrepreneur, entering in second and first place respectively amongst
other reasons such as the possibility of going bankrupt, the risk of losing your property, job insecurity etc.
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There is currently little research on optimal investment timing decisions under incomplete mar-
kets that takes technological innovation and strategic aspects over technology adoption into account.3
This paper contributes to fill this gap in the literature. Specifically, I address the following ques-
tion related to the dynamics of entrepreneurship: What is the impact of non-diversifiable risk on
the optimal investment timing decision compared to complete markets, in the presence of strategic
considerations regarding technology adoption? 4
To analyze this question, I extend the model in Huisman and Kort (2004) to an incomplete
market setting where two risk-averse entrepreneurs each have access to an investment opportunity.
Each entrepreneur has to strategically decide when to invest, and whether to adopt an existing
technology (technology 1) for production or wait until a more efficient technology (technology 2)
may become available for adoption. In addition, to decide on the optimal time to exercise their real
investment options, they also make optimal intertemporal portfolio decisions as in Merton (1971).
This raises another question, I address in the model: How is the optimal portfolio choice affected by
strategic considerations regarding technology adoption?
The main results of the model can be summarized as follows: First, I show that the impact of
non-diversifiable risk on the entrepreneurs’ option timing is ambiguous and depends on the arrival
intensity of technology 2. Consequently, presence of non-diversifiable risk may accelerate or delay
the optimal investment timing compared to complete markets. This result complements the finding
in Miao and Wang (2007), who show that the investment timing decision for a single agent who
receives a flow payoff over time should always be delayed in the presence of non-diversifiable risk
compared to complete markets.
Second, the model gives rise to empirical implications regarding optimal investment timing for
3Concurrently while I was working on this paper, I became aware of a related paper by Bensoussan, Diltz, and
Hoe (2010). They analyze real options games in complete and incomplete markets with several decision makers from
a pure mathematical perspective. The aim of their paper is to mathematically characterize whether a solution exists
to certain variational inequalities, characterize its mathematical properties and determine whether it is unique under
different conditions. Thus, the authors make no attempt to solve the model numerically nor do they perform any
economic analysis about the implications of non-diversifiable risk. Furthermore, they do not consider technological
innovations in their model.
4This question was motivated by the anecdotal evidence described in Section II.6.
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individuals contemplating to become entrepreneurs. For the set of parameters used in the numerical
analysis, when it is optimal for one of the entrepreneurs to invest and become the leader, the predom-
inant prediction is that technology adoption by an under-diversified risk-averse entrepreneur should
occur sooner under incomplete markets compared to a well-diversified individual or company. This
is consistent with other theoretical work that entrepreneurs tend to promote new innovations (see,
e.g., Romer (1990) or Schmitz (1989) by way of imitation by established companies). According to
the model, a possible explanation for such behavior (at the micro-level) is driven by optimality con-
cerns and risk-aversion: entrepreneurs may take strategic aspects over uncertain future technological
innovations and their exposure to non-diversifiable income risk into account prior to investing.
Third, the model offers new insight into the determinants on optimal portfolio choice for both
current and prospective entrepreneurs. In environments with greater technological innovation and
higher correlation between the operating net-income and the risky asset, the more the prospective
entrepreneur (follower) should reduce the portfolio allocation to the risky asset, already prior to
exercising the investment option, as it becomes more profitable to invest. This finding suggests
that not only current entrepreneurs being exposed to non-diversifiable income risk from managing
a business should hold more conservative risky asset allocations (e.g., Heaton and Lucas (2000) and
Hongyan and Nofsinger (2009) for empirical evidence) it may also apply to prospective entrepreneurs.
In contrast, the current entrepreneur (leader) should conversely increase the portfolio allocation
to the risky asset, in anticipation that the follower optimally exercises her investment option, should
the more efficient technology arrive. When the follower decides to exercise her investment option, the
leader will experience a reduction in operating income from managing the business and also be less
exposed to non-diversifiable income risk which ceteris paribus, induces a lower hedging demand. The
precise effect depends on the relative profitability of operating in the market alone versus operating
with an inferior technology. These findings have practical relevance for optimal portfolio choice
for both current and prospective entrepreneurs in environments where technological innovation is
important.
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A fourth and final novel contribution of the paper, is that I jointly relax three commonly used
assumptions in the real option literature: (1) the real investment opportunity is always tradable,
i.e., it is always instantaneously available; (2) the real asset payoff can be completely spanned by
existing traded financial assets; and (3) the agent is risk-neutral.
I.1. Relation to the Existing Literature
The current paper contributes to several strands of research: (1) to the growing literature on invest-
ment under uncertainty in incomplete markets; (2) to the literature on optimal investment timing in
the presence of competition; and (3) to studies on entrepreneurial portfolio choice. In this section,
I briefly review related papers in these areas of research.
Most papers in the real option literature traditionally rely on the assumption that either the
underlying real asset is directly traded or its risk profile can be spanned by trading existing financial
assets. In reality, most real assets are not traded in the capital markets and their risk characteristics
may at best be partially spanned by the universe of traded financial assets thus leading to incomplete
markets. Recently some theoretical development has been made in the literature to extend real
option models to incomplete markets. Miao and Wang (2007) study the optimal consumption
and portfolio choice for a single entrepreneur who has a single investment opportunity. Henderson
(2007) considers a single entrepreneur who has a single investment opportunity to receive a lump-
sum payoff. Managerial investment behavior has been analyzed in Hugonnier and Morellec (2007).
Evans, Henderson, and Hobson (2008) study the optimal time to sell an asset in the presence of
wealth effects. Chen, Miao, and Wang (2010) combines a real option model under incomplete
markets with Leland (1994)’s capital structure model. Bensoussan, Diltz, and Hoe (2010) study the
mathematical properties real options under incomplete markets for several decision makers. Wang,
Wang, and Yang (2012) study the effects of non-diversifiable risk on the optimal investment and
exit decisions of a single entrepreneur in the presence of financing and liquidity constraints.5
5Empirical papers concerned with entrepreneurship and non-diversifiable risk include, Heaton and Lucas (2000),
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Hall and Woodward (2010).
85
Chapter 2: Strategic Investment and Optimal Portfolio Choice
Common for the above papers (except for Bensoussan, Diltz, and Hoe (2010)), is that they only
consider the investment decision of a single entrepreneur. In reality, real investment opportunities
can rarely be considered in isolation. A distinct branch of the real option literature considers strategic
interactions in various forms.6 An early prominent contribution is Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), who
in a deterministic setting, present a theoretical formalization of games in continuous-time. They
study technology adoption for two identical firms and show that preemption should happen at the
point where rent equalization occurs between the leader and the follower. Stenbacka and Tombak
(1994) extend the model setup in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) by introducing uncertainty into the
length of time from initial adoption of a technology and until successful implementation. Similarly,
Hoppe (2000) extends the setting in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) to consider uncertainty regarding
the profitability of adopting a new technology. Recently, Thijssen, Huisman, and Kort (2002) have
extended the Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) model to a stochastic setting and in a follow-up paper,
Huisman and Kort (2004) extend the work by Thijssen, Huisman, and Kort (2002) to identical risk-
neutral firms competing over technology adoption while taking into account future technological
innovations. However, a standard assumption in the above mentioned papers is that markets are
complete.
The final strand of research to which the current paper is related, regards optimal portfolio
choice of entrepreneurs. Theoretical studies such as Merton (1971), Viceira (2001), and Heaton
and Lucas (2004) document the importance of non-diversifiable risk for individuals’ portfolio choice.
The notion is that in the presence of uninsurable risk, individuals will adjust their risky asset
holdings to partially hedge against unfavorable movements in this risk factor. Empirical studies on
entrepreneurial portfolio choice include Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996), Heaton and Lucas
(2000) and Hongyan and Nofsinger (2009).
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the economic setting. In Section III, the
6In the report (Entrepreneurship in the EU and beyond) nearly 50% of the European respondents answered, that
they do not like situations in which they have to compete with others. Hence, presence of competition may not
only generate ”affordable” variations in the investment behavior but may in some cases even deter some people from
engaging in entrepreneurial activity in the first place.
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model is solved and Section IV presents a numerical analysis. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. The Economic Setting
II.1. Assumptions on the Entrepreneurs and Technology Adoption
Two identical infinitely lived risk-averse entrepreneurs each have a single irreversible investment op-
portunity to enter a market which gives them an uncertain flow payoff over time. The entrepreneurs
have to strategically decide when to invest and whether to adopt the existing technology (tech-
nology 1) for production or whether to wait until a more efficient technology (technology 2) may
become available for adoption. Each entrepreneur can only invest once, i.e., it is not possible for the
entrepreneurs to upgrade from technology 1 to technology 2. As in Huisman and Kort (2004) the
innovation process is assumed to be exogenous. The arrival of technology 2 is modeled according to
a Poisson process with constant parameter λ > 0. Thus, at the random time T , which follows an
exponential distribution with mean 1/λ, a more efficient technology will be available.7
II.2. Assumptions on the Investment Project (Non-traded Asset)
Let the index k ∈ {i, j} represent each of the entrepreneurs and let Nk ∈ {0, 1, 2} denote whether
entrepreneur k has adopted technology 1 (Nk = 1), technology 2 (Nk = 2) or whether she has not yet
entered the market at all (Nk = 0). The entrepreneurs can invest by paying a fixed investment cost
I > 0 equal for both entrepreneurs. After investing, entrepreneur i receives operating net-income
from managing the business given by DNiNjYt, where DNiNj is a factor representing the technologies
adopted. The dynamics of Y equals,
(Project value) .s dYt = αydt+ σyρdBt + σy
√
1− ρ2dB˜t Y0 = y (1)
7Modeling the arrival of a new technology in this way, helps to ensure that the model setup remains in a time-
homogenous setting which facilitates analytical tractability.
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where {Bt}t≥0 and {B˜t}t≥0 are independent standard Brownian motions. The parameter αy denotes
the expected drift and σy the volatility of the project value. The parameter ρ denotes the correlation
between the project value and the risky asset (see Section II.3). The risks inherent in the investment
project cannot be completely hedged by trading in the financial market, i.e., |ρ| < 1. Positive values
of the process {Yt}t≥0 denote operating profits whereas negative values denote operating losses.
I follow Huisman and Kort (2004) and specify the following assumptions on the “income factors”
representing the technology adopted by the entrepreneurs,
D20 > D21 > D22
∨ ∨ ∨
D10 > D11 > D12
The entrepreneurs receive zero operating income if they have not invested, i.e., D0Nk = 0 for
Nk ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The structure on the factors, DNiNj , implies that technology 2 is superior to
technology 1, and adopting either technology before the competitor yields a higher flow payoff
compared to the situation where the competitor has adopted the same technology.
II.3. Assumptions on the Financial Market
In addition to investing in the business project, the entrepreneurs have access to a risk-free bond, P ,
paying a constant interest rate r > 0, and a risky asset, S, which is traded in the financial markets.
The dynamics of the risky asset is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. The financial
investment universe is defined as follows,
(Risky asset) .s dSt = µSStdt+ σSStdBt .S0 > 0 (2)
(Bank account) dPt = rPtdt ...... P0 > 0 (3)
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where µS and σS are constant parameters respectively denoting the expected rate of growth and
volatility of the risky asset.
II.4. Assumptions on the Valuation Methodology
The implication of working under incomplete markets is that the usual valuation techniques from no-
arbitrage option pricing theory (e.g., Black and Scholes (1973)) cannot be applied since a standard
replication argument no longer applies.8 Furthermore, under incomplete markets there exists no
unique measure under which we can evaluate real asset investment opportunities to obtain a unique
price. As a consequence, we have to resort to other pricing methods suitable under incomplete
markets.
One such method (which will be adopted in this paper) is obtained by making explicit assump-
tions about the entrepreneurs’ attitude toward risk via a utility function. When pricing is embedded
in a utility maximization setting, a unique (martingale) measure emerges, which can then be used
for valuation of non-traded investment opportunities using dynamic programming techniques (e.g.,
Henderson (2009) or Birge and Linetsky (2007)). This is termed utility indifference pricing and
gives rise to so-called certainty-equivalent valuation.9 Because the valuation is performed via utility
indifference pricing, the entrepreneurs’ preferences toward risk have an impact on the option values
characterizing the investment opportunities.10
II.5. Assumptions on the Entrepreneurs’ Decision Problem
The entrepreneurs are endowed with an exponential utility function over consumption c, specified
by u(c) = − 1γ e−γc, where the parameter γ > 0 denotes the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion. The
8That is, it is not possible to construct a replicating portfolio from existing financial assets which match the payoff
and risk profile of the investment project perfectly.
9The certainty-equivalent valuation is the amount of wealth (Wce), which makes the entrepreneur indifferent in
utility terms between, (a) having the investment option to adopt technology 1 or 2 and receive an uncertain income
stream, and (b) giving up the investment option and instead receive the amount (Wce).
10This is different from complete markets where the option values are independent of risk-preferences.
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choice of utility function is chosen for analytical tractability and the two entrepreneurs are assumed
to have the same level of risk-aversion.11 The objective for each of the entrepreneurs is to maximize
the expected discounted utility from consumption over an infinite investment horizon,
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βsu(cs)ds
]
(4)
where β > 0 denotes the entrepreneurs subjective discount rate. The entrepreneurs optimize the
objective with respect to investment and consumption strategy, pi and c, and strategically decide on
the optimal time to undertake the investment opportunity.
II.6. Anecdotal Evidence
It is instructive to think of the modeling setup having the following real-world example in mind: In
2007, the entrepreneur Shai Agassi founded the California-based company Better Place - an electric
vehicles service provider with a vision to make zero-emission cars. In the Harvard Business Review,
May 2009, Shai Agassi talks about technology adoption:
“Every night I went to Wikipedia, picked a term like “ethanol” or “natural gas,” and
studied for hours. Eventually I wrote a white paper proposing a plan that relies on
existing technology: cars that run on lithium-ion batteries recharged by renewable energy.”
(Akresh-Gonzales (2009))
We can think of electric-driven vehicles as the existing technology (technology 1). Technological
innovation plays a fundamental role in the market for zero-emission vehicles:
“The market outlook for electric vehicles seems bright [...] Yet the future of electric
vehicles is far from assured. [...] Will other technologies - such as hybrid cars or vehicles
11Assuming different levels of risk-aversion for the entrepreneurs would imply that the one with the lowest risk-
aversion would always invest before its competitor. The same argument holds for differentiated investment costs,
(e.g., Pawlina and Kort (2006)) Without allowing for, e.g., incomplete information as in Lambrecht and Perraudin
(2003) assuming different levels of risk-aversion and/or investment costs appears to be less interesting since the order
of investment is given a priori.
90
Chapter 2: Strategic Investment and Optimal Portfolio Choice
powered by natural gas, ethanol, or hydrogen - emerge and win the competition against
electric cars?” (Graham and Messer (2011))
Upon arrival of a more efficient technology (technology 2) other entrepreneurs are likely to invest
and compete with the technology adopted by Shai Agassi.
III. Derivation of the Value Functions
In this section, the model is solved using stochastic dynamic programming. Section III.1 derives the
project value payoff the entrepreneurs obtain from exercising their investment options. In Section
III.2, the (option) value functions are derived in the case where technology 2 is available. In Section
III.3 the (option) value functions are derived before technology 2 has arrived by relying on the
expressions derived in Section III.2.
III.1. The Project Value
Proposition 1. The project value associated with income factor, DNiNj , in the presence of non-
diversifiable risk, is given by the function,
f(y;DNiNj ) =
DNiNj
r
y +
(αy − ρσyη)DNiNj
r2
−
γσ2y(1− ρ2)D2NiNj
2r2
(5)
To provide intuition for the expression in Proposition 1, consider the situation where the risk-
aversion parameter goes to zero (γ → 0) and the correlation between the operating net-income
and the risky asset goes to one (ρ→ 1). Then we approach the traditional complete market setting
with risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Under complete markets the risk-neutral dynamics of the operating
net-income equals dYt =
(
αy − σyη
)
dt+ σydB
Q
t where η =
µS−r
σS
denotes the market price of risk.12
12Under the risk-neutral measure, Q, the risky asset commands a drift equal to the risk-free rate. Then by relying
on Girsanov’s theorem (e.g., Bjork (2004)) we have that dBt = htdt+ dB
Q
t where B
Q is a Q-Brownian motion and the
Girsanov kernel ht, equals ht = −η where η = µS−rσS denotes the market price of risk and the risk-neutral dynamics of
the operating net-income under complete markets follows.
91
Chapter 2: Strategic Investment and Optimal Portfolio Choice
Consequently, the project value can be computed as the expected present value under the risk-neutral
measure, Q, of the flow payoff DNiNjYt discounted by the risk-free rate,
f(y;DNiNj ) = E
Q
Y0=y
(∫ ∞
0
e−rtDNiNjYtdt
)
=
DNiNj
r
y +
(
αy − σyη
)
DNiNj
r2
. (6)
The project value under complete markets corresponds to the two first terms in the project value
under incomplete markets. The last term in the project value under incomplete markets (see Propo-
sition 1), accounts for the risk attitude of the entrepreneurs and the non-diversifiable income risk
which lower the valuation relative to complete markets. In contrast to the valuation under incom-
plete markets, the entrepreneurs’ risk-preferences do not appear in the project value under complete
markets.
III.2. The Situation when Technology 2 is Available
In this section, we consider the situation where technology 2 is available. There are three possible
scenarios: First, a scenario where none of the entrepreneurs have invested before time T (Section
III.2.1); Second, a scenario where one entrepreneur has invested before time T and has become
the leader (Section III.2.2); Third a scenario where both entrepreneurs have invested before time T
(Section III.2.3). Below the (option) value functions and investment thresholds (where relevant) for
each of the scenarios are derived.
III.2.1. None of the Entrepreneurs have Invested before Time T
Because t ≥ T both entrepreneurs will adopt technology 2 since it is assumed to be superior to tech-
nology 1. Thus, we can view this situation as a single entrepreneur who has to decide when to invest
in technology 2. Having determined the project value in Section III.1, we can now determine the
associated (option) value function. Proposition 2 gives the option value and the optimal investment
threshold for the entrepreneurs.
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Proposition 2. The value function for joint investment in technology 2 is given by,
J22;AI(y) =
 g(y) if y ∈ (−∞, y¯22)f(y;D22)− I if y ∈ (y¯22,+∞)
after time T and where y¯22 denotes the optimal investment threshold. The function g(y) satisfies
the following non-linear ODE,
rg(y) =
σ2y
2
g′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)g′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)g′(y) (7)
on y ∈ (−∞, y¯22) subject to limy→−∞ g(y) = 0 and the value-matching and smooth-pasting con-
ditions, g(y¯22) = f(y¯22;D22) − I and g′(y¯22) = f ′(y¯22;D22) where the function f(·) is given in
Proposition 1. The optimal portfolio policy of the entrepreneurs is given in Appendix A.
The function g(y) represents the option value of joint investment using technology 2 in the
continuation region and f(y;D22)−I denotes the intrinsic value of the option in the stopping region.
As the operating net-income approaches minus infinity the option value becomes worthless. There
exists no closed-form expression for the function g(y) which satisfies the boundary conditions and
the solution has to be found numerically.13 When the operating net-income hits the endogenously
determined threshold y¯22 both entrepreneurs exercise their investment option, pay the investment
costs I and receive the project value f(y;D22).
III.2.2. One Entrepreneur has Invested before Time T
Next, we consider the case where one entrepreneur is assumed to have invested before time, T , in
technology 1 (the leader). The entrepreneur who has not yet invested (the follower), faces a situation
of a single individual who has to decide when to invest in technology 2. The follower’s option value
13Throughout the paper, projection methods using Chebyshev collocation have been applied to solve the differential
equations numerically. This approach has proven to be far superior to, e.g., conventional finite difference methods
when trying to numerically approximate the solution to non-linear differential equations subject to a free-boundary
(see, e.g., Judd (1992) and Dangl and Wirl (2004)).
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function and investment threshold are given in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. The value function for the follower after time T , is given by,
F21;AI(y) =
 g(y) if y ∈ (−∞, y¯12)f(y;D21)− I if y ∈ (y¯12,+∞)
where y¯12 denotes the optimal investment threshold. The function g(y) satisfies the following non-
linear ODE,
rg(y) =
σ2y
2
g′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)g′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)g′(y) (8)
on y ∈ (−∞, y¯12) subject to limy→−∞ g(y) = 0 and the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
g(y¯12) = f(y¯12;D21) − I and g′(y¯12) = f ′(y¯12;D21) where the function f(·) is given in Proposition
1. The optimal portfolio policy of the follower is given in Appendix A.
Having determined the value function F21;AI(y) for the follower we are in a position to determine
the value function to the leader, i.e, for the entrepreneur who has invested in technology 1. The
result is given in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The value function for the leader after time T , is given by,
L12;AI(y) =
 g(y) if y ∈ (−∞, y¯12)f(y;D12) if y ∈ (y¯12,+∞)
where y¯12 denotes the follower’s optimal investment threshold determined in Proposition 3. The
function g(y) satisfies the following non-linear ODE,
rg(y) =
σ2y
2
g′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)g′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)g′(y) +D10y (9)
on y ∈ (−∞, y¯12) subject to lim
y→−∞g(y) = f(y;D10) and the value-matching condition g(y¯12)=f(y¯12;D12)
where the function f(·) is given in Proposition 1. The optimal portfolio policy of the leader is given
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in Appendix A.
The value-matching condition captures that the leader faces a reduction in the flow payoff from
managing the business when the follower invests in technology 2.14
III.2.3. Both Entrepreneurs have Invested before Time T
In this scenario both entrepreneurs are assumed to have invested in technology 1 before time, T .
The value function is given in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The value function for joint investment in technology 1 is given by J11;AI(y) =
f(y;D11) where the function f(·) is given in Proposition 1.
III.3. The Situation before the Arrival of Technology 2
Next, we consider the situation before technology 2 has arrived. In Section III.3.1 the follower’s
value function is derived. In Section III.3.2 the leader’s value function is derived by relying on the
follower’s optimal investment behavior. In Section III.3.3 and III.3.4 the value functions for joint
investment in technology 2 and 1 are respectively derived.
III.3.1. The Follower’s Value Functions
We identify two scenarios for which we can derive the option value functions for the follower: (1)
The follower waits for technology 2 before investing, given the leader has invested in technology
1 (Proposition 6); and (2) The follower considers investing in technology 1, given the leader has
invested in technology 1 (Proposition 7).
Proposition 6. The value function for the follower before time T (given the follower waits for
technology 2) is given by F21;BI(y) = G(y) where the function G(y) satisfies the following non-linear
14Note, that to determine the value function for the leader, we do not need to invoke any smooth-pasting condition
because it is not a free-boundary value problem. Moreover, since we assume the leader has already invested in
technology 1, we do not subtract the investment costs in the value-matching condition.
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ODE,
rG(y) =
σ2y
2
G′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)G′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)G′(y) + λ(F21;AI(y)−G(y)) (10)
on y ∈ (−∞,∞) where F21;AI(·) is given in Proposition 3, subject to the boundary conditions
limy→−∞G(y) = 0 and limy→+∞G(y) = Ay + B. The expressions for A and B and the optimal
portfolio policy of the follower are given in Appendix A.
The non-linear ODE that determines the function G(y) has to be solved numerically.15 The
lower boundary condition, limy→−∞G(y) = 0, captures that the option to invest loses its value, as
the operating net-income approaches minus infinity. The upper boundary condition represents the
expected net-present value of the flow payoff D21Yt accruing to the follower from investing at time
T and onwards using technology 2 adjusted for risk-aversion and incomplete hedging (see Appendix
A for additional details).
Next, we consider the scenario where the follower considers investing in technology 1. According
to Huisman and Kort (2004), and in line with intuition, such a situation would only be an attractive
option for the follower for sufficiently low values of λ.
Proposition 7. The value function for the follower before time T , is given by,
F11;BI(y) =
 G(y) if y ∈ (−∞, y¯11)f(y;D11)− I if y ∈ (y¯11,+∞)
where y¯11 denotes the optimal investment threshold for the follower to invest in technology 1. The
15Note, that in order to solve for G(y) under complete markets, one would rely on the continuity and differentiability
conditions around the threshold y¯12 (which is known under both complete and incomplete markets) to determine the
relevant parameters. However, under incomplete markets, we do not know the value taken by the function G(y) in
this point and therefore we cannot utilize the information to determine the function G(y) numerically since we have
no closed-form expression to guide us. Thus, we have to solve the differential equations subject to the boundary
conditions given in the proposition.
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function G(y) satisfies the following non-linear ODE,
rG(y) =
σ2y
2
G′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)G′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)G′(y) + λ(F21;AI(y)−G(y)) (11)
on y ∈ (−∞, y¯11) where F21;AI(·) is given in Proposition 3, subject to limy→−∞G(y) = 0 and the
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, G(y¯11) = f(y¯11;D11)− I and G′(y¯11) = f ′(y¯11;D11)
where the function f(·) is given in Proposition 1. The optimal portfolio policy of the follower is
given in Appendix A.
Note, that we subtract the investment costs in the value-matching condition. This represents
the case where the operating net-income process reaches (or is above) y¯11 and the follower invests
in technology 1 and pays the investment costs.
III.3.2. The Leader’s Value Functions
Next, we derive the value functions for the leader under the assumption of immediate investment in
technology 1.16 We identify two scenarios: (1) The follower waits for technology 2 (Proposition 8);
and (2) The follower considers investing in technology 1 (Proposition 9).
Proposition 8. The value function for the leader before time T (given the follower waits for
technology 2), is given by L12;BI(y) = G(y) − I where the function G(y) satisfies the following
non-linear ODE,
rG(y) =
σ2y
2
G′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)G′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)G′(y) +D10y + λ (L12;AI(y)−G(y)) (12)
on y ∈ (−∞,∞) where L12;AI(·) is given in Proposition 4, subject to the boundary conditions
lim
y→−∞G(y) = f(y;D10) and limy→∞G(y) = Ay + B. The expression for A and B and the optimal
portfolio policy of the leader are given in Appendix A.
16Thus we simply subtract the investment costs at the end, since we assume immediate investment by the leader.
They are not part of the problem as it was the case for the follower since we are not explicitly concerned with the
exact entry point by the leader at this stage. This is conventional to do when considering real options and competition
(see, e.g., Pawlina and Kort (2006)).
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The lower boundary condition captures that the leader is exposed to any downside movements in
the operating net-income. As the operating net-income approaches minus infinity, it is not optimal
for the follower to invest regardless of the technology available and therefore the leader’s value
function converges to the project value f(y;D10). The upper boundary condition captures the
expected present value of receiving the flow payoff D10Yt (from immediate investment in technology
1) up to time T and from that point onwards the flow payoff D12Yt in perpetuity adjusted for
risk-aversion and incomplete hedging.
Proposition 9. The value function for the leader before time T , is given by,
L11;BI(y) =
 G(y)− I if y ∈ (−∞, y¯11)f(y;D11)− I if y ∈ (y¯11,+∞)
where y¯11 denotes the follower’s optimal investment threshold for investment in technology 1 deter-
mined in Proposition 7. The function G(y) satisfies the following non-linear ODE,
rG(y) =
σ2y
2
G′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)G′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)G′(y) +D10y + λ (L12;AI(y)−G(y)) (13)
on y ∈ (−∞, y¯11) where L12;AI(·) is given in Proposition 4, subject to lim
y→−∞G(y) = f(y;D10) and
the value-matching condition G(y¯11) = f(y¯11;D11) where the function f(·) is given in Proposition
1. The optimal portfolio policy of the leader is given in Appendix A.
The upper boundary condition, G(y¯11) = f(y¯11;D11), captures the reduction in the flow payoff
the leader incurs, at the moment when the follower invests in technology 1.
III.3.3. Waiting to Invest until Technology 2 Arrives
Next, we derive the option value function when both entrepreneurs wait for technology 2.
Proposition 10. The value function for joint waiting until technology 2 arrives, before time T ,
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is given by J22;BI(y) = G(y) where The function G(y) satisfies the following non-linear ODE,
rG(y) =
σ2y
2
G′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)G′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)G′(y) + λ(J22;AI(y)−G(y)) (14)
on y ∈ (−∞,∞) where the function J22;AI(y) is given in Proposition 2, subject to the boundary
conditions limy→−∞G(y) = 0 and limy→+∞G(y) = Ay +B. The expressions for A and B and the
optimal portfolio policy of the entrepreneurs are given in Appendix A.
The upper growth condition in Proposition 10 represents the expected net-present value of the
flow payoff D22Yt accruing to both entrepreneurs from investing at time T and onwards using
technology 2 adjusted for risk-aversion and incomplete hedging.
III.3.4. Joint Investment in Technology 1
Finally, Proposition 11 states the value function for joint investment in technology 1.
Proposition 11. The value function for joint investment in technology 1 before time T is given
by, J11;BI(y) = f(y;D11)−I where the function f(·) is given in Proposition 2. The optimal portfolio
policy is given in Proposition 5.
IV. Numerical Analysis
In this section, a numerical analysis of the model is presented. The differential equations defining the
(option) value functions in Section III, allow us to study how non-diversifiable risk and technological
innovation affect the optimal strategic investment behavior of the risk-averse entrepreneurs compared
to the benchmark setting with risk-neutral agents and complete markets.
This paper extends the complete market model in Huisman and Kort (2004) to incomplete
markets. Because closed-form solutions exist under complete markets, Huisman and Kort are able
to explicitly characterize the different equilibria that can arise depending on the value of the arrival
intensity of technology 2. In the presence of non-diversifiable risk, it is no longer possible to obtain
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closed-form solutions for the (option) value functions and investment thresholds. However, by
restricting the model to risk-neutral entrepreneurs (γ → 0) and complete markets (ρ → 1), we can
find the thresholds of λ which characterize the equilibria that occur with respect to the stochastic
process considered in this paper. This will serve as the benchmark to which we compare the model
predictions under incomplete markets. We merely state the result here and refer to their paper for
a complete treatment: A preemptive equilibrium occurs for λ ∈ [0, rD10D21−D12 ) and for λ < rD11D21−D11 ,
the follower considers investing in technology 1. That is, for values of λ greater than rD11D21−D11 the
threshold y¯11 does not exist. For λ ∈ [ rD10D21−D12 , rD10D22−D12 ), an attrition equilibrium arises where the
follower is better off than the leader. Finally, for λ ∈ [ rD10D22−D12 ,∞), a waiting equilibrium arises,
where it is profitable for both entrepreneurs to wait for technology 2 to arrive before investing.17
The strategic and optimal investment timing decisions are analyzed in Sections IV.1 to IV.4 for
varying levels of technological innovation. Section IV.5 discusses the implications on the optimal
portfolio choice of the entrepreneurs. Finally, Section IV.6 provides comparative statics of the
optimal investment behavior with respect to certain key parameters.
IV.1. A Preemption Equilibrium
Consider first the situation where λ < rD10D21−D12 = 0.2667.
18 Panel A and C in Figure 1 show the
(option) value functions for an arrival intensity λ = 0.02 under complete and incomplete markets
respectively. Panel B and D show a similar picture for λ = 0.15. The panels thus allow for a
comparison of how the valuation and optimal investment timing of the follower and the leader
changes when we move from complete to incomplete markets. We discuss each of the entrance
17Under incomplete markets, it appears difficult to establish a similar general result about the equilibria occurring
depending on the value of λ, since closed-form solutions are absent. However, since the project value, the entrepreneurs
obtain after investing, is linear in the operating net-income under both complete and incomplete markets, the upper
growth conditions are also linear in the operating net-income under the two market settings. Thus, up to certain
parameter combinations which may introduce large non-linear effects in the (option) value functions under incomplete
markets, the equilibria defined by the critical values of λ under complete markets, can be transferred to the incomplete
market setting. This is because the upper growth conditions to a large extent define the critical values of λ, cf. Huisman
and Kort (2004).
18To assess the impact of the arrival intensity on the optimal investment timing, λ is varying whereas all the other
parameters are fixed throughout Figure 1-3.
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points in turn.
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Figure 1. Option value functions. Panel A and B show the value functions under complete
markets for λ = 0.02 and λ = 0.15 and Panel C and D show the value functions under incomplete
markets for λ = 0.02 and λ = 0.15, respectively. The dash-dotted line denotes the value function
for the leader, the dotted line denotes the value function for the follower, the solid line denotes
the value function for joint waiting for technology 2 and the dashed line denotes the value function
for joint investment in technology 1. The other parameters are specified as follows: project value
drift αy = 0.05, project value volatility σy = 30%, risk-free interest rate r = 8%, investment costs
I = 50, risky asset drift µs = 0.10, risky asset volatility σs = 20%, risk-aversion γ = 0.25, correlation
between operating net-income and risky asset ρ = 0.15. The income factors are, D10 = 5, D12 = 2.5,
D21 = 4, D11 = 3 and D22 = 3.2.
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IV.1.1. The Follower’s Investment Threshold
We first examine the follower’s optimal investment threshold. The investment threshold y¯11 under
incomplete markets is determined by trading off the relative changes of the project value f(y;D11)
and the option value G(y) compared to complete markets (e.g., Miao and Wang (2007)). When the
follower invests in technology 1, the value functions for the leader and follower coincide and equals
the joint investment value, f(y;D11). This happens at the point where the three curves (the leader,
the follower and the joint investment curve) collapse into one, as indicated by the vertical dotted
line(s) in Figure 1.
Note first, that risk-aversion and incomplete hedging lower both the option value and the project
value compared to complete markets. This is intuitive, since the entrepreneurs face non-diversifiable
income risk (both before and after option exercise) to which they are risk-averse and that ceteris-
paribus has a negative impact on the valuations.
From panel A and C in Figure 1 we observe that when technological innovation is sufficiently
sparse (e.g., λ = 0.02), option exercise should be delayed under incomplete markets relative to
complete markets. This occurs because risk-aversion and incomplete hedging lower the project
value (i.e., the payoff from investing) more relative to the option value.19
We also observe that the expected certainty-equivalent gain from arrival of technology 2 has a
positive impact on the follower’s option value under both market settings. In line with intuition, the
more likely technology 2 is to arrive, the more valuable it is for the follower to wait for technology 2,
and the larger the operating net-income needs to be, in order to justify investment in technology 1.
But in contrast to the situation when technological innovation is sparse (e.g., λ = 0.02), we observe
from Panel B and D that when technological innovation is more concentrated (e.g., λ = 0.15),
investment by the follower should instead be accelerated under incomplete markets compared to
19If we let the arrival intensity of technology 2 go to zero (λ → 0), we essentially approach the model in Miao and
Wang (2007). They show (in a setting with a single risk-averse entrepreneur and without technological innovation),
that investment in a project yielding a flow payoff will always be delayed under incomplete markets compared to
complete markets. In light of their finding, the prediction of delayed option exercise under incomplete markets for
levels of technological innovation close to zero is as expected.
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complete markets.
By virtue of risk-aversion and incomplete hedging, the entrepreneurs attach a lower value to the
investment opportunity in technology 2 under incomplete markets. Thus, the expected certainty-
equivalent gain from arrival of technology 2 has a smaller positive impact on the follower’s option
value under incomplete markets than under complete markets. This is evident in Figure 1. In
particular, the larger the arrival intensity, the smaller is the positive contribution to the option
value under incomplete markets relative to complete markets. This can be motivated, by rewriting
the expected certainty-equivalent gain from arrival of technology 2 under incomplete markets into a
component which resembles the certainty-equivalent gain under complete markets plus an additional
term as follows: λ(F21;AI(y) − G(y)) ≈ λ(F21;AC(y) − G(y)) − λ(F21;AC(y) − F21;AI(y)) where the
subscript I denotes “incomplete markets” and C denotes “complete markets”. The additional term
λ(F21;AC(y) − F21;AI(y)) is positive, and thus has a negative impact on the option value under
incomplete markets, which is increasing in the degree of technological innovation.
Hence, there exists a level of technological innovation, above which, the smaller certainty-
equivalent gain under incomplete markets, ends up lowering the option value more relative to the
project value because the project value itself is unaffected by the degree of technological innovation.
This implies, that the overall positive effect on the option value of waiting in the environment with
sparse (or without) technological innovation is reversed, thereby leading to accelerated investment
in technology 1 by the follower under incomplete markets.
IV.1.2. The Leader’s Investment Threshold
Next, we study the optimal investment threshold for the leader. According to Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) preemption by the leader should occur when there is rent equalization between the leader
and the follower (i.e., when the leader and the follower curve intersect each other). We therefore
need to examine how the leader and follower value functions are affected as we move from complete
to incomplete markets.
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When the operating net-income decreases, the leader’s value function is lowered more relative
to the follower’s value function as we move from complete to incomplete markets. Specifically, risk-
aversion and non-diversifiable risk reduce the value attained by the lower boundary condition in
the leader’s valuation problem and that again results in a lower value function under incomplete
markets. The follower, on the other hand, has no direct exposure to movements in the operating
net-income since she has not exercised her investment option.20 As a result, the follower’s value
function converges to zero as the operating net-income decreases regardless of the market setting.
From Panel A and C, we observe that when λ = 0.02, preemption under complete markets occurs
at a level of operating net-income, where the leader’s value function under incomplete markets is
lowered more than the follower’s value function. This results in delayed investment under incomplete
markets.
In contrast, when λ = 0.15 preemption should be accelerated under incomplete markets. For
increasing operating net-income, risk-aversion and non-diversifiable risk lower the instantaneous
expected drift in the follower’s value function more than in the leader’s value function. That is,
the follower’s value function exhibits a lower option’s Delta under incomplete markets.21 As the
operating net-income increases, risk-aversion and non-diversifiable risk matter less for the leader
since the payoff flow from managing the business has an increasingly positive impact on the value
function. Therefore, when the operating net-income becomes sufficiently large, the follower’s value
function is lowered more than the leader’s value function as we move from complete to incomplete
markets.
In line with intuition, as technology 2 is more likely to arrive, preemption will occur at a higher
level of operating net-income. Specifically, from Panel B and D we observe that preemption under
complete markets for λ = 0.15 occurs at a level of operating net-income where it is more profitable
to be the leader than to be the follower under incomplete markets. This, ceteris paribus, results in
20However, because the follower is forward looking, she has a more indirect exposure to movements in the operating
net-income through the option value function G(y).
21This holds, of course, only up to the point where the follower’s option value reaches its intrinsic value and the
option’s Delta coincides with the option’s Delta of the leader’s value function.
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accelerated investment by the leader under incomplete markets.22
The numerical analysis in Figure 1, illustrates, that the implications of technological innovation
on the optimal strategic investment timing behavior in the presence of non-diversifiable risk is am-
biguous compared to complete markets. This result has ramifications for individuals contemplating
to become entrepreneurs in markets where technological innovation plays an important role.
IV.2. A Second-mover Advantage
Next, we consider a value of the arrival intensity λ ∈ [ rD10D21−D12 , rD10D22−D12 ) = [0.2667, 0.5714). Panel
A and C in Figure 2 show the value functions for λ = 0.27 under complete and incomplete markets,
respectively. Panel B and D show a similar picture for λ = 0.40. In this situation, the arrival
likelihood of technology 2 is sufficiently large such that the leader and the follower curve do not
intersect, i.e., no preemption equilibrium will occur. For all values of the operating net-income, it is
more optimal to invest as the follower in technology 2, than to invest as the first-mover in technology
1, i.e., there exists a second-mover advantage.
As in Huisman and Kort (2004) an attrition equilibrium arises when the leader and the waiting
curve intersect each other, see also Hendricks, Weiss, and Wilson (1988). At this attrition point
(illustrated by the vertical dotted line(s)), it is more profitable for one of the entrepreneurs to invest
than to engage in joint waiting until technology 2 arrives, but it is still more profitable to invest
22The valuation of the leader curve slightly increases as the arrival intensity of technology 2 increase. As the arrival
intensity increases, technology 2 is expected to arrive sooner and this should mainly benefit the follower. However, this
phenomenon happens because, as the arrival intensity of technology 2 increases then so does the investment threshold,
y¯11, when the follower optimally invests in technology 1. This implies that the leader receives the flow payoff D10Yt
for a longer period of time given technology 2 does not arrive and that has a slight upward impact on the valuation
of the leader curve.
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Figure 2. Option value functions. Panel A and B show the value functions under complete
markets for λ = 0.27 and λ = 0.40 and Panel C and D show the value functions under incomplete
markets for λ = 0.27 and λ = 0.40, respectively. The dash-dotted line denotes the value function
for the leader, the dotted line denotes the value function for the follower, the solid line denotes the
value function for joint waiting for technology 2. The other parameters are given as follows: project
value drift αy = 0.05, project value volatility σy = 30%, risk-free interest rate r = 8%, investment
costs I = 50, risky asset drift µs = 0.10, risky asset volatility σs = 20%, risk-aversion γ = 0.25,
correlation between operating net-income and risky asset ρ = 0.15. The income factors are, D10 = 5,
D12 = 2.5, D21 = 4, D11 = 3 and D22 = 3.2.
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second and wait for the arrival of technology 2.23
From Figure 2 we observe, that as technology 2 is more likely to arrive over the next instant,
it becomes more valuable for the entrepreneurs to engage in joint waiting for technology 2. This
pushes the waiting curve up relative to the leader curve such that the attrition point occurs later
under both market settings. Note also, that the differential equation defining the value function
for joint waiting (Proposition 10) is identical to that defining the valuation of and the follower’s
value function (Proposition 6) apart from the income factor. Therefore, the impact of risk-aversion
and non-diversifiable risk on the value function for joint waiting, is similar to that discussed in
Section IV.1.2 for the follower’s value function. Hence, the value function for joint waiting is lowered
relatively more than the leader’s value function, as we move from complete to incomplete markets,
for increasing values of the operating net-income. As for the follower’s value function, the opposite
situation occurs for decreasing values of the operating net-income.
For λ = 0.27, the attrition point occurs at a level of operating net-income, where the leader’s
value function is lowered relatively more than the value function for joint waiting thereby resulting
in delayed investment under incomplete markets. In contrast, when λ = 0.40 the attrition point
occurs at a level of operating net-income where the waiting curve suffers relatively more than the
leader curve thereby leading to accelerated investment under incomplete markets.
23Since the aim of the analysis is to understand when investment should optimally take place rather than to
differentiate between which of the entrepreneurs that will invest first and given that the entrepreneurs are assumed
to be similar, it is for simplicity assumed, that with probability one half, each of the entrepreneurs will invest as
the leader. The attrition equilibrium represents a situation, where one of the entrepreneurs is better off investing in
the existing technology (technology 1) to become the leader rather than to engage in joint waiting for the arrival of
technology 2. We may think of such a situation in the market for zero-emission vehicles (cf. the anecdotal evidence
in Section II.6) where new innovations are constantly being developed, but the time it takes for them to reach the
market as operational technologies is highly uncertain, so eventually, one may be better off investing in the existing
available technology.
107
Chapter 2: Strategic Investment and Optimal Portfolio Choice
IV.3. Waiting for Technology 2
Next, we consider a value of the arrival intensity λ ∈ [ rD10D22−D12 ,∞) = [0.5714,∞). Panel A and B in
Figure 3 illustrate the situation for λ = 2.95 under complete and incomplete markets, respectively.24
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Figure 3. Option value functions. Panel A and B show respectively the option value functions
under complete and incomplete markets. The dash-dotted line denotes the value function for the
Leader, the dotted line denotes the value function for the Follower, the solid line denotes the value
function for joint waiting for technology 2. The other parameters are given as follows: project
value drift αy = 0.05, project value volatility σy = 30%, risk-free interest rate r = 8%, investment
costs I = 50, drift risky asset µs = 0.10, volatility risky asset σs = 20%, risk-aversion γ = 0.25,
correlation between project value and risky asset ρ = 0.15. The income factors are, D10 = 5,
D12 = 2.5, D21 = 4, D11 = 3 and D22 = 3.2.
For this value of the arrival intensity, both entrepreneurs should optimally wait until technology 2
arrives. This occurs because the leader’s value function is below the value function for joint waiting
for all values of the operating net-income. The primary difference as we move from complete to
incomplete markets is that the value functions decrease due to presence of risk-aversion and non-
diversifiable risk.
24The value of λ = 2.95 is chosen purely for illustrative purposes since for, e.g., λ = 0.58 the waiting curve and the
leader curve will be very close together making it hard to visualize any differences in the figure.
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IV.4. Empirical Implications regarding Investment Timing
The numerical analysis above has shown that significant differences can occur regarding the opti-
mal strategic investment behavior between under-diversified individuals such as entrepreneurs who
own a substantial share of their entrepreneurial business and well-diversified individuals or com-
panies. Specifically, the degree of technological innovation as well as risk-attitude in conjunction
with non-diversifiable risk appear to play an important role in determining the optimal investment
timing. This leads to empirical implications regarding optimal investment timing for individuals
contemplating to become entrepreneurs.
For the set of parameters used in the numerical analysis, when it is optimal for one of the
entrepreneurs to invest and become the leader (cf. Figure 1–2), the predominant prediction is that
technology adoption by an under-diversified risk-averse entrepreneur should occur sooner under
incomplete markets compared to a well-diversified individual or company. This is consistent with
other theoretical work that entrepreneurs tend to promote new innovations and technologies, e.g.,
Romer (1990) and Schmitz (1989) by way of imitation by established companies and Quadrini (2009)
for a review. According to the model, a possible explanation for such behavior (at the micro-level)
is driven by optimality concerns and risk-aversion: entrepreneurs may take strategic aspects over
uncertain future technological innovations and their exposure to non-diversifiable income risk into
account prior to investing.
Moreover, the numerical analysis has shown that by accounting for strategic aspects and arrival
of future technological innovations, the investment timing may, in the presence of non-diversifiable
risk, be accelerated compared to complete markets, in contrast to the findings in Miao and Wang
(2007).
IV.5. Analysis of the Optimal Portfolio Policy
A number of studies in the literature have documented the importance of non-diversifiable risk for
individuals’ portfolio choice (e.g., Merton (1971), Bodie, Merton, and F. (1992) and Viceira (2001)).
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The notion is that in the presence of uninsurable risk, individuals will adjust their risky asset
holdings (“hedging demand”) to partially hedge against unfavorable movements in this risk factor.25
The numerical analysis complements this literature and sheds new light onto factors which affect the
hedging demand and thus optimal portfolio choice. Specifically, strategic considerations regarding
entrance of other individuals and business specific factors such as technological innovation are shown
to have substantial implications for the optimal portfolio choice under incomplete markets.
Panel A and B in Figure 4 illustrate the optimal portfolio choice as a function of the operating net-
income for the follower and the leader for varying levels of technological innovation and incomplete
hedging. In anticipation of a more efficient technology arriving sooner and for higher correlation
between the operating net-income and the risky asset, the more the follower should reduce the risky
asset holdings as the operating net-income increases. Specifically, as the option’s Delta becomes more
sensitive to changes in the operating net-income, the follower optimally hedges the larger variations
that can occur in the certainty-equivalent valuation of the non-traded investment opportunity by
lowering the exposure to the risky asset already prior to exercising the investment option. This
result has implications for prospective entrepreneurs contemplating to start up their own business
in markets where technological innovation plays a fundamental role.
In the same vein, the leader should also adjust the portfolio allocation in the risky asset as the
arrival intensity of technology 2, the amount of hedging and the operating net-income increases
in anticipation of sooner entry by the follower. Once the follower invests, the leader’s operating
net-income from managing the business is adversely affected and the exposure to non-diversifiable
risk is reduced. Therefore, the leader should increase the holdings in the risky asset already prior
to investment by the follower, however still at levels below the myopic mean-variance portfolio
consistent with findings in Hongyan and Nofsinger (2009) and Heaton and Lucas (2000). This gives
25In the numerical analysis, the correlation between innovations to the risky asset and the operating net-income is
assumed to be positive (ρ = 0.15) and therefore, the entrepreneurs will attempt to hedge the uninsurable income risk
by reducing the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets relative to the mean-variance portfolio. This is consistent
with empirical evidence in, e.g., Heaton and Lucas (2000) who find a positive correlation of 0.14 between the quarterly
growth rate of real non-farm proprietary income for U.S. entrepreneurial businesses and the CRSP value-weighted
stock return.
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Figure 4. Optimal portfolios. Panel A and B exhibit the optimal portfolio for the follower
and leader divided by the initial wealth as a function of the operating net-income respectively, for
selected parameters. The solid line is for ρ = 0.15, λ = 0.25, the dashed line ρ = 0.15, λ = 1.25, the
dotted line ρ = 0.25, λ = 0.25 and the dashed-dotted line ρ = 0.25, λ = 1.25. The other parameters
are set as follows: project value drift αy = 0.05, project value volatility σy = 30%, risk-free interest
rate r = 8%, investment costs I = 50, drift risky asset µs = 0.10, volatility risky asset σs = 20%,
risk-aversion γ = 0.25, initial wealth W0 = 100. The income factors are given as follows: D10 = 5,
D12 = 2.5, D21 = 4, D11 = 3 and D22 = 3.2.
rise to another empirical prediction. For a given amount of non-diversifiable risk, entrepreneurs
managing a business in profitable environments where technological innovation and entrance by
other individuals are more likely to occur should have more wealth invested in the financial market
compared to their peers in environments where technological innovation and entrance by other
individuals are less likely to occur.
IV.6. Comparative Statics Analysis
This section discusses comparative statics regarding the optimal investment timing decision and
optimal portfolio choice. To facilitate the discussion, the set of parameters specified in Figure 1-3
are kept fixed, except for the parameter of interest discussed below.
First, if the entrepreneurs are more risk-averse (γ = 0.45), preemption will occur later relative to
111
Chapter 2: Strategic Investment and Optimal Portfolio Choice
the setting in Figure 1 with λ = 0.15. But preemption will still occur sooner compared to complete
markets. This is intuitive, higher risk-aversion implies that the operating net-income has to be higher
to make it profitable to invest as the leader. Furthermore, investment by the follower will occur
sooner compared to the situation with λ = 0.15. Higher risk-aversion implies that the certainty-
equivalent gain under incomplete markets is reduced compared to the setting with γ = 0.25, i.e.,
the gain from waiting for arrival of technology 2 is further reduced, and that leads to accelerated
investment compared to the setting with lower risk-aversion.26
Higher project volatility (σy = 0.40) implies that the entrepreneurs are also exposed to greater
non-diversifiable risk and that has an overall negative impact on the value functions. Specifically,
the leader’s value function is lowered more for decreasing operating net-income thus resulting in
later preemption compared to the incomplete market setting with σy = 0.30 (for both cases λ =
0.02, 0.15). Similar to increasing risk-aversion, greater project volatility (σy = 0.40) reduces the
certainty-equivalent gain from arrival of technology 2 and that has a larger negative impact on the
option value compared to the project value when λ = 0.15. This results in sooner investment by
the follower in technology 1 relative to the incomplete market setting in Figure 1. In contrast, for
λ = 0.02 the certainty-equivalent gain matters less for the option valuation and the project value is
therefore reduced more than the option value resulting in delayed investment.
Similar to the optimal investment timing, the optimal portfolio choice of the entrepreneurs is also
sensitive to the profitability of adopting a given technology. This is captured by the income factors
(i.e., the Dij ’s). A higher income factor implies higher expected drift in the operating net-income,
but it also implies higher exposure to non-diversifiable risk. For instance, a higher income factor
D21, would from the followers perspective lead to higher valuation of being the follower and more
importantly a higher option’s Delta thereby resulting in a larger hedging demand and thus a smaller
amount of wealth invested in the risky asset. Hence, it is important to take strategic considerations
26For the situation where λ = 0.02 the predictions in Figure 1 continue to hold relative to complete markets.
However, compared to the incomplete market setting, preemption when γ = 0.45 occurs later due to higher risk-
aversion and the follower also invests later since the project value is reduced even further relative to the option value
in this case.
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regarding technology adoption by other individuals and arrival of future technological innovations
into account when investing in the financial markets. But the relative profitability of managing
the business with a given technology compared to its competitors, also matters profoundly when
deciding how much wealth to allocate to the financial markets in order to hedge the non-diversifiable
risk.
V. Concluding Remarks
I have studied the implications of technological innovation and strategic considerations regarding
technology adoption on optimal investment timing and valuation of the associated investment op-
portunities. According to the model, before individuals (contemplating to become entrepreneurs)
decide whether to invest in a business project using a current available technology or whether to wait
until a more efficient technology may be available for adoption, they should take into account: (a)
the likelihood of such a better technology arriving; (b) potential entrance by other individuals and
the impact on profitability; (c) any non-diversifiable (income) risk surrounding the business project.
Failure to account for these elements when deciding to invest, may lead individuals to overestimate
the value attached to the investment opportunity and subsequently lead to suboptimal investment
behavior. A numerical analysis has shown that these considerations have important implications
not only for optimal investment timing but also for the optimal portfolio choice for both prospective
and current entrepreneurs. In future research, it would be interesting to investigate to what extent
these predictions hold empirically.
To study the implications of non-diversifiable risk, technological innovation and strategic aspects
regarding technology adoption on investment timing under uncertainty in the simplest possible way,
the model has a number of limitations which could be interesting to address in future research. One
extension would be to consider a power utility function which is arguably more realistic than the
exponential utility function. The advantage of working with an exponential utility function is that
it helps reduce the dimension of the problem since it does not capture wealth effects. A power utility
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function, on the other hand, would introduce wealth effects into the model and the non-linear ODE’s
which determine the (option) value functions would become non-linear partial differential equations
subject to a free-boundary value and this is significantly more challenging to solve numerically.
Another extension relates to the innovation process. In future research it would be interesting to
relax the exogenous innovation assumption and make the innovation process endogenous within the
model.
A final interesting extension would be to pursue a calibration of the model parameters to actual
data. However, challenges in defining and measuring the precise role of an entrepreneur (see, e.g.,
Wong, Ho, and Autio (2005)) leads to difficulties in calibrating such a model to actual data. More-
over, there is generally little available data for measuring the amount of non-diversifiable income
risk, the degree of technological innovations, the risk attitude of entrepreneurs, etc. An attempt
to calibrate an entrepreneurial model is done in Heaton and Lucas (2004). They discuss issues
related to the calibration of their parameters and also have to resort to qualitative guidance on
parameter choices for risk-aversion, idiosyncratic risk and so on. In this paper, I have not pursued
a “calibration” of the model parameters since the primary focus was on the qualitative implications.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by considering the situation after investment has taken place. Let, pit, denote the amount
invested in the risky asset measured in units of the consumption good (i.e., pit, represents the amount
of cash in the risky asset) and the remainder is invested in the risk-free bond. After investment in
technology Ni given the competitor has invested in technology Nj , the entrepreneur receives a flow
payoff equal to DNiNjYt and consumes ct. This means, that the wealth dynamics after investment
to the entrepreneurs equals,
dWt = pit
dSt
St
+ r(Wt − pit)dt+DNiNjYtdt− ctdt
=
(
rWt + pit(µS − r) +DNiNjYt − ct
)
dt+ pitσSdBt. (A.1)
Denote by J(w, y) the value function to the entrepreneur after option exercise. After option exercise,
the wealth dynamics, w, but also the project value, y, affect the value function after option exercise
because the entrepreneurs are exposed to non-diversifiable risk from managing the business which
cannot be hedged by trading in the risky financial asset.27 An application of Ito’s formula yields
27As shown in Miao and Wang (2007), this is different to the lump-sum case where the exercise of the investment
option generates an exit from incomplete markets.
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the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation,
βJ(w, y) = max
pi,C
U(c) + Jw(w, y)
(
rw + pi(µS − r) +DNiNjy − c
)
+ Jy(w, y)αy
+
pi2σ2S
2
Jww(w, y) +
σ2y
2
Jyy(w, y) + ρσypiσSJwy(w, y) (A.2)
which is subject to the transversality condition limT→∞E[e−βTJ(WT , YT )] = 0. For simplicity, I
have omitted the time-index. Now conjecture that the value function takes the following form,
J(w, y) = − 1
γr
exp
−γr(w + f(y;DNiNj ) + η22γr2 + β − rγr2
) (A.3)
for some function, f(y;DNiNj ), which have to be determined and where η =
µS−r
σS
, denotes the
Sharpe-ratio on the risky asset. Deriving the first-order conditions with respect to the portfolio and
consumption gives,
0 = Jw(w, y)(µS − r) + σ2SpiJww(w, y) + Jwy(w, y)ρσyσS
pi∗ =
−Jw(w, y)(µS − r)
Jww(w, y)σ2S
+
−Jwy(w, y)ρσy
Jww(w, y)σS
(A.4)
and
U ′(c) = Jw(w, y)⇔ c∗ = −1
γ
log(Jw(w, y)) (A.5)
By relying on the conjecture, the derivatives of the value function can be written as follows,
Jw(w, y) = −γrJ(w, y) Jww(w, y) = (γr)2J(w, y)
Jwy(w, y) = (γr)
2f ′(y;DNiNj )J(w, y)
Jy(w, y) = −γrf ′(y;DNiNj )J(w, y)
Jyy(w, y) = −γrf ′′(y;DNiNj )J(w, y) + (γr)2f ′(y;DNiNj )2J(w, y) (A.6)
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and we obtain the optimal portfolio and consumption policy as,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
f ′(y;DNiNj ) and c
∗ = r
(
w + f(y;DNiNj ) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.7)
Plugging them back into the HJB equation and simplifying we obtain the following non-linear
ordinary differential equation (ODE) for the function, f(y;DNiNj ),
σ2y
2
f ′′(y;DNiNj )− γr
σ2y
2
(1− ρ2)f ′(y;DNiNj )2 + (αy − ρσyη)f ′(y;DNiNj )
−rf(y;DNiNj ) +DNiNjy = 0 (A.8)
which has to be solved subject to the transversality condition for the value function stated above.
Ruling out speculative bubbles in the project value (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) we obtain the
solution given in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
The situation after option exercise is derived in Proposition 1 by setting DNiNj = D22. Thus the
project value is given by,
f(y;D22) =
D22
r
y +
(αy − ρσyη)D22
r2
− γσ
2
y(1− ρ2)D222
2r2
(A.9)
and the optimal portfolio and consumption policy are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
f ′(y;D22) and c∗ = r
(
w + f(y;D22) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
. (A.10)
To analyze the situation before option exercise, we note that the wealth dynamics before investment
to the entrepreneurs is given by,
dWt =
(
rWt + pi(µS − r)− ct
)
dt+ piσSdBt (A.11)
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Before investing neither of the entrepreneurs receive a flow payoff since by assumption D0Nj = 0.
Similar to derivations for the project value derived in Proposition 1, we conjecture that the value
function takes the following form,
V (w, y) = − 1
γr
exp
−γr(w + g(y) + η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
) (A.12)
for some function g(y) which have to be determined and where η = µs−rσS again denotes the Sharpe-
ratio on the risky asset. The derivations are similar to those in the proof of Proposition 1. Hence,
we obtain the optimal portfolio and consumption,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
g′(y) and c∗ = r
(
w + g(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.13)
and where the function g(y) satisfies the following non-linear ODE,
σ2y
2
g′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)g′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)g′(y)− rg(y) = 0 (A.14)
The function g(y) represents the option value function to the entrepreneurs. The function has to be
solved numerically subject to the value matching and smooth-pasting condition,
g(y¯22) = f(y¯22;D22)− I (A.15)
g′(y¯22) = f ′(y¯22;D22) =
D22
r
(A.16)
and the lower boundary condition, limy→−∞ g(y) = 0. The optimal investment threshold y¯22 also
has to be found numerically. The reason for the three boundary conditions is that we have to jointly
determine the endogenous investment threshold y¯22 together with the option value function g(y).
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The option value function can take the following form,28
J22;AI(y) =
 g(y) if y ∈ (−∞, y¯22)f(y;D22)− I if y ∈ (y¯22,+∞).
The optimal portfolio and consumption policy after investment are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
f ′(y;D22) and c∗ = r
(
w + f(y;D22) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.17)
Proof of Proposition 3
The situation after option exercise is derived in Proposition 1 by setting DNiNj = D21. Thus the
project value is given by,
f(y;D21) =
D21
r
y +
(αy − ρσyη)D21
r2
− γσ
2
y(1− ρ2)D221
2r2
(A.18)
and the optimal portfolio and consumption policy after investment are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
f ′(y;D21) and c∗ = r
(
w + f(y;D21) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
. (A.19)
whereas before investment they take the form,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
g′(y) and c∗ = r
(
w + g(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.20)
The derivations to obtain the follower’s option value function when technology 2 is available is similar
to the proof of Proposition 2 by replacing the income factor D22 with D21 and where the optimal
investment threshold for the follower in technology 2 is instead denoted by y¯12. The boundary
28The value function is denoted by J22;AI(y) where J refers to joint investment, the subscript ”22” refers to the
income factor D22 to the operating net-income process the entrepreneurs receive and A refers to the situation after
technology 2 has arrived and I that it is the value function under incomplete markets.
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conditions are given analogously.
Proof of Proposition 4
After option exercise the leader receives the flow payoff D10Yt up to the moment when the follower
invests in technology 2. From that point and onwards the leader’s flow payoff is reduced to D12Yt.
Before the follower optimally invests in technology 2 at the threshold y¯12, the leader has wealth
dynamics given by,
dWt =
(
rWt + pi(µS − r) +D10Yt − ct
)
dt+ piσSdBt (A.21)
Deriving the HJB equation following similar steps as in the earlier proofs, the value function for the
leader satisfies the following non-linear ODE,
σ2y
2
g′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)g′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)g′(y)− rg(y) +D10y = 0 (A.22)
subject to the lower boundary condition, lim
y→−∞g(y) = f(y;D10) and the value-matching condition
g(y¯12) = f(y¯12;D12) where the function f(·) is given in Proposition 1. The reduction in the flow
payoff to the leader, when the follower invests in technology 2, is captured in the value-matching
condition. The optimal portfolio and consumption policy of the leader before the follower has
invested are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
g′(y) and c∗ = r
(
w + g(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.23)
and after the follower has invested they are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
f ′(y;D12) and c∗ = r
(
w + f(y;D12) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
. (A.24)
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Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to that for Proposition 1. It follows by inserting the income factor D11 and the
optimal portfolio policy of the entrepreneurs is similar to that in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 6
Denote the value function to the follower before option exercise by, V (w, y), where,
V (w, y) = − 1
γr
exp
−γr(w +G(y) + η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
) (A.25)
and where the function, G(y), represents the follower’s option value before technology 2 has arrived.
The wealth dynamics of the follower before investment is given by,
dWt =
(
rWt + pi(µS − r)− ct
)
dt+ piσSdBt + λ
(
F21;AI(y)−G(y)
)
dt (A.26)
Note that, at any given point in time, the state of the world may change, in that technology 2 will
arrive with probability λdt thus making technology 1 inferior from that point and onwards. This
means, that the entrepreneur, at any instant, can experience an expected capital gain corresponding
to F21;AI(y)−G(y) with probability λdt from the arrival of technology 2. Note, also that the terms
F21;AI(y) and G(y) are actual values, i.e., they are not utility terms. This expected positive shift
in wealth materializing at some future time T has to be reflected in the wealth dynamics. That
explains the new term, λ
(
F21;AI(y)−G(y)
)
dt in the wealth dynamics.
Accounting for the arrival of technology 2 with intensity λ we obtain the HJB equation,
βV (w, y) = max
pi,C
U(c) + Vw(w, y)
(
rw + pi(µS − r) + λ
(
F21;AI(y)−G(y)
)− c)
+ Vy(w, y)αy +
pi2σ2S
2
Vww(w, y) +
σ2y
2
Vyy(w, y) + ρσypiσSVwy(w, y) (A.27)
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subject to the transversality condition limT→∞E[e−βTV (WT , YT )] = 0. Following similar steps as
earlier we derive the following non-linear ODE,
σ2y
2
G′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)G′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)G′(y)− (r + λ)G(y) + λF21;AI(y) = 0 (A.28)
where the function F21;AI(y) was determined in Proposition 3.
By inserting the expression for F21;AI(y) we can derive the boundary conditions. The lower
boundary condition limy→−∞G(y) = 0 represents that the follower’s option value loses its value
as the operating net-income approaches minus infinity. The upper growth condition follows as the
particular solution to the system of ODE’s we obtain by inserting the expression for F21;AI(y).
Therefore, the upper growth condition becomes limy→+∞G(y) = Ay +B where,
A =
λD21
r(r + λ)
(A.29)
B = −γrσ
2
y(1− ρ2)λ2D221
2r2(r + λ)3
+
(αy − ρσyη)λD21
(r + λ)2r
+
λ(αy − ρσyη)D21
(λ+ r)r2
− λγσ
2
y(1− ρ2)D221
(r + λ)2r2
− λ
(r + λ)
I (A.30)
To get insight about the upper boundary condition, it is useful to consider it under complete markets.
Let limy→∞Gc(y) denote the expected value under complete markets of receiving the flow payoff
D21Yt in perpetuity starting from time T (when technology 2 arrives) and paying the investment
costs I. Said quantity can be computed as follows,
lim
y→∞G
c(y) = EY0=y
[
e−rT
(
D21
r
YT +
(αy − σyη)D21
r2
− I
)]
=
λD21
r(r + λ)
y +
(αy − σyη)λD21
(r + λ)2r
+
λ(αy − σyη)D21
(λ+ r)r2
− λ
(r + λ)
I
since EY0=y(Yt) = y + (αy − σyη)t under complete markets and because T is exponentially dis-
tributed with intensity λ. The expression for limy→∞Gc(y) resembles the upper growth condition
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in Proposition 6 except for the two remaining terms, that incorporate the notion of risk-aversion
and incomplete hedging. Thus, the upper growth condition in Proposition 6 represents the expected
net-present value of the flow payoff D21Yt accruing to the follower from investing at time T and on-
wards using technology 2 adjusted for risk-aversion and incomplete hedging. The optimal portfolio
and consumption policy of the follower before investment are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
G′(y) and c∗ = r
(
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.31)
for y ∈ (−∞,∞).
Proof of Proposition 7
The problem is similar to that in Proposition 6 except that the upper boundary condition changes.
The follower invests at the threshold y¯11 which has to be determined as part of the problem.
Therefore the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions become, G(y¯11) = f(y¯11;D11) − I
and G′(y¯11) = f ′(y¯11;D11). The optimal portfolio and consumption policy of the follower before
investment are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
G′(y) and c∗ = r
(
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.32)
for y ∈ (−∞, y¯11) and after investment in technology 1 they are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
f ′(y;D11) and c∗ = r
(
w + f(y;D11) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.33)
for y ∈ (y¯11,∞).
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Proof of Proposition 8
Denote the value function for the leader (before the follower optimally exercises the option to invest
in technology 2 at the threshold y¯12) by V (w, y) where,
V (w, y) = − 1
γr
exp
−γr(w +G(y) + η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
) (A.34)
and where G(y) represents the value function. The leader’s wealth dynamics takes the following
form,
dWt =
(
rWt + pi(µS − r) +D10Yt − ct
)
dt+ piσSdBt + λ
(
L12;AI(y)−G(y)
)
dt (A.35)
Note, that we assume immediate investment in technology 1 by the leader which means that she
receives a flow payoff equal to D10Yt accruing to the wealth at any given time. Moreover, the
leader may experience (at any given point in time with probability λdt) an expected shift in wealth
corresponding to L12;AI(y)−G(y) similar to that of the follower which happens when technology 2
arrives. Deriving the usual HJB equation we obtain that the non-linear ODE defining the leader’s
value function is given by,
rG(y) = D10y + λ
(
L12;AI(y)−G(y)
)
+ (αy − ρσyη)G′(y)
− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)G′(y)2 + σ
2
y
2
G′′(y) (A.36)
and the expressions for L12;AI(y) is determined in Proposition 4.
As the operating net-income approaches minus infinity, it is not optimal for the follower to invest
regardless of the technology available and therefore the value function for the leader converges to the
project value f(y;D10). By inserting the expressions for L12;AI(y) into the non-linear ODE above
we can derive the upper growth condition as the particular solution. The upper growth condition
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equals limy→∞G(y) = Ay +B where
A =
D10
(r + λ)
+
λD12
r(r + λ)
B = −
γrσ2y(1− ρ2)
(
D10
(r+λ) +
λD12
r(r+λ)
)2
2(r + λ)
+
(αy − ρσyη)
(
D10
(r+λ) +
λD12
r(r+λ)
)
(r + λ)
+
λ(αy − ρσyη)D12
(λ+ r)r2
− λγσ
2
y(1− ρ2)D212
(r + λ)2r2
To obtain intuition about the upper boundary condition it is again useful to consider it under
complete markets. Under complete markets the growth condition for the leader contains the expected
present value of receiving the flow payoff D12Yt in perpetuity from time T when the follower invests
in technology 2. The leader invest immediately and thus receives a flow payoff D10Yt but only up
to the moment when the follower invests in technology 2. Hence, the growth condition also contains
the expected present value of receiving the flow payoff D10Yt up to time T . Denoting said quantity
by limy→∞GcD10(y) it follows as,
lim
y→∞G
c
D10(y) = EY0=y
[∫ T
0
e−rtD10Ytdt
]
= E
EY0=y
(∫ k
0
e−rtD10Ytdt|T = k
)
=
D10
(r + λ)
y +
(αy − σyη)D10
(r + λ)2
since EY0=y(Yt) = y+(αy−σyη)t under complete markets and because T is exponentially distributed
with intensity λ. To sum up, the upper growth condition in Proposition 8 captures the expected
present value of receiving the flow payoff D10Yt (from immediate investment in technology 1) up to
time T and from that point onwards the flow payoff D12Yt in perpetuity adjusted for risk-aversion
and incomplete hedging.
The optimal portfolio and consumption policy of the leader before investment of the follower are
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given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
G′(y) and c∗ = r
(
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.37)
for y ∈ (−∞,∞).
Proof of Proposition 9
The problem is similar to that in Proposition 8 except that the upper boundary condition changes.
The follower invests at the threshold y¯11 and that results in the following value-matching condition,
G(y¯11) = f(y¯11;D11). The optimal portfolio and consumption policy of the leader before the follower
has invested in technology 1 are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
G′(y) and c∗ = r
(
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.38)
for y ∈ (−∞, y¯11) and after the follower has invested in technology 1 they are given by,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
f ′(y;D11) and c∗ = r
(
w + f(y;D11) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.39)
for y ∈ (y¯11,∞).
Proof of Proposition 10
The proof is similar to that for Proposition 6 by replacing the income factor D21 with D22 and
the value function when technology 2 is available to be inserted in the non-linear ODE is J22,AI(y)
instead of F21,AI(y). The option value function G(y) therefore satisfies the following non-linear
ODE,
rG(y) =
σ2y
2
G′′(y)− γrσ
2
y
2
(1− ρ2)G′(y)2 + (αy − ρσyη)G′(y) + λ(J22;AI(y)−G(y)) (A.40)
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on y ∈ (−∞,∞) where the function J22;AI(y) was determined in Proposition 2.
By inserting the expression for J22;AI(y) we can derive the boundary conditions as the particular
solutions to the system of non-linear ODE’s. The lower boundary condition is similar to that in
Proposition 6. The upper growth condition equals limy→+∞G(y) = Ay +B where
A =
λD22
r(r + λ)
B = −γrσ
2
y(1− ρ2)λ2D222
2r2(r + λ)3
+
(αy − ρσyη)λD22
(r + λ)2r
+
λ(αy − ρσyη)D22
(λ+ r)r2
− λγσ
2
y(1− ρ2)D222
(r + λ)2r2
− λ
(r + λ)
I
Similar to the motivation for the boundary condition in Proposition 6, the upper growth condition
in Proposition 10 represents the expected net-present value of the flow payoff D22Yt accruing to both
entrepreneurs from investing at time T and onwards using technology 2 adjusted for risk-aversion
and incomplete hedging. The optimal portfolio and consumption policy of the entrepreneurs before
investment in technology 2 are,
pi∗ =
η
γrσS
− ρσy
σS
G′(y) and c∗ = r
(
w +G(y) +
η2
2γr2
+
β − r
γr2
)
(A.41)
for y ∈ (−∞,+∞).
Proof of Proposition 11
The proof is similar to that for Proposition 5.
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Chapter 3: Managerial Incentives to Take Asset Risk
I. Introduction
This paper investigates managerial incentives to take asset risk. A significant theoretical literature
deals with these incentives, offering the central insight that managerial compensation structures
should “...take into account not only the agency relationship between shareholders and manage-
ment, but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships ...” (John
and John, 1993, p. 950). Besides the manager-shareholder conflict, perhaps the most important
conflict arising in the corporate “nexus of contracts” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is the shareholder-
bondholder conflict regarding “asset substitution.” While shareholders want to align managerial
interests with their own and also to shift risk to bondholders to some extent, they consider that
asset risk-taking incentives optimally avoid excessive (firm value-reducing) agency costs of debt.
Although these ideas have long been theoretically established,1 little is known empirically about
managerial incentives to take asset risk embedded in observed compensation contracts. This is
surprising, given the great relevance of these incentives in corporate finance research (in particular,
for work aiming to explain asset risk-taking by firms) and discussions in practice. This paper aims to
make progress on this issue by addressing two questions: First, how powerful are a typical manager’s
incentives to take asset risk and to increase firm value? Second, can asset risk-taking incentives add
to our understanding of the cross-sectional variation of asset risk-taking?
Section I deals with the first question. We consider a CEO who receives stock and/or stock
options, the two most direct means of aligning shareholder and managerial interests. To understand
the embedded incentives to take asset risk, we not only model equity itself as an option on the firm’s
assets (Merton, 1974), but, to be consistent, we also treat stock options as compound options on the
underlying asset value (Geske, 1979). This combined approach is novel to the incentives literature.
In this framework, we calculate the following incentive measures: Asset Volatility Vega is the
dollar change of the value of a stock or stock option with respect to a 0.01 change in the asset
1Other theoretical papers studying how optimal incentives navigate the two conflicts include, for example, Haugen
and Senbet (1981) and John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000).
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return volatility, and Asset Delta is the dollar change of the value of a stock or stock option with
respect to a one percent change in the firm value. One auxiliary contribution of this paper is that we
provide a correct formula for the sensitivity of a compound option to the volatility of the underlying
(departing from the formula presented in Geske (1979)).
These two quantities capture asset incentives. We choose this terminology to emphasize that
although the manager receives pay whose value depends on equity values, ultimately we are interested
in his implied incentives to influence asset values and asset risk.
By contrast, Equity Volatility Vega measures the incentives of the CEO to increase stock return
volatility. Equity Delta measures the incentives to increase the stock price. These two quantities,
usually calculated as in Core and Guay (2002), have been widely used in the empirical literature on
risk-taking and incentives. They form the equity incentives.
The critical difference between asset incentives and equity incentives is that the level of debt
enters explicitly only in the calculations of asset incentives. To intuitively see why this is important
when aiming to compare, across CEOs, incentives to take asset risk, note that the additional asset
risk-taking that causes a 0.01 change in equity return volatility depends on leverage. This reflects
the idea from the theory of asset substitution that managerial asset risk-taking incentives change as
leverage changes. However, leverage does not feature explicitly in the calculation of equity incentives;
therefore, equity incentives can indicate asset incentives, but the cross section of equity incentives
only partially captures the cross section of asset incentives. More formally, for a given CEO, asset
volatility and equity volatility are linked through the elasticity of the equity value with respect to
the asset value, and this elasticity varies (non-linearly) across firms as leverage varies. In the cross
section of CEOs, asset incentives are, therefore, not simply a uniformly scaled version of equity
incentives.
To develop this intuition and to explore the quantitative importance of the difference between
the incentive measures in practice, we then consider a CEO receiving a compensation package of a
given value, consisting of different combinations of stock and stock options. For an interpretation of
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the overall incentives to take asset risk embedded in a compensation package, we note that because
the manager is risk-averse, higher exposure to firm value movements (due to a higher Asset Delta)
makes the manager less willing to take asset risk. A meaningful measure of overall managerial asset
substitution incentives is, therefore, given by the Asset Incentive Ratio, the ratio of total Asset
Volatility Vega and total Asset Delta. Similarly, the Equity Incentive Ratio is the ratio of total
Equity Volatility Vega and total Equity Delta.
This basic analysis yields four results. First, the Asset Incentive Ratio suggests significant asset
risk-taking incentives even when a CEO is compensated only with stock. Second, for all combinations
of stock and stock options, the Asset Incentive Ratio is significantly higher than the Equity Incentive
Ratio. Third, as expected, the difference between the Asset Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive
Ratio is greater when leverage is higher; however, even at 40% leverage (the average leverage of a
BBB-rated firm) the differences can be substantial. Fourth, the higher leverage is, the less stock
options add in terms of asset risk-taking incentives (compared to equity risk-taking-incentives);
intuitively, at high leverage, stock itself has such strong optionality that even a CEO holding only
stock already has strong incentives to take asset risk, and the marginal contribution of stock options
is, in fact, small.
In view of the important role that leverage plays for incentives, we then explore the relevance of
asset risk-taking incentives in a sample of U.S. financial institutions. We are particularly interested
in the years before the 2007/08 financial crisis.
Here, too, we document several notable facts, which confirm in the data what the previous
analysis had suggested for a hypothetical CEO. First, for many CEOs in the sample, incentives to
take asset risk emanating from stock-holdings are substantial. In some contrast, relying on results
from Guay (1999) for an average of firms over a range of industries, the existing literature argues
that the incentives, due to stock holdings, to take equity risk are negligible. By setting Equity
Volatility Vega from stock to zero, the literature effectively assumes that risk-taking incentives are
due only to stock options. Practitioners also tend to perceive stock options as the main driver of
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risk-taking behavior by CEOs. Our theoretical and empirical findings qualify this view, and they
have both practical implications for boards of directors designing managerial compensation systems
and implications for research on risk-taking.
Second, a puzzling fact in much of the literature is that the observed Equity Incentive Ratio
is often fairly small – perhaps too small to offer an economic justification for a CEO to engage in
significant risk-taking. For asset incentives, we obtain quite different results. In our sample, for the
main parameter choice, the average CEO has an Asset Volatility Vega of around US$3.5 million and
an Asset Delta of around US$6 million dollars. The Asset Incentive Ratio is, at the mean, about
0.50, around 30-50% larger than the Equity Incentive Ratio. For other reasonable parameter values,
this difference can be much larger.
Third, there is not only a difference in levels between asset and equity incentives, but also in the
cross-sectional pattern. The correlation between the Asset Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive
Ratio is on average only about 0.40 in our sample. Thus, incorporating cross-sectional variation in
leverage into the calculation of incentives and recognizing that risk-taking incentives emanate also
from stocks indeed yields a new perspective on incentives.
Section II then provides a topical example of the potential importance of considering managerial
asset incentives when aiming to explain asset risk-taking, namely the 2007/08 crisis. This crisis
essentially exposed the downside of the asset risk that banks undertook in prior years. As such,
write-downs in 2007/08 form a natural indication of the degree of asset risk-taking by financial
institutions in years prior to the crisis.2
We find that, by and large, banks with higher Asset Incentive Ratios in the years 2003-05 (and
2006 when controlling for governance) had higher write-downs (both in absolute terms and scaled
by total assets). In other words, incentives help explain variation in asset risk-taking by financial
institutions. Interestingly, the Equity Incentive Ratio does not provide much explanatory power in
our regressions, consistent with the intuition that to explain asset risk-taking it is important to use
2In the data section, we discuss issues such as the discretion companies have in setting the level of write-downs, as
well as the benefits and challenges of using alternative measures of risk-taking.
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asset incentives.
I.1. Related literature
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, the general literature on managerial
compensation schemes and their consequences, which is too large to review in detail, mostly deals
with incentives of the CEO to increase the share price and to take equity risk (see, for example,
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), Guay (1999) and Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002)). The main
contribution of this paper is to introduce and shed light on the relevance of managerial incentives
to take asset risk and increase the firm value. Although asset substitution has been a central theme
of corporate finance since Jensen and Meckling (1976), we do not know of other empirical studies of
asset incentives.
Second, this paper also makes a specific contribution to the financial crisis literature because
our approach and, consequently, our results differ from other papers.3 The related papers in this
literature can be organized in terms of the dependent variable (risk-taking before the crisis or
performance during the crisis) and the central explanatory variable (incentives or governance), as
shown in the following matrix.
The work listed in the four quadrants is as follows: First, some papers consider risk-taking and
governance: Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2012) document a positive association between total
compensation and risk-exposure of financial institutions; other work focuses on corporate governance
and specific measures of risk-taking, such as risky mortgage-backed securities involvement (Ellul
and Yerramilli, 2013). Second, Adams (2012) considers the quality of governance in U.S. banks,
while Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2012) primarily consider the relation between various measures
of performance and corporate governance in a global sample. (They also provide results regarding
risk-taking.) Third, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) study the correlation of performance measures,
3For studies on risk-taking and governance in banks generally see, for example, Laeven and Levine (2009) and
Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990). Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala, and Senbet (2010) survey some of the
financial crisis literature.
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stock returns and returns on assets, with equity incentives.
Selection of related empirical papers in the financial crisis literature
Risk-Taking Performance
Incentives DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2012) Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)
This paper
Governance Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2011) Erkens, Hung und Matos (2009)
Ellul and Yerramilli (2009) Adams (2012)
Fourth, DeYoung, Peng, and Yan (2012) consider the relationship between incentives and risk-
taking. They provide a rich set of evidence. Of particular interest, in relation to our analysis, are
their results on asset risk-taking. They find that both Equity Volatility Vega and Equity Delta
were positively associated with investments in MBS securities in the years before the crisis. As they
note, this finding is puzzling. Theoretical considerations and previous empirical evidence suggest
that Vega and Delta should be associated with risk-taking with opposite signs (e.g., Knopf, Nam,
and Thornton (2002)).4 Our analysis provides empirical support for this idea in the context of the
2007/08 financial crisis.
II. Managerial Asset Incentives
We consider a CEO who receives equity-based compensation, consisting of stock and/or stock op-
tions. To measure managerial incentives to take asset risks, we appeal to the idea, dating back
to Merton (1974), that equity can be viewed as a contingent claim on the firm value. Using this
framework, we calculate asset incentives, Asset Volatility Vega – capturing the incentives to increase
the standard deviation of firm value – and Asset Delta – capturing the incentives to increase firm
4In an earlier working paper version, De Young, Peng and Yan looked at an even broader range of asset risk
variables, for example, bank investments in commercial real estate and mortgages. Like MBS investments, these other
variables are arguably related to our summary measure, write-downs. However, they obtained mixed results with these
variables. For equity risk-taking measures, systematic equity risk and idiosyncratic equity risk, DeYoung, Peng, and
Yan (2012) find a positive relation with Equity Volatility Vega and a negative relation with Equity Delta, consistent
with theoretical predictions.
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value. Guay (1999) also relies on the contingent claims idea to calculate, for a sample of firms
including both financial and non-financial companies, the Equity Volatility Vega of stock. However,
Guay (1999) then goes on to calculate Equity Volatility Vega from stock options in the usual way,
relying on the Black-Scholes formula, treating equity as the primitive, and then adds to this the
Equity Volatility Vega from stocks obtained by relevering his Asset Volatility Vega of stocks. We
instead consider stock options as compound options (Geske, 1979). The idea of considering stock
options as compound options on the firm value is new to the literature on risk-taking, but a natural
step in order to operate within a coherent framework.
Subsection II.1 sets up the model framework. Subsection II.2 derives Asset Delta and Asset
Volatility Vega. Subsection II.3 introduces Equity Delta and Equity Volatility Vega. Subsection II.4
explains the differences of asset incentives and equity incentives for the case of a single stock or stock
option. Subsection II.5 investigates the incentives emanating from a portfolio of stocks and stock
options. Subsection II.6 provides a quantitative analysis of managerial incentives to take asset risk
in a cross section of financial institutions.
II.1. Model
We follow Merton (1974) and assume the firm value, V , follows a geometric Brownian motion
dVt
Vt
= µV dt+ σV dWt (1)
where {Wt}t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion under the historical measure. The parameters µV
and σV are assumed constant. We also assume that there exists a bank account which yields a
constant interest rate r. Considering equity as a call option on the firm value, stock can be valued
142
Chapter 3: Managerial Incentives to Take Asset Risk
according to the Black-Scholes formula5,
BS0 := S0 = V0N(d1)−De−rTDN(d2) (2)
where d1 =
ln(V0/D)+(r+σ2V /2)TD
σV
√
TD
and d2 = d1 − σV
√
TD.
Next, we recognize that stock options can be viewed as compound options on the underlying
firm value V . This idea is novel to the executive incentives literature. Geske (1979) shows that the
price of a compound call (CC) option is given by6
CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K) = V N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC/TD)
− De−rTDN2(h, k;
√
TCC/TD)−Ke−rTCCN1(h), (3)
where N2(·) represents the bivariate cumulative normal distribution function, N1(·) represents the
standard normal cumulative distribution function, TCC denotes the expiration of the stock option
and TD denotes the maturity of the debt.
7 The remaining terms are
h =
ln(V/V¯ ) + (r − 12σ2V )TCC
σV
√
TCC
, and k =
ln(V/D) + (r − 12σ2V )TD
σV
√
TD
(4)
and V¯ is the value of V which is the implicit solution to the equation
V N1(k¯(V ) + σV
√
TD − TCC)−De−r(TD−TCC)N1(k¯(V ))−K = 0, (5)
5We exclude dividends for simplicity. From option pricing theory there is no reason to expect that omitting this
component will result in substantially different outcomes.
6From here on, we omit the time subscripts for notational simplicity.
7Thus, the model requires that TD > TCC . We come back to the choice of appropriate debt and stock option
maturities in our application below.
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where
k¯(V ) =
ln(V/D) + (r − 12σ2V )(TD − TCC)
σV
√
TD − TCC
(6)
and where K denotes the strike price of the option and D denotes the face value of debt per share,
so that V¯ denotes the firm value where the option is just at the money at time TCC .
II.2. Asset Incentives
We now compute sensitivities of a single stock and a single stock option with respect to firm value
parameters. Asset Delta is the first derivative of the stock and stock option price, respectively, with
respect to a one percent change in the firm value, V . Asset Volatility Vega is the first derivative of
the stock and stock option price, respectively, with respect to a 0.01 change in the underlying asset
return volatility, σV .
First, the sensitivity of a stock with respect to a change in firm value is
Asset Delta from stocks =
∂BS0(V,D, r, TD, σV )
∂V
· (V/100)
= N(d1(V,D, r, TD, σV )) · (V/100). (7)
Note that Asset Delta from stocks is not equal to one.
Second, by relying on the formula for a compound call option,
Asset Delta from stock options =
∂CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K)
∂V
· (V/100) (8)
= N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , k + σV
√
TD,
√
TCC/TD) · (V/100).
Note that the derivative of the compound formula with respect to the underlying asset value, V ,
converges to the Delta in the Black-Scholes model as the face value of debt equals zero.
Third, we compute the incentive, coming from the CEO’s stock holdings, to increase the firm
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value return volatility. Relying on the Black-Scholes formula, we obtain
Asset Volatility Vega from stocks =
∂BS0(V,D, r, TD, σV )
∂σV
· (1/100),
= ϕ(d1(V,D, r, TD, σV ))V
√
TD · (1/100), (9)
where ϕ denotes the standard normal probability density.
Fourth, we turn to the incentive, coming from the CEO’s stock option holdings, to increase the
firm value return volatility. For this sensitivity, we derive the result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The Asset Volatility Vega of a stock option in the compound option pricing
model is given by
Asset Volatility Vega from stock options =
∂CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K)
∂σV
· (1/100) (10)
where
∂CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K)
∂σV
= V ϕ(h+ σV
√
TCC)
√
TCCN1
(
k¯(V¯ ) + σV
√
TD − TCC
)
+ De−rTDϕ(k)
√
TDN1
h−
√
TCC
TD
k√
1− TCCTD
 (11)
and the parameters are defined in Section II.1.
Proof See Appendix A.
Contrary to the result presented in Geske (1979), which is shown in Appendix A for completeness,
our formula for the derivative of the compound option value with respect to the asset return volatility
converges to the Black-Scholes Vega as the debt converges to zero. Indeed, this appears to be the
intuitive benchmark result. In the formula of Geske (1979), vega goes to zero for zero debt. More
importantly, there are often substantial differences in the magnitude of the calculated risk-taking
incentives using both approaches even for non-zero debt. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure
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considers a single stock option. We plot the Asset Volatility Vega using the formula in Geske (1979)
and the formula given in Proposition 1. Figure 1 also shows a discrete difference approximation
using the compound option pricing formula derived by Geske (1979).8 Notably, this difference
approximation agrees with our analytical formula for the Asset Volatility Vega given in Proposition
1.
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Figure 1. Asset Volatility Vega as a function of debt.
This graph plots Asset Volatility Vega for varying levels of the face value of debt, D, computed using
three different approaches: The Geske (1979) approach (dotted line), our analytical result derived
in Proposition 1 (“+”) and the difference approximation (solid line). See Section II.2 for details.
The parameters are V = 100, K = 50, r = 0.04, TD = 10, TCC = 6 and σV = 0.10. ∆ = 10
−11 is
used to calculate the difference approximation.
For the chosen parameters and a face value of debt of 85 (which implies leverage of around 55%),
8 That is, we approximate the derivative of the compound call option price with respect to σV with a first difference
of the compound option pricing formula with respect to σV . For this, we consider a sufficiently small change in σV in
order to approximate the true derivative with a high precision.
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a single compound call option on the stock is worth US$ 11.5. For this case, we observe an Asset
Volatility Vega (from a single stock option) of around US$ 0.94 based on Proposition 1, whereas the
equivalent Asset Volatility Vega based on the formula presented in Geske (1979) equals US$ 0.12.
Naturally, at very high leverage levels, when the compound option is deep out of the money,
increases in the asset volatility induce small value changes in the option value, resulting in the same
hump-shape form of Asset Volatility Vega of a stock option with respect to the debt level that
arises also for a stock option with respect to the stock option strike price. Asset Volatility Vega is
monotonically increasing in the underlying asset volatility; see Figure A-1 in Appendix A.
II.3. Equity Incentives
An alternative way to quantify managerial incentives is to consider the sensitivities of CEO wealth
to the stock price level and stock return volatility, respectively. Equity Delta is the sensitivity of a
stock or stock option with respect to a one percent change in the company’s underlying stock price.
Equity Volatility Vega is the change in the dollar value of a stock or stock option in response to
a one percentage point change in stock return volatility based on the Black-Scholes option pricing
formula. Following Core and Guay (2002) and most of the existing literature, we assume that the
Equity Volatility Vega from shares of stock equals zero. See Appendix B for details.
II.4. Comparing Asset Incentives and Equity Incentives
Asset incentives depend explicitly on the level of leverage, consistent with the central insight of
Jensen and Meckling (1976) that asset substitution incentives increase with leverage. By contrast,
leverage does not enter explicitly into the formulas determining equity incentives shown in Appendix
B. Thus, Equity Delta is unity, but Asset Delta is less than unity. Conversely, Asset Volatility Vega
is greater than Equity Volatility Vega. For a given firm (at a given leverage), the latter result is
merely a reflection of the fact that equity volatility is determined by asset volatility, multiplied by
the elasticity of the equity value with respect to the asset value (σS = σV (dS/S)/(dV/V )). This
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elasticity is greater than one. Importantly, it is a (non-linear) function of leverage; thus, it varies
across firms. In the cross section of firms with varying degrees of leverage this fact induces a critical
difference between asset incentives and equity incentives.
Intuitively, when working with equity incentives, an increase in equity volatility by 0.01 comes
about from different increases of asset risk for each CEO because firms differ in leverage. Thus,
the cross section of incentives to take equity risk yields limited insight into the cross section of
CEO incentives to take asset risk. Considering asset incentives, instead, “normalizes” the incentive
measure in the sense that an increase of asset volatility by 0.01 means the same for each CEO.9
The following two subsections develop this intuition in more detail and explore its quantitative
importance in practice.
II.5. Incentives From a Portfolio of Stock and Stock Options
Consider a board that provides a CEO with an equity-based compensation package. The package
should have some given value (say, US$ 5 million, though this value is irrelevant for the analysis
that follows). The total Vegas and Deltas are obtained by multiplying the single stock and single
stock option Vegas and Deltas by the numbers of stocks and stock options conveyed to the CEO.
What are the implied managerial asset substitution incentives of different combinations of stock and
stock options, holding the overall value of the compensation package constant?
To analyze this issue in a condensed fashion, we begin by noting that, clearly, asset risk-taking
incentives are higher if Asset Volatility Vega is higher. In addition, a risk-averse CEO wishes to
avoid fluctuations in the asset value, and this desire is more pronounced the more he participates
in any upward or downward movement of firm value. Therefore, asset risk-taking incentives are
lower if Asset Delta is higher. In the spirit of Dittmann and Yu (2011), we therefore define the
9Of course, it may be more difficult for some CEOs to achieve such an increase than for others, but that is not a
matter of incentives, but a matter of cost of effort.
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Asset Incentive Ratio as the ratio of Asset Volatility Vega and Asset Delta.10 This provides a useful
summary measure of incentives for our purposes. Similarly, the Equity Incentive Ratio is the ratio
of Equity Volatility Vega and Equity Delta.
Figure 2 shows three lines each for the Asset and Equity Incentive Ratio, using different levels
of leverage. Several properties of the incentive ratios are noteworthy.
First, the intercept of the Asset Incentive Ratio line is above zero – consistent with the fact that
the asset view allows for risk-taking incentives to emanate also from stock holdings. Naturally, the
intercept is higher for higher leverage.
Second, the Asset Incentive Ratio is larger than the Equity Incentive Ratio. In other words, asset
risk-taking incentives can be large relative to incentives to increase firm value, even when incentives
to take equity risk are dwarfed by incentives to increase the stock price.
Third, over the whole range of portfolio combinations, as leverage increases, asset substitution
incentives for managers become more pronounced and the difference between the Asset Incentive
Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio becomes bigger. (The same is naturally also true for higher
asset volatility; this result is not shown in the graph.) For high leverage, the Asset Incentive Ratio
is easily greater than unity, while this only occurs in extreme cases for the Equity Incentive Ratio.
Fourth, when stock options make up a larger fraction of the portfolio of the CEO, the overall
risk-taking incentives, measured by the two incentive ratios, increase. But the role of stock options
varies between asset incentives and equity incentives. For example, starting at 80% stock and 20%
stock options and going to 20% stock and 80% stock options, the Equity Incentive Ratio goes up by
a factor of three. By contrast, for the same change in the composition of the pay package the Asset
Incentive Ratio only approximately doubles (in the case of leverage of 40% and 55%) or increases by
only about 40% (in the case of leverage of 70%). This result can be explained by recognizing that
when leverage is higher, stock itself already incorporates a significant optionality (reflected in the
10Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Ingersoll (2006), and Carpenter (2000) also argue that a risk-averse and
under-diversified manager may adopt risk-reducing policy choices when compensation exhibits high pay-performance
sensitivity.
149
Chapter 3: Managerial Incentives to Take Asset Risk
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Fraction of the value of stock options in CEO equity portfolio
In
ce
nt
iv
e 
R
at
io
 (IR
)
 
 
Asset IR, Leverage = 70%
Asset IR, Leverage = 55%
Asset IR, Leverage = 40%
Equity IR, Leverage = 70%
Equity IR, Leverage = 55%
Equity IR, Leverage = 40%
Figure 2. Incentive ratios.
This graph plots the two incentive ratios (IR), the Asset Incentive Ratio (solid lines) and the Equity
Incentive Ratio (dotted lines), for different combinations of stocks and stock options, for a given
value of the total equity-based compensation package. For the Asset Incentive Ratio, sensitivities
of stocks and stock options are calculated according to the model described in Section II.2, using in
particular the Merton (1974) model and the compound option framework for stock options (Geske,
1979), but using our analytical result for Asset Volatility Vega of a stock option (see Proposition
1). The parameters for the Asset Incentive Ratio are V = 100, r = 0.04, TD = 10, TCC = 6 and
σV = 0.10. For the Equity Incentive Ratio, sensitivities are calculated as described in Section II.3,
using the Black-Scholes model, also using 6 years as the stock option maturity. The face value of
debt is varied to capture different degrees of leverage. Variation in leverage implies variations in the
value of equity according to the Merton (1974) model. For both incentive ratios, we choose the strike
price for the stock options to be equal to the stock price implied from the Merton (1974) model at
each point, i.e., stock options are granted at-the-money. The stock return volatility is numerically
determined through the portfolio relationship described in Appendix C.
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higher intercept), so that the extra optionality introduced by the compound option adds relatively
little to the overall asset risk-taking incentives.11
II.6. The Cross Section of CEO Incentives in Financial Institutions
We have seen that, consistent with intuition, asset substitution incentives of CEOs are likely to
become particularly pronounced at high leverage. We now study a group of firms for which leverage
is a central characteristic: financial institutions. Indeed, understanding incentives of managers in
the financial services industry is of particular interest in the light of recent events.
The sample in which we study this issue includes depository institutions, non-depository credit
institutions, and investment banks and some brokerage firms. We refer to all companies in our
sample as financial institutions.12 We require a company to have compensation data available in
the ExecuComp database. We focus on the years 2003 to 2006 because, as we explain further below,
these years are most likely to contain information regarding the incentives of managers related to
asset risk-taking that became relevant in the crisis. We also require that the company is alive at
the beginning of the third quarter of 2007. Companies which did not have a stock price observation
in CRSP for July 2007 are deemed inactive and excluded from our analysis. However, companies
remaining on this list are allowed to subsequently default, be taken over by or merged with another
company during the crisis period.13
11One can also verify that, when leverage is higher, the maximum difference between the Asset Incentive Ratio and
the Equity Incentive Ratio occurs at a lower fraction of stock options.
12The sample choice is motivated by the empirical analysis of asset risk-taking by financial institutions that we
conduct later. Table C-1 in Appendix C displays the SIC codes we consider in the analysis.
13Some companies were too small to remain in the ExecuComp database for all years 2003 to 2006 but were still
alive going into July 2007. Their compensation information is included into the analysis for the year(s) when they are
covered in the ExecuComp database.
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II.6.1. Inputs
Information about executive compensation pay packages is available annually for U.S. entities in
Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database. We focus our analysis on the CEO.14 Consistent with
existing literature, we define the inputs for our calculations as follows: (1) The stock options exercise
prices and (2) maturities are taken from ExecuComp to the extent these are available. If the exercise
price for granted stock options is not available, we assume they were granted at-the-money. To obtain
the stock option maturity for missing grant dates, we follow Guay (1999) and calculate the maturity
of the stock options by assuming that the stock options were granted on July 1 of the year in which
the stock options were granted. (3) We use the fiscal year end closing price of the given year as the
current stock price. (4) The stock return volatility is calculated (from CRSP data) as the annualized
standard deviation of daily log-returns over the past three years by assuming 250 trading days in
the year. (5) We use the U.S. Treasury yields obtained from the Fed’s webpage as proxies for the
risk-free interest rate. (6) The annual cash dividend paid by the company over the fiscal year end
closing price is used to calculate the dividend yield. This information is also from CRSP.
For the asset incentives, we follow Guay (1999) in the calculations of the implied firm value and
other parameters needed for the calculation of incentives. In particular, (7) the firm value (return)
volatility is determined through a portfolio relationship with stock volatility and debt volatility (see
Appendix C for details). For the standard deviation of debt returns, we use the annualized standard
deviation calculated on monthly (log) returns using the Merrill Lynch Bank of America corporate
financial bond index using a five year period.15 As in Guay (1999), (8) the strike price for equity,
14Murphy (2011) argues that incentives of traders were more important than those of CEOs. Data on below-
management-level compensation structures are not broadly available, unfortunately. For years with missing CEO
information and where the dates at which the CEO assumed office is prior to the particular year, we classify the
executive as the CEO accordingly. If the CEO is not recorded and the necessary information is not accessible from
the SEC Edgar database, we do not include the respective firm in the analysis.
15We believe that this index fits our purposes better than the general Merrill Lynch Bank of America corporate
bond index that matches the S&P senior debt rating which Guay (1999) uses. With the index used in Guay (1999),
we obtain stronger results both in terms of the size of risk-taking incentives and the statistical significance in our
write-down regressions. Finally, the approach used in Gropp and Heider (2010), just delevering stock return volatility,
yields very similar overall results, too.
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seen as an option on firm value, is the book value of debt per share. (9) Guay (1999) assumes
for financial firms that they have a single debt obligation with time to maturity equal to 7.5 years
(as for most financial firms maturity data is unavailable). We use the same baseline assumption.16
Together with the observation that the stock can be considered as a call option on the firm value,
one can finally back out (10) an implied firm value per share. Table C-2 shows descriptive statistics
for all the relevant variables.
Delta and Vega for previously granted options (i.e., exercisable and un-exercisable options) and
current year granted options are then multiplied by the amount of options held by the CEO in each
of these dimensions to form the final Vega and Delta quantities.
II.6.2. Asset and Equity Incentives in Financial Institutions
As a benchmark, we begin by analyzing the results for equity incentives. As seen in Table I, the
average Equity Volatility Vega implies that a one percentage point increase in the company’s stock
price volatility is associated with an increase of around US$301,000 in CEO wealth. This number
is comparable in size with that of other studies on risk-taking incentives in banks. While Equity
Volatility Vega in financial institutions is about double the size of Equity Volatility Vega in the
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) sample of industrial firms, it still seems modest, in particular
compared to Equity Delta. A 1% increase in the company’s stock price results in an increase of
around US$1,131,000 in the CEO’s wealth on average. The Equity Incentive Ratio, defined as the
ratio of Equity Volatility Vega and Equity Delta, is 0.30 on average.
However, it would be wrong to conclude, on the basis of evidence from equity incentives, that
16Core deposits (in addition to long-term debt as funding channels in financial institutions) have no explicit maturity
and are often referred to as non-maturity debt. As pointed out by Sheehan (2013) such deposits often remain within
the financial institution for significant periods of time, often longer than 10 years. Thus, 7.5 years is a reasonable
approximation. Note that the debt maturity needs to be longer than the stock option maturity in order for the
compound option approach to apply. In practice, stock option maturities typically range from 3 to 10 years. In cases
where the stock option maturity is longer than 7.5 years, we set the maturity of debt equal to the stock option maturity
plus two years. That is, for a stock option with a 10 year maturity, we effectively assume that the debt maturity is
12 years. However, consistent with Guay’s (1999) assessment of the sensitivity of his results for Asset Volatility Vega
from stocks to assumptions about debt maturity, we find that for Asset Volatility Vega from options, the results do
not appear sensitive to how we adjust the debt maturity either.
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the wealth-driven incentives of CEOs to engage in risky activities, such as investing in sub-prime
products, is small. The Asset Incentive Ratio, that is, the ratio of Asset Volatility Vega to Asset
Delta, equals 0.44 at the median and is, as such, about 50% larger than the Equity Incentive Ratio.
Interestingly, the correlation of Asset Volatility Vega with Equity Volatility Vega is far from perfect,
at 0.5 to 0.7 across the years. And the correlation between the Asset Incentive Ratio with the
Equity Incentive Ratio is only around 0.4. This set of results reflects the fact that, as explained in
Subsection II.4, asset incentives explicitly take into account leverage.
Moreover, Table I also shows that, as expected, a large part of asset risk-taking incentives
continues to come from stock options, but it is clear that stock holdings can also imply significant
asset risk-taking incentives. For the median CEO, asset risk-taking incentives due to options are
large compared to those due to stock, but for the mean CEO, (only) about half of the total incentives
to increase the asset return volatility are due to options. Table II confirms that the results holds
across the years under consideration.
At higher asset volatilities, these effects are even more pronounced. This is important because
it is often argued that in recessions asset volatilities increase, suggesting particularly powerful asset
risk-taking incentives of managers in bad times, relative to incentives to increase firm value. For
instance, using debt volatilities proposed by Guay (1999) in his analysis (which covers both financials
and industrial firms) yields somewhat higher asset volatilities and, consequently, ratios of Asset Vega
Volatility to Asset Delta that are easily twice or three times as large as the ratios of Equity Volatility
Vega and Equity Delta. This second version is shown as “V2” in Table I.
In sum, considering incentives to take asset risk yields a novel picture of managerial risk-taking
incentives and may, therefore, contribute to an enhanced understand of the relationship of incentives
with risk-taking. We explore this potential in the next section.
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Table II. Summary statistics II.
Summary statistics of Asset Volatility Vega and Asset Delta divided into incentives coming from
stock holdings and stock options, respectively, across the years 2003-2006 for all financial institutions
in our sample. The Asset Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio represent Asset Volatility
Vega divided by Asset Delta and Equity Volatility Vega divided by Equity Delta, respectively. The
variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentile on an annual basis. The term “q” denotes the
quantile, i.e., 10q refers to the 10th quantile in the empirical distribution of the respective variable.
All monetary values are denominated in 1000 USD and expressed in year 2008 dollars.
Year Variable Mean Std. Dev. 10q 25q median 75q 90q
2003 Asset Volatility Vega
due to stocks 1526.5 3944.8 8.8 37.2 171.5 777.8 3682.5
due to options 2718.9 4195.1 48.0 218.8 1063.4 3128.7 8908.9
Asset Delta
due to stocks 2566.2 5046.2 61.1 226.7 769.4 2148.5 5864.3
due to options 3555.7 4662.5 135.7 380.1 1888.5 4546.6 10730.2
Asset Incentive Ratio 0.63 0.37 0.20 0.33 0.61 0.88 1.09
Equity Incentive Ratio 0.37 0.25 0.05 0.16 0.36 0.52 0.77
2004 Asset Volatility Vega
due to stocks 1754.6 5064.1 8.0 26.8 145.5 751.0 2808.3
due to options 2461.9 3929.3 53.4 197.7 938.6 2511.4 9498.3
Asset Delta
due to stocks 2867.8 5939.3 91.5 237.8 848.3 2468.1 6682.0
due to options 3686.7 5212.6 136.0 422.7 1745.5 4429.1 10661.7
Asset Incentive Ratio 0.55 0.32 0.14 0.32 0.52 0.74 0.96
Equity Incentive Ratio 0.36 0.24 0.05 0.14 0.31 0.57 0.70
2005 Asset Volatility Vega
due to stocks 2045.5 6465.7 6.4 28.7 138.3 1048.5 2391.4
due to options 2299.5 3526.1 91.7 198.3 906.4 2602.8 8460.8
Asset Delta
due to stocks 3687.9 9121.7 86.3 370.2 834.1 2411.4 6297.8
due to options 3846.3 5181.1 135.9 398.4 1724.0 4321.6 12509.7
Asset Incentive Ratio 0.51 0.32 0.12 0.28 0.50 0.67 0.95
Equity Incentive Ratio 0.39 0.30 0.04 0.13 0.33 0.59 0.82
2006 Asset Volatility Vega
due to stocks 879.8 2112.9 2.3 9.7 78.8 448.7 2029.6
due to options 1557.9 2728.1 25.5 81.0 410.4 1783.0 3983.3
Asset Delta
due to stocks 2633.9 4307.1 86.6 219.4 792.5 2497.2 7519.0
due to options 2954.8 4278.2 75.8 248.6 1058.0 3515.9 11394.3
Asset Incentive Ratio 0.40 0.30 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.50 0.70
Equity Incentive Ratio 0.29 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.23 0.42 0.60
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III. Incentives, Asset Risk-Taking, and the Financial Crisis of 2007/08
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011) begins its review of incentive com-
pensation practices with the simple statement: “Risk-taking incentives provided by incentive com-
pensation arrangements in the financial services industry were a contributing factor to the financial
crisis that began in 2007” (p. 1). Even some of those whose pay is being heavily regulated seem to
agree that compensation systems played a role.17
In this section, we study the relation between incentives of CEOs and asset risk-taking before
the crisis of 2007/08.
III.1. Hypotheses, Empirical Strategy, and Data
It is important to note at the outset that shareholders in principle (ex-ante) welcomed the asset risk-
taking that later turned out to be harmful to the health of their financial institutions. For example,
holding AAA tranches of securitized loans was appealing to shareholders for two reasons. First,
these tranches paid extra yields over and above the typical AAA investments. Second, whether held
on or off the balance sheet, these investments did not require backing by enhanced equity capital.18
Thus, to the extent that there are factors apart from material rewards that make CEOs act in the
interest of shareholders, part of the asset risk-taking in banks, as in other corporations, will not
be explained by direct monetary incentives of CEOs. Functioning alignment of CEO actions with
shareholder interests in financial institutions thus generates a baseline amount of asset risk-taking.
What we are interested in is whether part of the variation in asset risk-taking beyond this baseline
level can be explained by incentives embedded in the equity and stock option holdings of managers.
Building on the earlier considerations (see Section I.E), we test three main hypotheses regarding
17For example, in May 2008, PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Economist Intelligence Unit conducted a global survey
of financial services industry executives and commentators. Asked which factors have created the conditions for the
credit/banking crisis, only 31% of survey participants put the blame on “monetary policy,” but an impressive 70% on
“reward systems.” See PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008).
18Whether equity is “expensive” is debated hotly. These discussions notwithstanding, it is a fact that most practi-
tioners did believe that holding more equity was not desirable.
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this relation.
Hypothesis 1: Asset Volatility Vega is positively associated with asset risk-taking.
Hypothesis 2: Asset Delta is negatively associated with asset risk-taking.
Hypothesis 3: The Asset Incentive Ratio is positively associated with asset risk-taking.
Our empirical strategy to test these hypotheses is straightforward: We run cross-sectional re-
gressions with a measure of asset risk-taking as the dependent variable. Risk-taking incentives,
governance features, and other firm-specific variables serve as explanatory variables. We identify
sub-industries with dummies in our regressions.
We first explain the choice of our dependent variable (Subsection III.1.1). We next describe
the explanatory variables (Subsection III.1.2). Subsection III.1.3 then discusses issues related to
endogeneity problems in the relationship between asset risk-taking incentives and asset risk-taking.
An overview of all dependent and explanatory variables is contained in Table III.
III.1.1. Dependent Variable: Write-downs
Like other studies (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Guay, 1999; Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu, 2011;
Sanders and Hambrick, 2007), our empirical tests rely upon ex-post evidence of asset risk-taking.
The idea we appeal to is that for a given expected project value, a CEO with higher incentives to
take risk will be willing to tolerate a greater spread in potential outcomes. Because the financial
crisis exposed the downside of the investments that banks undertook in prior years, the write-downs
form an indication of the degree of asset risk-taking.19 Because we aim to capture as broadly as
possible the potential downsides, we focus on write-downs during the period 2007Q3-2008Q4. We
19Write-downs, of course, also cover simply bad business choices, even those that were not considered risky ex-ante.
For example, the practice of making “Ninja” (no income, no job, no asset) loans on the sheer hope that real estate
prices would continue climbing was arguably ex-ante questionable. But not all risks that were taken can be labeled as
ex-ante bad. Related to this question, there is some discussion as to just how much CEOs suffered from the crisis. On
the one hand, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) show that management teams in the case of Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers were able to cash out large amounts of bonus compensation before the crisis. On the other hand,
some evidence suggests that in general CEOs did not take actions they thought would be on average value-destroying
and that they did not, on average, anticipate the crisis. For example, they did not sell their own shares prior to the
crisis, see Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011).
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Table III. Variable description.
Write-downs
Write-downs (USD mill.) The losses incurred by the financial institutions
during the financial crisis period 2007Q3-2008Q4.
Write-downs scaled by total assets Write-downs divided by a company’s total assets.
CEO compensation
Equity Volatility Vega (1000 USD) The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01
change in the standard deviation of returns.
Equity Delta (1000 USD) The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth with respect
to a one percent change in the underlying stock price.
Equity Incentive Ratio Equity Volatility Vega divided by Equity Delta
Asset Volatility Vega (1000 USD) The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for a 0.01
change in the standard deviation of firm value returns.
Asset Delta (1000 USD) The dollar change in the CEO’s wealth with respect
to a one percent change in the underlying firm value.
Asset Incentive Ratio Asset Volatility Vega divided by Asset Delta
Firm Characteristics
Market Cap. (USD mill.) The market capitalization of the company
Total assets (USD mill.) Total assets on the company’s balance sheet.
Book-to-Market ratio (%) Book value of assets over market value of assets.
Book leverage (%) Book leverage = 1 - (book value of equity / book
value of assets)
Market leverage (%) Market leverage = 1 - (market value of equity / market
value of the financial institution) where market value of
equity equals the number of shares times end-of-year
stock price and the market value of the financial institu-
tion equals the market value of equity plus the book
value of liabilities
Governance
Percentage independent directors (%) The fraction of directors on a board classified as
independent.
Tenure The number of years the CEO has been in office.
Governance index The number of anti-takeover provisions a company
has in place.
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collect write-downs data for all U.S. financial institutions for which they are available and for which
we have compensation data from ExecuComp.
Description of Write-Downs: For the largest U.S. financial institutions these write-downs are
available from Bloomberg, covering write-downs, losses, and loan-loss provisions. For the smaller
U.S. financial institutions for which Bloomberg does not record write-downs we consult the compa-
nies’ proxy filings (10-K and 10-Q). In particular, we identify the following components from the
SEC filings in order to be as consistent as possible with the figures reported by Bloomberg: (1)
Write-downs which are explicitly referred to as such. They cover charge-offs on loans (conditional
on the fact that these are not included in the loan loss provisions). Furthermore, as a consequence
of the financial crisis, some companies had to abandon certain development projects which led to
rising severance charges. These are typically reported as specific write-downs related to the crisis.
(2) Loan loss provisions are charges or expenses against income and loans which are deemed to be
uncollectible due to the impact of the credit deterioration during the crisis period. (3) Subprime
losses appear when companies directly state that certain losses have occured specifically due to, e.g.,
investments in the subprime mortgage backed security market or due to the bankruptcies of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. (4) Impairment charges (or impairment on securities) are non-temporary
impairments on held to maturity and available for sale securities. This is sometimes referred to as
losses on trading securities or impairment on real estate investments. (5) Credit losses which are
directly referred to as such but are not included in the loan loss provisions.
We use both the logarithm of write-downs to study the absolute (dollar level) of asset risk-
taking (controlling, of course, for firm size in various ways) and write-downs scaled by total assets
to investigate the relative level of asset risk-taking.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Write-downs and Alternative Measures: Write-downs
form a natural proxy for the ex-ante asset risk-taking of financial institutions precisely because they
are not only realized losses, but also unrealized losses. Even if assets that are held to maturity
in the end do not lead to an actual loss, the fact that banks had to take write-downs on them
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indicates their ex-ante riskiness. Also, while concrete policy choices can in principle be read from
banks’ financial reports, the discretion banks have in classifying certain assets puts bounds on the
exactness of information obtained from these data.20 Write-downs are a summary variable that
captures all these facets in a relatively straightforward way.
Nonetheless, write-downs bring with them some limitations which need to be borne in mind.
First, write-downs are accounting data. They are not always completely clearly and unambiguously
described in company reports.21
Second, and related, firms have discretion of when to announce which write-downs. Also, in
October 2008, the SEC allowed banks to switch from mark-to-market accounting to hold-to-maturity
accounting. We cover a relatively wide data period, but it is still possible that some write-downs
that were announced were not “fair value” losses, or that some losses have not yet been recorded
as write-downs.22 Some studies report that banks use accounting discretion to understate the
impairment of their real estate related assets (Huizinga and Laeven, 2012). Others find the opposite,
namely, that poorly-performing banks overstate unrealized losses (“take a bath”) in order to show
higher earnings the following year (Fiechter and Meyer, 2009). Yvas (2011) documents that higher
corporate governance quality was associated with timelier write-downs in the time period 2007/08.
His study takes it as given that the cumulated actual write-downs and those implied by benchmarking
devaluations to credit indices are identical per the end of 2008. What is certain is that investors
demonstrated a particularly keen interest in write-downs during the financial crisis, which, together
20Moreover, investing in one asset class, for example, MBS securities, may have meant simultaneously shifting out
of another class; moreover, MBS investments often were acquired by banks in the process of securitization, so that the
choice of banks was, in fact, multi-dimensional. Understanding these choices would probably require jointly modeling
all policy choices.
21Naturally, one can debate in each and every case which parts of the announced overall write-downs should be
included in the analysis, and it can be difficult to precisely disentangle some of the above categories from each other.
We use the sum of all losses associated to the crisis. For a discussion of the challenges and opportunities of accounting
in the financial crisis, see Ryan (2008).
22For example, write-downs may be overestimated because some firms may have been pushed by government author-
ities to “come clean.” Conversely, write-downs may be underestimated due to the fact that some financial institutions
were bailed out just for the bailout funds to flow through indirectly to other banks which could otherwise have ended
up in deep trouble.
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with accounting standards (in particular, FAS 157 - Fair Value Measurement which became effective
for annual periods beginning on or after November 15, 2007) requiring detailed disclosure, is likely
to have reduced opportunities for manipulation.23
III.1.2. Explanatory Variables
Incentives. We use the incentive measures developed above.
Company Characteristics. We obtain company-specific information from the Compustat Fun-
damental and Bank Annual databases. As control variables in the main analysis we include proxies
for firm size (the logarithm of market capitalization), the ratio of the book value of assets over
the market value of assets (as a proxy for the companies potential investment opportunities), and
market or book leverage.
Corporate Governance Features. We also control for a set of corporate governance variables
including (a) CEO Tenure which measures the number of years the CEO has been in office and
(b) Percentage of independent directors which is the fraction of directors on a board classified as
independent. These data are from ExecuComp and Riskmetrics, supplemented by hand-collected
data where possible. (c) The Governance index is the number of anti-takeover provisions a company
has in place (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). A higher value of the Governance index is regarded
as less shareholder-friendly governance.
23It is possible that despite diligent reading of the proxy statements available, we missed some write-downs in our
data collection. If all institutions report truthfully, the losses must ultimately show up in net income. The drawback
of using net income over assets is that it is a more noisy measure of ex-ante asset risk-taking, as it also comprises a
lot of other activities of the financial institutions, including gains and losses from other business lines unrelated to the
crisis. Nonetheless, the overall results with net income over assets as the dependent variable are similar to those for
write-downs.
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III.1.3. Endogeneity Concerns
The cross-sectional regressions we employ do not allow us to strictly identify a causal effect. Our re-
sults are correlations, and we interpret them as such. Various features of our analysis may ameliorate
endogeneity concerns, however.
First, as for reverse causation, we are considering the relationship between incentives (and other
variables) in the years 2003-2006 and outcomes over the years 2007-2008. We do not have information
on the decision criteria boards used to allocate incentive packages in a given year. It is conceivable
that incentive packages of a given year include options given as a reward for undertaking risky deals
in earlier years; this would imply an upward bias in the respective estimates. However, this concern
is much less likely to apply to incentives in 2003. Incentive packages relevant for that year may, of
course, include stock and options given as a reward for other asset risk-taking in prior years, but
these potential earlier risky activities do not include the investments that led to write-downs in the
financial crisis. Using these earlier years is also attractive because the vast majority of deals related
to the subprime and mortgage backed security market originated in the early part of the decade,
not in 2006. This is illustrated in Figure 3. While subprime mortgages have been used for a long
time, the “take-off” of the market occurred around 2002/3 (e.g., Ha¨ssig (2009) for the case of UBS).
Second, asset substitution incentives of managers explicitly take into account leverage. Our
regressions, therefore, show the relation between incentives and asset risk-taking for a given level
of leverage. The ideal situation would be to jointly model the setting of incentives and the choices
of the CEO to take asset risk through increasing the firm value return volatility and financial risk
through higher firm leverage (in the spirit of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)).24 Unfortunately,
we cannot do this in our cross-sectional setup. Market leverage may, however, be subject to fewer
concerns because it fluctuates passively simply because of changes in stock price performance (Welch,
24Indeed, not only the level of debt but also the maturity is endogenous Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010). As
explained earlier, in line with Guay (1999) we use identical debt maturities for all financial institutions.
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Figure 3. The development in subprime mortgage securitization over the years 1995-2006.
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, http://www.insidemortgagefinance.com.
2004). Thus, the endogeneity of leverage may be less of a concern given that we use market leverage
throughout. All our results hold more strongly with book leverage.
Third, we control for important firm-level variables as well as industry dummies. We also control
for several governance features that may be correlated both with incentives and risk-taking and are
likely to capture important differences between firms. Of course, this still does not rule out the
possibility that a positive association between risk-taking incentives and write-downs could arise
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because of omitted factors that are positively correlated with both variables.25 It is equally possible
that we are underestimating the relationship between risk-taking incentives and poor outcomes.26
Despite several controls, our analysis cannot definitively rule out these concerns. (We will briefly
comment on instrumental variables regressions that yield results consistent with a causal effect of in-
centives on asset risk-taking, but our sample is simply too small to reliably employ this identification
strategy.)
III.2. Regression Results
III.2.1. Main Findings
During the credit crisis period, the companies in our sample had on average write-downs of around
US$6.6bn, which implies write-downs of around 5.5% of their total assets (averaging assets over the
years). See Table I; monetary values are in 2008 dollars. The heterogeneity in asset risk-taking also
shows in the standard deviation of write-downs and scaled write-downs.
Table IV presents the main regression results. Panel A relates log write-downs to the Asset
Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio, respectively. We observe that the Asset Incentive
Ratio in 2003, 2004, and 2005 is positively and significantly (in one case only borderline so) related to
write-downs. In 2006, we find no significant relationship. Given that the vast majority of subprime
deals was done before 2006, it is perhaps not too surprising that we do not find a robustly significant
relationship between incentives in 2006 and write-downs; however, when controlling for governance
measures, this relationship does become significant (the results are not shown to conserve space).
25For instance, board competence is unobserved. Some may argue that less competent boards are more easily
captured by the CEO and may, therefore, grant an excessive number of options to CEOs. Moreover, less competent
boards are less able to monitor investments and may provide worse advice to the CEO. These two factors may combine
into a cross-sectional positive relationship between risk-taking incentives and write-downs. Or, the least talented CEOs
(who choose the worst projects on average) may be inclined to self-select into the firms with the highest risk-taking
incentives, to occasionally “hit the jackpot.”
26For example, if a company has a culture of risk-taking, it may attract risk-seeking individuals and may, thus, need
to provide incentives with lower Vega than other firms. At the same time, these companies may, indeed, engage in
a lot of risk-taking simply because the manager likes risk, which, in the case of the subprime crisis resulted in large
write-downs.
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By contrast, we find no significant association between write-downs and the Equity Incentive
Ratio in any year. Indeed, for this measure the point estimates for 2003 and 2006 are of equal
magnitude, but with opposite signs.
A similar picture emerges in Panel B. Here, we consider write-downs divided by total assets
as a measure of relative asset risk-taking. In 2003, 2004, and 2005, the Asset Incentive Ratio is
positively and (in one case borderline) significantly related to write-downs scaled by total assets. As
before, for 2006 we do not obtain significant results in these regressions. By contrast, when we relate
write-downs scaled by total assets to Equity Volatility Vega, we find some (borderline) significance
in on year, 2003, but none at all in the other years. One difference between the results for relative
asset risk-taking (write-downs scaled by firm size) and absolute asset risk-taking (log write-downs)
is that the regressions for the latter generally show greater explanatory power than for the former,
in terms of R-squared. Indeed, only asset incentives offer explanatory power for write-downs scaled
by assets; by contrast, there is no size effect in relative asset risk-taking, for example.
In Table V we expand the regression specification in two ways. Columns (1)-(3) and (5)-(7)
of Table V add governance variables. Including these variables is likely to ameliorate potential
endogeneity concerns. The Asset Incentive Ratio remains consistently significant in all regressions.
To conserve space we only show the results for 2003, but the results for the other years are similar
and, with governance in the regressions, the results are also more significant for 2006. The Equity
Incentive Ratio remains insignificant throughout when controlling for governance. (As another way
to tackle the potential endogeneity concerns, we have also experimented with instrumental variables.
These results are reported below.)
Finally, columns (4) and (8) show the Asset Volatility Vega and the Asset Delta separately in the
regression instead of the Asset Incentive Ratio. We observe that Asset Volatility Vega is positively
related to log write downs, while Asset Delta is negatively and significantly associated to write-
downs consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2. Moreover, these results are also similar to what Knopf,
Nam, and Thornton (2002) find for corporate hedging activities. As such, our findings confirm that
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incentives were related to risk-relevant activities in the time ahead of the financial crisis just like in
other times.
Overall, the findings broadly provide support for Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3, confirming the idea of
a link between asset risk-taking and incentives to take asset risk. By contrast, we do not find a
significant relationship between equity incentives and asset risk-taking. Of course, given that the
Asset Incentive Ratio and the Equity Incentive Ratio are correlated, we do find some relationship
between the Equity Incentive Ratio and asset risk-taking, too, but the relation is overall much
weaker. Thus, our analysis documents that, in order to explain asset risk-taking, it can be important
to use asset incentives instead of equity incentives.27
III.2.2. Additional Findings
As can be seen in Table V, we find no robust association of any of the governance characteristics with
write-downs, controlling for incentives to take asset risk. That we detect no significant relationship
between director independence and write-downs may be the result of several countervailing factors.
On the one hand, boards acting more strongly on behalf of shareholders may have pushed CEOs
to engage in more asset risk-taking (thus implying a positive relationship).28 On the other hand,
such boards may also have been more prudent in avoiding the worst investments. Moreover, board
independence does not directly capture board competence (Fernandes and Fich, 2013).
Some additional results are not tabulated to conserve space. First, we considered two instruments
for incentives to try to get closer to a causal estimate of the impact of incentives on asset risk-taking:
27From society’s point of view, the relationship between write-downs and compensation structures was accentuated
because the downsides of financial institutions’ investments resulted in significant external costs presumably not taken
into account by shareholders. Thus, a natural future research question is whether and how incentive systems at
financial institutions may encourage managers of these companies to take into account (to a greater extent than is
arguably common today) the external effects of their actions. Some work exists that has begun addressing related
issues. For example, on optimal incentive design in the presence of government guarantees see John, Saunders, and
Senbet (2000), John, Mehran, and Qian (2010), Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), and Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro
(2011).
28It is also possible that more independent boards forced executives to disclose write-downs earlier or higher. This
argument only holds if one posits that despite the strict accounting regime and the eagerness of investors to monitor
developments at financial institutions, some banks were able to manipulate the total amount of write-downs in the six
quarters considered here.
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(1) past cumulative returns and (2) lagged stock return volatility. High previous-year cumulative
returns are likely to induce the board to reduce risk incentives going forward (because they suggest
that a lot of risk was taken previously), but should not be directly correlated with asset risk-taking
in the years before the crisis.29 Similarly, higher equity volatilities (measured over 5 years prior
to the year when we measure the incentives) are correlated with current incentives because they
indicate that it was relatively cheap to grant CEOs stock options, and the historical volatility can
arguably be excluded from regressions explaining asset risk-taking just before the crisis.30 With
these instruments we obtain results supportive of a significant, positive causal impact of the Asset
Incentive Ratio on write-downs.31 However, the reliability of 2SLS may be limited with this small
sample size, so we do not emphasize these results.
The regression results continue to hold when we consider book leverage. In the spirit of Edmans,
Gabaix, and Landier (2009), we scaled Delta by total compensation. The results continue to hold.
Finally, although this is not the focus of the paper, we consider performance of banks in the crisis,
not asset risk-taking, as the dependent variable. We find that financial institutions with higher
Asset Volatility Vegas had lower stock returns during the crisis period, whereas those with higher
Asset Deltas had higher returns. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) had found no relationship of stock
returns with equity incentives. These results again confirm that asset incentives capture different
features than the equity incentives.
29This instrument is often used in studies of risk-taking (Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012; DeYoung, Peng, and
Yan, 2012).
30Indeed, studies aiming to explain risk-taking do not generally use historical volatility as an explanatory variable
because there is no reason to expect a direct effect.
31For example, for 2003 and log write-downs, the first-stage F-statistic is 13.34, above the critical value of 11.59
for two instruments suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002), ameliorating weak instruments concerns; the
Hansen-Sargan J statistic yields a p-value of 0.91, implying that, conditional on one instrument fulfilling the exclusion
restriction, the other instrument is also likely to be valid. A Hausman test (in the two instruments version) has a
p-value of just below 0.1, suggesting that the data do not actually reject the use of OLS in favor of 2SLS (the point
estimates are not very different).
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IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper offers, to our knowledge, the first investigation of the quantitative importance of man-
agerial incentives to take asset risk. It is motivated by the observation that, while the notion that
asset risk-taking incentives depend on leverage has been a cornerstone of corporate finance since
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the measures of equity incentives typically employed in research do not
explicitly incorporate this idea. The asset incentives we calculate, instead, reflect the intuition that
variation of leverage between companies needs to be taken into account when trying to understand
managerial incentives to take risk. Each incentive measure should be used in the context where it
is appropriate.
We show that the conceptual idea that asset incentives differ from equity incentives is also
relevant quantitatively. We document three main results. First, incentives to take asset risk can be
large compared to incentives to increase the value of assets; this provides a contrast to the fact that
incentives to take equity risk are usually small compared to incentives to increase the stock price.
Second, stock-holdings can also induce substantial asset risk-taking incentives; thus, the proposal,
often heard in practice, to compensate CEOs mostly with stock rather than stock options, in order to
rein in risk-taking incentives does not apply so cleanly anymore. Third, in our empirical application
in the context of the financial crisis, asset incentives possess considerable explanatory power for
asset risk-taking; using equity incentives, one would instead erroneously conclude that managerial
incentives were unrelated to the asset risks that financial institutions took in the years before the
financial crisis 2007/08.
These results may prove helpful for future studies on incentives and risk-taking and may aid
boards in evaluating the incentives conveyed by equity-based compensation.
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Appendix A: Asset Volatility Vega
From Stock Options
Consider the compound option pricing model described in Section II.II.1. Our task is to calculate the
sensitivity of the compound option pricing formula for a call option with respect to the underlying
asset return volatility. Geske (1979) presents a formula for this derivative, which we denote by
“Geske Vega,”
Geske Vega =
∂CC(V,D, r, TCC , TD, σV ,K)
∂σ2V
· dσ
2
V
dσV
=
N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , k + σV
√
TD,
√
TCC/TD)
N1(k + σV
√
TD)
De−rTDϕ(k)
√
TD. (A.1)
However, we do not rely on this formula for computing the Asset Volatility Vega we use in our
analysis. Our motivation not to employ this formula is that the Black-Scholes model is a special
case of the compound option model when the firm’s debt, D, goes to zero (this observation is also
noted by Geske (1979)). Indeed, in the limit as D → 0, the compound option price converges to
the Black-Scholes price. Therefore, we would also expect that, for zero debt, the Asset Volatility
Vega from the compound option model should collapse into the formula for the Asset Volatility Vega
(and, thus, in this special case the Equity Volatility Vega) from the Black-Scholes model. However,
the formula for the Geske Vega suggests, counter-intuitively, that in the limit when D → 0 the Asset
Volatility Vega given by the compound option pricing model would converge to zero.
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In Proposition 1, we derive a different expression for the vega for a compound call option.
Proof of Proposition 1. Taking the derivative of a call option in the compound option pricing
model with respect to σV gives us
∂CC
∂σV
= V
∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
· d(σV
√
TCC)
dσV
+
∂N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k+σV
√
TD
· d(k + σV
√
TD)
dσV

− De−rTD
∂N2(h, y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k
· dk
dσV
+
V ∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
− De−rTD
∂N2(x, k;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h
−Ke−rTCC dN(h)
dh
 dh
dσV
. (A.2)
In Lemma 1 (see below), we show that the expression in the square bracket of the last term in
Equation (A.2) equals zero. This leaves us with
∂CC
∂σV
= V
∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
· d(σV
√
TCC)
dσV
+
∂N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k+σV
√
TD
· d(k + σV
√
TD)
dσV

− De−rTD
∂N2(h, y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k
· dk
dσV
. (A.3)
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Inserting the remaining derivatives used in Lemma 1 into Equation (A.3) we obtain the formula
∂CC
∂σV
= V
ϕ(h+ σV√TCC)N1
k + σV
√
TD −
√
TCC
TD
(h+ σV
√
TCC)√
1− TCCTD
√TCC (A.4)
+ ϕ(k + σV
√
TD)N1
h+ σV
√
TCC −
√
TCC
TD
(k + σV
√
TD)√
1− TCCTD
 d(k + σV√TD)
dσV

− De−rTDϕ(k)N1
h−
√
TCC
TD
k√
1− TCCTD
 dk
dσV
,
where
dk
dσV
= − k
σV
−
√
TD and
d(k + σV
√
TD)
dσV
= − k
σV
. (A.5)
Now simplifying terms and using that V ϕ(k + σV
√
TD) = De
−rTDϕ(k) we obtain Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. Given the model assumptions,
Q := V
∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
−De−rTD
∂N2(x, k;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h
−Ke−rTCC dN(h)
dh
= 0.(A.6)
Proof of Lemma 1. By relying on the relation
N2(h, k; ρ) =
∫ h
−∞
ϕ(x)N1
(
k − ρx√
1− ρ2
)
dx (A.7)
as given in Geske (1979) (pages 79-80) and from the symmetry between k and h, we have the
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following relations
∂N2(x, k + σV
√
TD;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h+σV
√
TCC
= ϕ(h+ σV
√
TCC)N1
k + σV
√
TD −
√
TCC
TD
(h+ σV
√
TCC)√
1− TCCTD

(A.8)
and
∂N2(h+ σV
√
TCC , y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k+σV
√
TD
= ϕ(k + σV
√
TD)N1
h+ σV
√
TCC −
√
TCC
TD
(k + σV
√
TD)√
1− TCCTD

(A.9)
and
∂N2(x, k;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂x
∣∣∣
x=h
= ϕ(h)N1
k −
√
TCC
TD
h√
1− TCCTD
 (A.10)
and
∂N2(h, y;
√
TCC
TD
)
∂y
∣∣∣
y=k
= ϕ(k)N1
h−
√
TCC
TD
k√
1− TCCTD
 , (A.11)
where ϕ denotes the standard normal probability density. Moreover, we use that V ϕ(h+σV
√
TCC) =
V¯ e−rTCCϕ(h) where V¯ is the solution to Equation (5). This gives us
Q = V¯ e−rTCCϕ(h)N1
k + σV
√
TD −
√
TCC
TD
(h+ σV
√
TCC)√
1− TCCTD
 − De−rTDϕ(h)N1
k −
√
TCC
TD
h√
1− TCCTD

− Ke−rTCCϕ(h). (A.12)
Simplifying terms inside the standard normal distribution functions, we can write Equation (A.12)
180
Chapter 3: Managerial Incentives to Take Asset Risk
as follows
Q = e−rTCCϕ(h)
[
V¯ N1(k¯(V¯ ) + σV
√
TD − TCC)−De−r(TD−TCC)N1(k¯(V¯ ))−K
]
. (A.13)
By again relying on Equation (5) and on the definition of V¯ , we know that the term in square
brackets is zero. Thus, our result is obtained.
Remarks to the proof of Proposition 1.
In some cases, researchers may be interested in analyzing how the firm value where the option is
precisely at the money, V¯ , varies as the asset volatility varies. That is, we would wish to compute
the term dVdσV . Although the term
dh
dσV
, in which V¯ features, plays no role in the proof of Proposition
1 (the terms in front of it cancel out), we present the derivations for computing this derivative here
for completeness.
Define the following function
f(x, y) = xN1(k(x, y) + y
√
TD − TCC)−De−r(TD−TCC)N1(k(x, y))−K, (A.14)
where
k˜(x, y) =
log( xD ) + (r − y
2
2 )(TD − TCC)
y
√
TD − TCC
. (A.15)
Now, by relying on Equation (A.14) above we have that
f(V , σV ) = 0. (A.16)
Since the function f depends on σV both through the direct effect but also indirectly through its
effect on V¯ , we can consider the function f as a function in these two variables. Writing up the
dynamics using the chain-rule, we have
df(V , σV ) =
∂f
∂x
(V , σV )dV +
∂f
∂y
(V , σV )dσV = 0, (A.17)
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which equivalently can be written as
dV
dσV
= −
∂f
∂y (V , σV )
∂f
∂x (V , σV )
. (A.18)
We obtain
dV
dσV
= −De
−r(TD−TCC)ϕ(k)
√
TD − TCC
N1(k + σV
√
TD − TCC)
, (A.19)
where
k = k˜(V , σV ). (A.20)
Now it is straightforward to compute the term dhdσV in Equation (A.2). From,
h =
log(V
V
) + (r − σ2V2 )TCC
σV
√
TCC
(A.21)
we obtain
dh
dσV
=
1
V
√
TCC
De−r(TD−TCC )ϕ(k)
√
TD−TCC
N1(k+σV
√
TD−TCC) − h
σV
−
√
TCC (A.22)
We rely on the formula in Proposition 1 to measure the CEO asset risk-taking incentives we
apply in the analysis. Analogously to the Asset Volatility Vega from stocks we divide the expression
in Proposition 1 by 100 so that it measures the sensitivity of the option price with respect to a 0.01
change in the underlying asset return volatility, as we did it with the Equity Volatility Vega.
To confirm the intuitive benchmark result mentioned above, consider the case when the debt,
D, tends to zero. Then, since V¯ tends to the strike K and k tends to +∞ it is clear that
lim
D→0
∂CC
∂σV
= V ϕ(h+ σV
√
TCC)
√
TCC (A.23)
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which is precisely the vega of a call option in the Black-Scholes model and where h is given in
Equation (A.21).
Figure A-1 shows a comparison of the formulas for the Asset Volatility Vega given by the formula
in Geske (1979) (see Equation (A.1)) with our Asset Volatility Vega (see Proposition 1) and the
one computed by the first difference approximation for parameter values relevant for the analysis
conducted in this paper and for varying levels of asset volatilities, σV . We make two observations.
First, as before, the analytical formula in given in Proposition 1 completely agrees with the first
difference approximation. Second, there are substantial differences between the Asset Volatility
Vega computed using the formula in Proposition 1 and the formula presented in Geske (1979) at
common levels of the asset volatility. The difference (both in absolute and in relative terms) between
the two approaches to compute the Asset Volatility Vega is particularly pronounced for moderate
and low levels of asset volatility, which is commonly observed for financial institutions, though it
remains substantial even at higher levels of asset volatility. That is, if we were to use the formula in
Geske (1979), we would substantially underestimate the incentives to take asset risk as compared
to our formula (and the difference approximation).
183
Chapter 3: Managerial Incentives to Take Asset Risk
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
σV
A
ss
et
 V
ol
at
ili
ty
 V
eg
a
Figure A-1. Comparison of Asset volatility Vega to Geske’s formula.
Comparison of Asset Volatility Vegas for varying asset volatility, σV , computed using three different
approaches: The Geske approach (dotted line), our approach (“+”) and the difference approximation
(solid line). The parameters are V = 100, K = 50, r = 0.04, TD = 10, TCC = 6 and D = 85.
∆ = 10−11 is used to calculate the difference approximation.
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Appendix B: Equity Delta and Equity
Volatility Vega
Following Core and Guay (2002), we calculate Equity Delta and Equity Volatility Vega using the
derivatives of the Black-Scholes formula (see Black and Scholes (1973)) with respect to the underlying
stock and the stock return volatility respectively. We assume that the stock price, S, follows a
geometric Brownian motion
dSt
St
= µSdt+ σSdWt (B.1)
under the historical measure. The parameters µS and σS are assumed constant and we also assume
that there exists a bank account which yields a constant interest rate r. Recall that the value of a
plain vanilla call is given by
BS = Se−δTDN(d1)−Ke−rTDN(d2) (B.2)
with
d1(S,K, r, TD, σS) =
ln(S/K) + ((r − δ) + σ2S/2)TD
σS
√
TD
(B.3)
d2(S,K, r, TD, σS) = d1(S,K, r, TD, σS)− σS
√
TD, (B.4)
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where N denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. S
denotes the stock, K denotes the strike, σS is the return volatility, r represent the risk-free rate, δ
denotes the dividend yield and TD represents the maturity of the option. T corresponds to TCC in
the Compound option pricing framework.
The Equity Delta of a single option can be computed according to
Equity Delta =
∂BS
∂S
· (S/100) = e−δTDN(d1) · (S/100), (B.5)
which measures the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a one percent change in the stock
price.
The Equity Volatility Vega of a single option can be computed according to
Equity Volatility Vega =
∂BS
∂σS
· (1/100) = e−δTDϕ(d1)S
√
TD · (1/100) (B.6)
which measures the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in the underlying
stock return volatility and ϕ denotes the density of a standard normal random variable.
As is standard in the literature, we assume that Equity Delta from stocks is equal to one (by
construction) and that Equity Volatility Vega from stocks equals zero; see Guay (1999).
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Appendix C: Sample and Parameter
Choices
Table C-1 shows the SIC codes we consider in the analysis. As described in the main text, we
mostly follow Guay (1999) in our parameter choices. Table C-2 shows descriptive statistics for all
the relevant variables.
To obtain an estimate of the firm value return volatility, σV , Guay (1999) proposes to rely on
portfolio theory. Thus, the variance of the firm value can written as
σ2V = X
2
debtσ
2
debt +X
2
equityσ
2
equity + 2XdebtXequityCov(σdebt, σequity), (C.1)
where Xdebt and Xequity are the weights of debt and equity in the firm’s capital structure and
σequity ≡ σS is the annualized standard deviation of daily log stock returns. We use the same σequity
as we have used for computing Equity Volatility Vega and Equity Delta. For σdebt, we use the
annualized standard deviation of monthly (log) returns using the Merrill Lynch Bank of America
corporate financial bond index using a five year period. Moreover, we follow Guay (1999) and set the
correlation between equity and debt returns equal to one, Corr(σdebt, σequity) =
Cov(σdebt,σequity)√
σ2debtσ
2
equity
= 1,
which implies that Cov(σdebt, σequity) = σdebtσequity and, therefore,
σ2V = X
2
debtσ
2
debt +X
2
equityσ
2
equity + 2XdebtXequityσdebtσequity. (C.2)
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Table C-1. Industry classification.
SIC code 6211 includes some well-known investment banks and some brokers. For our main analysis,
we keep these brokerage firms in the sample but exclude those brokers listed in the same SIC code
as exchanges, SIC code 6200. While engagement in the subprime mortgage business may not have
been at the core of the business strategy of those brokers in the SIC 6211 code, these companies
nonetheless often did engage in such activities. Our regression results generally speaking hold also
if we exclude all SIC 6211 firms, but this then also excludes firms such as Bear Stearns, Goldman
Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, clearly an undesirable sample restriction. We do not
consider investment advisors (SIC code 6282). For other finance SIC codes that are not shown we
do not have companies with compensation data.
Financial institutions 2-digit SIC SIC Code Financial Service Industry
Depository Institutions 60 6020 Commercial Banks
6035 Federal Savings Institutions
6036 Savings Institutions, Except Federal
6099 Functions Related to Depository Banking
Nondepository Credit 61 6111 Federal Credit Agencies
Institutions 6141 Personal Credit Institutions
6159 Miscellaneous Business Credit
6162 Mortgage Bankers and Loan Correspondents
6172 Finance Lessors
6199 Finance Services
Security Brokers and Dealers 62 6211 Security Brokers and Dealers
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Table C-2. Estimated parameters for the Compound option pricing model
Descriptive statistics of the parameters used in the computations of Asset Volatility Vega and Asset
Delta. The summary statistics are average over the years 2003-2006. Per-share stock price denotes
the average end-of-year stock price. Per-share book-value of debt denotes the book value of liabilities
end-of-year. The risk-free interest rate is the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds with a maturity similar
to maturity of the firms liabilities. Standard deviation of debt returns is the annualized standard
deviation calculated on monthly (log) returns using the Merrill Lynch Bank of America corporate
financial bond index using a five year period. Standard deviation of equity returns is calculated
(from CRSP data) as the annualized standard deviation of daily log-returns over the past three
years up to each year in our sample by assuming 250 trading days in the year. Est. std. dev. of
returns on firm value denotes the estimated standard deviation of returns on the firm value. Weight
of equity and Weight of debt are, respectively, the shares of equity and debt in the firm’s capital
structure. Implied per-share market value of assets is backed out using the Black-Scholes equation.
Per-share market value of assets denotes sum of the per share end-of-year stock price and the per
share book value of debt. Price-to-strike ratio is the implied per share firm value divided by the per
share book value of debt. The variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentile on an annual
basis. The term “q” denotes the quantile, i.e., 10q refers to the 10th percentile in the empirical
distribution of the respective variable. All monetary values are expressed in 2008 dollars.
Firm characteristics Mean Std. Dev. 10q 25q 50q 75q 90q
Per-share stock price ($) 42.0 22.7 17.9 25.6 37.3 52.8 69.6
Per-share book-value of debt ($) 238.3 254.3 61.2 103.9 160.4 282.4 409.7
Risk-free interest rate (%) 4.1 0.4 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.6
Standard deviation of debt returns (%) 3.1 0.1 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.2
Standard deviation of equity returns (%) 27.5 9.5 17.3 21.3 25.8 32.0 37.8
Est. std. dev. of returns on firm value (%) 5.7 2.8 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.9 7.1
Weight of equity (%) 10.4 6.9 5.6 7.4 9.0 10.5 14.3
Weight of debt (%) 89.4 7.9 85.6 89.4 91.0 92.6 94.4
Imp. per-share market value of assets ($) 215.6 200.4 67.1 108.1 156.9 256.0 373.3
Per-share market value of assets ($) 280.0 270.4 85.2 134.2 201.4 333.4 476.3
Price-to-strike ratio 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
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